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ABSTRACT

McCullough, Benjamin Patrick. M.A., International and Comparative Politics Program,
Wright State University, 2013. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: A Last Ditch Effort to
Turn Around a Failing War

As the United States moved closer to ending its military involvement in Afghanistan by
the end of 2014, intense debate on the relevance and success of the United States’
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in the country continues. Many observers have been
quick to declare the strategy a failure without fully analyzing the critical components of
COIN doctrine that are necessary for a campaign to succeed, and the extent to which
those components were in place in Afghanistan. This study examines the case of
Afghanistan by determining whether the U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy was
successful in achieving the four main objectives identified by FM 3-24 as necessary for
COIN’s success. This study also looks at whether or not the United States’ COIN strategy
was successful in generating and maintaining the public support needed to carry out a
prolonged counterinsurgency operation. By utilizing a mix of deductive logic based on
contemporary COIN theory and currently available scholarly resources, government
documents, and U.S. and ISAF military field reports, this study seeks to answer whether
the counterinsurgency strategy devised by Generals David Petraeus and Stanley
McChrystal was successful in achieving the four main objectives needed for the success
of this strategy in Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Back in 2001, the Taliban appeared to have been all but defeated. On October 7th,
2001, “the United States invaded Afghanistan in retaliation for the September 11th
attacks, and in a matter of months had overthrown the Taliban regime.” 1 In December
2001, Hamid Karzai had been appointed the interim Afghan president by a loya jirga
(grand council), and in January 2002 the international community had agreed to provide
extensive assistance to stabilize and rebuild the Afghan state. By mid-2002, U.S. SOF
forces were chasing the last remnants of the Taliban out of the country and hunting down
al Qaeda terrorists. 2 “Some individuals involved in the early months of Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) argued that it had revitalized the American way of war.” 3
Unfortunately, the war in Afghanistan soon became a sideshow to the war in Iraq
and “became hobbled by strategic drift, conflicting tactics, and too few troops.” 4 Since
2002, the United States has suffered over 2,335 Americans killed with many more
seriously injured. Thousands of Afghans have been killed as well. The U.S. “has also
spent close to $1 trillion trying to turn Afghanistan into a modern function state.” 5
Despite these efforts, Afghanistan continues to be plagued by Islamic extremism, tribal
rivalry, and a Taliban insurgency that has shown little or no sign of giving up.
1

Theo Farrel & Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004-2012.”
International Affairs (July 12, 2013), 845.
2
Donald P. Wright, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom
(Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 17.
3
Henry A. Crumpton, “Intelligence and War: Afghanistan 2001-2002,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence,
ed. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 177.
4
Nathaniel C. Fick, & John A. Nagl, “Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition,”
http://www.cnas.org/node/648 [accessed January 18 - January 12, 2009], 1.
5
Gian Gentile “America’s nation-building at Gunpoint,” Los Angeles Times, August 13, 2013.

1

Of the various strategies the United States has used in Afghanistan over the past
thirteen years, “the 2009 troop surge was by far the most ambitious and expensive.” 6
At the center of this Afghan surge was a protect-the-population counterinsurgency
(COIN) strategy promoted by Generals David Petraeus, Stanley McChrystal, and Admiral
Mike Mullen. “As recently as 2006, the country’s top generals were openly scorning
COIN as a concept; and then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld all but banned the
term’s utterance.” 7 Despite being enormously controversial both inside and outside the
defense and intelligence community, counterinsurgency soon became “enshrined as
Army doctrine, and promoted at the highest levels of the Pentagon.” 8 Much of this
fanfare was due to the belief that the counterinsurgency strategy promoted by General
Petraeus had helped to turn the tide in Iraq in 2007. 9
At the heart of this new doctrine is Field Manual 3-24, jointly published by the
U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. Directed by General David Petraeus, whose COIN
strategy is widely credited with pulling “Iraq from the abyss,” 10 this manual embraces a
model commonly referred to “clear, hold, and build.” This, in turn, “enables the
implementation of political, social, and economic programs designed to reduce the appeal
of the insurgency and ‘build’ the government’s legitimacy.” 11 Army FM 3-24 also argues
“that most active, passive, and potential supporters of an insurgency – whether they are
6

Karl W. Eikenberry “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan.” http://www.foreignaffa
irscom/print/136845 [accessed October 17 – September/October 2013], 1.
7
Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus.” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fredkaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus [accessed February 27 – February 12, 2013], 75.
8
Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 117.
9
Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus.” 75.
10
Nathaniel C. Fick, & John A. Nagl, “Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition,”
http://www.cnas.org/node/648 [accessed January 18 - January 12, 2009], 1.
11
Colin H. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm.” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63035/colin-hkahl/coin-of-the-realm [accessed April 19 – December 2007], 170.

2

ideological, ethnic, or religious in character – can be won over through the provision of security,
since citizens seek to ally with groups that can guarantee their safety.” 12

According to Colonel Paul Gentile (2013), Field Manual 3-24 has become the
most talked about, praised, and influential military doctrine in generations. 13
“A typical American reader strolling through the aisles of a Barnes & Noble
bookstore can sip a latte while perusing army doctrine.” 14
Shortly after its release in December 2006, FM 3-24 was downloaded from the Internet
more than 1.5 million times. 15 “Samantha Power, a special advisor to President Obama,
wrote a New York Times review of FM 3-24 in 2007, wherein she characterized the
doctrine as a ‘21st Century strategy.” 16 The University of Chicago also published a public
edition that has a written endorsement from General Petraeus, who remarks that this
manual is surely “on the bedside table of the President, Vice President, and the Secretary
of Defense and according to the general, deserves a place on the bedside table of every
American too.” 17
Reinforced by retired four-star general Jack Kean and influential civilian analysts
such as Frederick and Kimberly Kagan, Generals Petraeus, McChrystal and Admiral
Mullen “confidently pointed to Field Manual 3-24 as the authoritative playbook for
success in Afghanistan.” 18 When President Obama outlined his new Afghanistan strategy
and ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops during a speech at the United
States Military Academy at West Point, New York on December 1, 2009, “the Pentagon
12

U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1-108.
Gian Gentile “America’s nation-building at Gunpoint,” Los Angeles Times, 1.
14
Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: The New
Press), 2.
15
Ibid., 2.
16
Ibid., 2.
17
University of Chicago Press, The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
(Chicago, The University of Chicago Press), xliii
18
Karl W. Eikenberry “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan,” 1.
13

3

was successful in ensuring that the major tenets of COIN doctrine were also incorporated
into the revised operation plan.” 19
The stated aim of this strategy was to “protect key parts of southern Afghanistan
from Taliban advances: once that mission was completed, they would swing east to
pacify areas around Kabul.” 20 This “clear, hold, and build” strategy would also
“provide valuable time to expand the Afghan army, disburse reconstruction
assistance and create – in conjunction with the State Department – local
governments in places where there had been very little government influence,
reasoning that generating Afghan-led security and indigenous civil administration
would convince people to stop supporting the insurgency.” 21
Thus, with continuous outside efforts, supporters of the strategy argued, “the capacity of
the Afghan government would steadily grow, the levels of U.S. and international
assistance would decline, and the insurgency would eventually be defeated.” 22
Between the years 2010 to 2012 the strategy is credited for inflicting heavy losses
and pushing the Taliban out of large stretches of southern Afghanistan. At the same time
the United States and international community “poured billions of dollars into short-term
reconstruction projects, while accelerating the development of the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF).” 23 Despite these efforts, Afghanistan continued to experience
floundering reconstruction and widespread misgovernance. Moreover, the Taliban’s
capability to carry out high profile attacks throughout most of the country showed that the
insurgency not only survived the surge, but by some indicators had emerged even
stronger. Thus, there was little fanfare from the White House or Pentagon when the last
19

Ibid., 1.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “The Afghan Surge is Over,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/25
/the_afghan_surge_is_over [accessed April 24-September 25, 2012], 1.
21
Frances Z. Brown, “Taking Stock of the Surge.” http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/26/taking
/ _stock_of_the_surge_from_the_bottom_up [accessed January 20 – September 26, 2012], 4.
22
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “The Afghan Surge is Over,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/25
/the_afghan_surge_is_over [accessed April 24-September 25, 2012], 1.
23
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan, 37.
20

4

of the 30,000 surge troops sent overseas four years ago were withdrawn in September
2012. 24 Instead of issuing some grand proclamation of success, the job fell to thenDefense Secretary Leon Panetta during a visit to New Zealand to announce that the last
the of the surge troops dispatched by President Obama had left Afghanistan. 25
With a majority of U.S. and NATO troops withdrawing in 2014, and the Obama
administration indicating that the U.S. military will no longer be built for large-scale,
counterinsurgency operations, many military observers, politicians, and critics have been
quick to declare COIN a failure in Afghanistan and a strategy that has no role in future
conflicts involving the United States. 26 “For a military built on avoiding casualties with
quick, decisive victories, many believe counterinsurgency veers far too close to nationbuilding and other political tasks that soldiers are ill equipped to handle.” 27 According to
Karl W. Eikenberry (2011), it is
“sheer hubris to think that American military personnel without the appropriate
language skills and with only a superficial understanding of Afghan culture
could, on six-or 12-month tours, somehow deliver to Afghan villages
everything asked of them by FM 3-24. The typical 21-year old marine is hardpressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law; can he really be
expected to do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal elder?” 28
Other critics of the Afghan COIN strategy attack it as “cynically justifying the United
States’ continued presence in Afghanistan – neocolonialism dressed up in
PowerPoint.” 29
In many cases, Coalition operations “are seen as intrusive, unjustified, or using

24

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “The Afghan Surge is Over,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/25
/the_afghan_surge_is_over [accessed April 24-September 25, 2012], 4
25
Craig Whitlock, “Final ‘surge’ troops leave Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, September 20,2012
26
J. Dana Stuster, “To COIN or Not?” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/18/to_coin_or_not
[accessed October 17-March 18, 2013], 2.
27
Ibid. 2.
28
Karl W. Eikenberry “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan.” 3.
29
Fick & Nagl, “Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Ed”, 1.

5

excessive force; they caused some 2,500 civilian deaths between 2007 and 2010.” 30
Moreover, these operations are seen by many as expanding the authority of a predatory,
illegitimate government. 31 A final argument made by COIN critics is that although the
Taliban suffered heavy losses in Afghanistan, they continue to remain active and have
expanded their presence in the eastern and northern parts of the country. 32 According to
the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF], “insurgents launched more than twice
as many attacks across the country in 2012 as they did in 2008 – an average of some 500
attacks per week.” 33
Despite these critiques, there are very few studies that have fully analyzed and
examined the critical components of COIN doctrine identified by FM 3-24 needed to win
a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Thus, what makes this study unique is that
it examines the case of Afghanistan by determining whether or not the United States was
successful in achieving the four main objectives identified by Field Manual 3-24 needed
for the surge and its accompanying COIN strategy to prevail in Afghanistan:
1. The United States needed to secure Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, while
gaining its support in cracking down on insurgent sanctuaries on its soil.
2. The United States had to win over the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan
people and in particular the Pashtun tribes.
3. The U.S. had to promote a more capable and stable Afghan National
Government.
30

Waldman, Matt. “System Failure: The Underlying Causes of U.S. Policy-Making Errors in Afghanistan.”
International Affairs (February 26, 2013): 825.
31
Ibid., 829.
32
Bing, West, Learning From Our Wrong Turn: Why American Counterinsurgency has Proved to be
Unworkable,” http://.www.nationalreview.com/article/356323/learning-our-wrong-turn-bing-west
[accessed October 17 – August 21, 2013], 2
33
Matt Waldman, “Taliban Qatar Office: A small Step Forward,” https://www.chathamhouse.org/media
/comment/view/192553 [accessed October 17-June 20. 2013], 2.

6

4. Afghanistan’s National Security Forces (ANSF) had to be ready and willing to
assume control of areas that been cleared of insurgents by American troops.
Therefore, the main research question to be addressed by this study is: “was the United
States’ counterinsurgency strategy successful in achieving the four main objectives
identified by Field Manual 3-24 needed to win in Afghanistan?”
Even though this research question will be the main focus of the paper, a list of
secondary questions are needed to help in determining whether or not the U.S. was
successful in meeting the four main objectives of the counterinsurgency strategy devised
by Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal. Proponents of the U.S. Afghan
counterinsurgency strategy with some merit have claimed that the experiment was too
little, too late because “an industrial-strength COIN approach was not rigorously applied
until eight years after the war began, and too little because even then, limits were placed
on the size and duration of the surge, making it more difficult to change the calculations
of Afghan friends and enemies.” 34 Thus, secondary questions to be addressed by this
study include:
1. Was the COIN strategy devised by Generals David Petraeus and Stanley
McChrystal and Admiral Mike Mullen fully implemented?
2. Was the United States able to achieve its primary objective of reversing the
Taliban’s momentum and training Afghanistan’s National Security Forces?
3. Was the U.S. able to promote a more capable and accountable Afghan
government?
4. Did the United States’ heavy reliance on Pakistan to reign in Afghan
insurgents and militants help or hinder the U.S. in its efforts to achieve the
34

Eikenberry, “The Limits of Counterinsurgency,” 2.

7

main objectives of its counterinsurgency strategy?
By utilizing a mix of deductive logic based on contemporary COIN theory and
currently available scholarly resources, government documents, military field manuals,
and U.S. & NATO military field reports, this study hypothesizes that the
counterinsurgency strategy promoted by General David Petraeus, General Stanley
McChrystal, and Admiral Mike Mullen was never fully implemented and this set the
mission up for only partial success. More importantly, this study also argues that the
population-centric strategy promoted by the military leadership was the wrong strategy to
implement in Afghanistan due to conditions on the ground.

8

CHAPTER II: THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN AMERICAN COIN THEORY: POSTVIETNAM TO IRAQ
The American Army of 2003 was organized, designed, trained, and equipped to defeat
another conventional army; indeed, it had no peer in that arena. It was, however,
unprepared for an enemy who understood that it could not hope to defeat the U.S. Army
on a conventional battlefield, and who therefore chose to wage war against America from
the shadows.
-LTC John Nagl
According to Thomas X. Hammes (2005), “insurgency has been the most
prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949.” 1 Thus, most Americans believe that
insurgency is a relatively modern phenomenon, invented by Mao Zedong and refined by
his adversaries. 2 In reality, “insurgencies have been around since the dawn of recorded
history, as have the means used to suppress them.” 3 That said, “the strategic significance
of insurgency has ebbed and flowed over time.” 4
Insurgency took on strategic significance at the beginning of the Cold War “as the
Soviet Union looked to insurgencies as an indirect means of weakening the West.” 5
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviets backed multiple insurgencies in Africa and
Latin America. Beginning in 1975, “Communist or Marxist regimes came to power in
South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen,

1

Thomas X. Hammes, “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks,” Military Review (2006), 19.
Steven Metz, “Counterinsurgency and American Strategy, Past & Future.” http://www.worldpolitics
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Grenada, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Suriname.” 6 However, with the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991, interest in insurgency declined as many Americans anticipated for them at
least, that “the scourge of war was no more.” 7 Unfortunately, the emergence of a fresh set
of conflicts and the September 11th terrorist attacks dashed this promise. With the 9/11
attacks, counterinsurgency once again took on strategic significance as terror groups such
as al Qaeda (AQ) hoped to use insurgency as a means of overthrowing hostile regimes
and replacing with ones that were more sympathetic to their cause. 8 Thus,
counterinsurgency once again became the centerpiece of U.S. defense policy and military
strategy.
For most of its history, “the U.S. has been mediocre in counterinsurgency
activities, if not actively hostile to the idea that it should even bother worrying about
them.” 9 These types of conflicts “seem utterly alien to those schooled in the history of
America’s big wars – which is to say virtually anyone interested in American military
history.” 10 The big wars, especially the Civil War and World War II, are celebrated in
numerous movies, books, and documentaries. As it happens, “these were America’s only
experiences in total war in which the nation staked all of its blood and treasure to achieve
the relatively quick and unconditional surrender of the enemy.” 11 Some historians,
military officials, politicians, and policy makers speak of an ‘American way of war: war
that “annihilates the enemy, war that relies on advanced technology and massive
6
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firepower to minimize casualties among U.S. forces; war that results in total victory.” 12
In the wake of the Vietnam War, “the Pentagon threw out the books on what they
termed ‘low-intensity conflict’ and chose to focus instead on the prospect of a major
conventional war with the Soviets.” 13 The Army, in particular, “went back to its preferred
focus on Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union and a possible high-end armored
battle in the Fulda Gap of Germany.” 14 According to Michael O’Hanlon (2011), the
Army’s “equipment purchases, force structure decisions, approaches to training and
institutional ethnos and culture remained focused almost entirely on classic maneuver
warfare. 15 The blitzkrieg victory in the 1991 Gulf War only reinforced this approach as
the United States and its allies quickly routed Saddam’s forces in less than 96 hours of
ground combat between February 24 and February 28, 1991. Even though Desert Storm
proved the U.S. military “was ready for heavy air-ground battle,” 16 it failed to
foreshadow the types of conflicts that the United States would soon be fighting.
Shortly after the Vietnam War, “counterinsurgency thought, theory, and practice
had been relegated to the special operations community, whose primary focus was on
small-scale nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency and unconventional
warfare.” 17 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. did participate in a string of small
wars in El Salvador, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. Despite the success the
U.S. achieved during the invasions of Grenada and Panama in the 1980s and the bombing
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of Libya in 1986, these campaigns were belittled as military operations other than war,
abbreviated as MOOTW. Pronounced moot-wah, “MOOTW was a doctrinal term used in
the 1990s by the American military to describe a large number of what they considered
non-traditional tasks.” 18
According to Janine David (2009), the Joint Publication for Operations 3-07:
Joint Doctrine for Operations Other than War, defined the term as:
“operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of
military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to
complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and
occur before, during, and after war.” 19
JP 3-07also goes on to explain “that these missions can be either combat or non-combat
and include missions as diverse as arms control, combating terrorism, support to counterdrug operations, COIN, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, etc.” 20
Even though a majority of today’s top military officers rose through the ranks
fighting these small wars, “the diverse range of operations included under the category of
MOOTW, combined with the military tradition of focusing primarily on major theater
warfare, led to a popular joke among officers that ‘MOOTW’ really means, ‘military
operations other than what we want to do.” 21 Moreover, during a meeting of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCOS), then-chairman of the JCOS General John Shalikashvili,
reportedly once muttered, “Real men don’t do mootwah.” 22
Thus, little counterinsurgency doctrine existed when the U.S. invaded
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Instead, the U.S. military continued to stick to its
18
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conventional biases as the George W. Bush administration came up with a “light
footprint” strategy designed to defeat the enemies and get out quickly to avoid getting
bogged down. Even though U.S. forces were very successful in overthrowing the
governments of the Taliban and of Saddam Hussein, the strategy soon “revealed its limits
as Iraq began unraveling shortly after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime.” 23
According to Peter Mansoor, “the shortage of U.S. ground forces, combined with
the disbanding of the Iraqi army by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer meant that there were
insufficient troops available to execute a counterinsurgency strategy that focused on the
protection of the Iraqi people.” 24 Instead, U.S. forces chose to focus on destroying
insurgent forces and their hideouts. 25 These operations did little to secure the population
as militants would return to areas recently cleared by U.S. forces once they returned to
their bases 26
Frustrated with Iraq’s deteriorating security conditions, General George Casey
pursued a totally different approach in the fall of 2004. Believing that U.S. forces were
now viewed as a “virus infecting Iraqi society,” 27 Casey chose to remove them from their
outposts in Iraqi cities and move them to large forward operations bases (FOBs) on the
outskirts. 28 Thus, the U.S. pursued a policy of handing over security responsibilities to
the newly created Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Unfortunately, “the lack of trained and ready Iraqi police and army units doomed
23
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this policy from the beginning.” 29 As U.S. and Coalition forces handed over
responsibility to ISF units and withdrew to their bases, “Sunni insurgents and Shi’ite
militias began taking control of large parts of Baghdad and other neighboring cities.” 30
Throughout 2004 and 2005, different factions such as Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army
and al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had built up their organizations and had begun setting up
death squads and checkpoints around their respective neighborhoods. 31 Sunni extremists
also “began using intimidation and other forms of ‘soft’ ethnic cleansing such as threats,
physical intimidation, blackmail, seizure of property, raids on homes and businesses,
checkpoints, kidnappings, and extortion to gain a foothold in Sunni areas throughout
Baghdad from where they could launch attacks on Shi’ite communities.” 32
Despite Coalition efforts, sectarian violence began to spread outside of Baghdad
in early 2006, making it the most violent year in Iraq since the U.S. invasion in March
2003. 33 On February 22nd, 2006, Sunni insurgents affiliated with AQI detonated multiple
explosives at the Al Askari Mosque effectively destroying its golden dome and severely
damaging the mosque. Within hours of the bombing, 30 Sunni mosques were attacked in
retaliation for the bombing. 34 “As the cycle of violence progressed, secular Sunnis and
Shiites, lacking genuine security from the government, came to support the sectarian
militias.” 35 This dynamic was “exacerbated by the U.S.’s steady transfer of power and
responsibility to the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government, despite obvious signs that the
29
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government was acting as a sectarian player in the vicious civil war.” 36
By the end of 2006, “there were well over 50 attacks and three car bombs per day
on average in Baghdad alone.” 37 U.S. troop deaths also increased to 3,003 and Iraqi
ethno-sectarian civilian deaths are estimated to have increased to more than 150,000. 38
According to counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen (2009), “between September
2006 and January 2007, civilian deaths peaked between 2,700 and 3,800 civilians killed
per a month, with December 2006 being by far the worst month as killings peaked at
around 125 per night, more than half of whom were people killed inside Baghdad city
limits.”39 Thus, by the end of 2006 it appeared that war in Iraq was all but lost as the
country teetered on the brink of a full-scale civil war. 40
In an attempt to counter the ongoing insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
the U.S. Military began work on a new COIN doctrine directed by Army general David
Petraeus and Marine Corps general James Mattis on February 23rd, 2006. The same day
that work began on the new COIN manual at Fort Leavenworth, -- Sunni insurgents had
detonated multiple explosives at the Golden Mosque, sending Iraq to the brink of civil
war and “giving Petraeus a greater sense of urgency.” 41 Petraeus had heard stirrings that
in a year’s time, he might be sent back to Iraq as the new U.S. commander there. 42 Thus,
“pushing the manual through a resistant army bureaucracy and corralling support for
COIN among opinion leaders now appeared vital not only to shifting the military’s
36
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broader view of warfare, but also to avoiding catastrophe in Iraq.” 43 To be able to
implement his strategy in Iraq, however, “he would need the cover of officially
sanctioned doctrine, which the field manual if accepted, would provide.” 44
Put together “by a writing team of academics, military strategists, human rights
lawyers, and journalists led by West Point history professor Conrad Crane,” 45 United
States Army and Marine Corps’ Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24/3-33.5)
embraces a model commonly referred to as “clear, hold, and build.” It directs the military
to support the “host nation” government in combating insurgents by “clearing” areas and
then to transition to a law enforcement model to “hold” them. 46 This, in turn, “enables the
implementation of political, social, and economic programs designed to reduce the appeal
of the insurgency and ‘build’ the government’s legitimacy.” 47
Army FM 3-24 also argues that “most active, passive, and potential supporters of
an insurgency – whether they are ideological, ethnic, or religious in character – can be
won over through the provision of security, since citizens seek to ally with groups that
can guarantee their safety.” 48 Thus, the “population, rather than the insurgent movement,
is the ‘center of gravity,’ 49 and the military’s primary objective is protecting the
population. Instead of patrolling in armored vehicles and being stationed on large bases,
soldiers must live side by side with the people they are protecting. 50 Moreover, the
military “must be ready to pick up the slack if civilian entities are slow to arrive, lack
43
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sufficient resources, or are incapable of conducting these activities in dangerous
environments.” 51
On December 16, 2006, the counterinsurgency doctrine manual that Generals
Petraeus and Mattis had labored so hard to produce was finally published, “giving the
U.S. military a new playbook for COIN operations and validating what many younger
officers were discovering mistake by mistake at the tactical levels in Iraq.” 52 Shortly after
the 2006 midterm congressional elections, “President George W. Bush initiated a formal
internal review of Iraq policy among his national security agencies to obtain policy
options on a way forward in Iraq.” 53 The congressional midterm elections of 2006 in
which the Democrats took control of Congress from the Republican Party were viewed as
a repudiation of the war. 54
On January 4, 2007, President Bush delivered his long awaited speech on Iraq,
The New Way Forward, during a primetime address. In the speech, Bush acknowledged
“that despite the 2005 national elections in Iraq and the formation of a new Iraqi national
unity government in 2006, Iraq had not made the security and political gains that he had
hoped for.” 55 Against this backdrop President Bush ordered a “surge” of 40,000 troops to
provide greater security in order to facilitate greater political reconciliation at the national
level. 56
Shortly after his confirmation hearing on January 23rd, 2007, General Petraeus
51
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went to see President Bush in the Oval Office. “Betting his presidency on the success of
the surge, Bush described the commitment of additional forces as a ‘double down’
strategy.” 57 Petraeus said it was more than that, according to a source briefed after the
meeting. “This isn’t double down, Mr. President. It’s all in,” Petraeus stated. 58 “And we
need the whole U.S. government to go all in, not just the military.” 59 At first, many
experts viewed the “surge” as a simple reinforcement of American forces. 60 However,
this new strategy was in fact a “comprehensive counterinsurgency approach, a civil
military campaign that featured a number of important elements.” 61
At the premise of this new COIN strategy was the idea that the Iraqi population
was the “center of gravity” that required protection. 62 According to Generals Petraeus
and Raymond T. Ordierno (commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq), this was necessary
“in order to prevent an escalating cycle of sectarian combat, and also to elicit support
from the population so that it would not provide large numbers of additional recruits to
the insurgencies.” 63 Another important component of the surge strategy was the “clear,
hold, and build” concept which became the operative practice during Petraeus’s time in
Iraq. As noted in FM 3-24, “U.S. forces could not kill or capture its way out of the
industrial-strength insurgency that confronted U.S. troops in Iraq.” 64 Hence, U.S. forces
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had “to identify those insurgents and militia members who were ‘reconcilable,’ and then
had to persuade them to become part of the solution in Iraq rather than a continuing part
of the problem.” 65
From January to June 2007, the surge forces gradually deployed to Iraq. Generals
Petraeus and Ordierno ordered U.S. units to deploy off their FOBs “to establish smaller
joint security stations and combat outposts in Iraqi neighborhoods and communities.” 66 In
conjunction with community leaders, “Coalition forces emplaced cement barriers to wall
off neighborhoods and markets to impede the movement of insurgents, militiamen, and
terrorists.” 67 Iraqi units under the supervision of U.S. advisors also manned numerous
checkpoints that made insurgent and terrorist movement more difficult and “provided
much-needed security to the Iraqi people to protect them from terrorist violence and
sectarian intimidation.” 68
The U.S. military also partnered with Iraqi security forces in supporting local
neighborhood watch groups nicknamed the “Sons of Iraq.” Despite having been created
in late 2006, the Awakening movement “could not have survived or spread without the
support of U.S. commanders and the Iraqi government.” 69 According to Peter Mansoor
(2013), “the arrival of U.S. reinforcements signaled renewed resolve and assured Sunni
tribal leaders that they would not be abandoned once they turned their guns against al
Qaeda-Iraq, as had happened once before.” 70 Many U.S. commanders were hesitant to
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support these groups at first because “most of them had American blood on their
hands.” 71 Moreover, many Shia leaders including Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki had
concerns over the spread of the movement into Baghdad and areas near predominantly
Shiite or mixed communities. 72 Thus, Maliki only allowed the United States to support
awakenings in strictly Sunni areas such as Anbar Province at first. 73
By the end of 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi government had more than 100,000 “Sons
of Iraq” (more than 20,000 of them Shi’ite) on their payroll. 74 The improved security and
the increase of Iraqi security forces by more than 140,000 troops along with their
improved capabilities, “emboldened Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to confront the Jaish
al-Mahdi militia and bring the vast majority of southern and central Iraq under Iraqi
government control.” 75 Another main component of the surge strategy that helped to
bolster the security gains made by U.S. and Iraqi forces was the intensive campaign of
targeted operations to capture or kill key insurgent and militia leaders and operatives by
U.S. and British Special Operations Forces. 76 Under the command of then-Lt. General
Stanley McChrystal, commander of the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
and the Counter-Terrorism Special Operations Task Force, U.S. and British SOF units
were “relentless in their pursuit of al Qaeda and other Sunni Arab extremist leaders,
bomb makers, financiers, and propaganda cells – and of key Iranian-supported Shi’ite
Arab extremists.” 77
By the end of 2007, as many as 10 to 15 targeted operations were being carried
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out a night, “removing from the battlefield a significant proportion of the senior and
midlevel extremist group leaders, explosives experts, planners, financiers, and organizers
in in Iraq.” 78 In less than a year civilian deaths had decreased by more than 70% as
violence in Iraq had declined by 85% from its peak at the end of 2006. 79 In the Baghdad
Security Districts specifically, “ethno sectarian attacks and deaths decreased by more
than 90 percent over the course of 2007.” 80
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CHAPTER III: FROM VICTORY TO THE BRINK OF DEFEAT: THE UNITED
STATES IN AFGHANISTAN 2001-2009
As for the United States’ future in Afghanistan, it will be fire and hell and total defeat, God
willing, as it was for their predecessors – the Soviets and before them, the British.
-Mullah Omar

At the beginning of 2002, it appeared the Taliban had all but been defeated. In the
previous three months “thousands had been killed by American bombs or wounded and
left to die in their burned-out pickup trucks as the Taliban proved to be little match for
overwhelming American firepower.” 1 According to U.S. intelligence estimates, over
3,000-4,000 Taliban fighters were killed during this timeframe. 2 With the fall of Kabul,
Kandahar, and other major cities, thousands more were captured by anti-Taliban militias
including the Northern Alliance. 3 Those who escaped death or capture fled to Pakistan 4.
Mullah Omar, with a handful of bodyguards, had gone underground, where he could
easily avoid the infrequent U.S. military sweeps. 5 Thus, the remnants of the Taliban who
were able to escape into Pakistan were initially a demoralized lot. 6
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Many senior figures, “including some of Mullah Omar’s chief lieutenants were
open to the possibility of reconciliation and abandoning the fight.” 1 In November 2002,
“the entire leadership, except for Mullah Omar, gathered in the city of Karachi, Pakistan
to discuss possible reconciliation with the Afghan government.” 2 This group included
“Tayeb Agha, at one point Mullah Omar’s top aide; Mullah Beradar, the movement’s
number two after the collapse of the Taliban regime, then already a powerful commander;
Sayed Muhammad Haqqani, the former ambassador to Pakistan; Mullah Obaidullah, the
defense minister; Mullah Abdul Razzak, the interior minister; and many others.” 3
According to Anand Gopal (2010), “at this juncture, these leading Taliban
members (as well as the rank and file) did not appear to view the government and its
foreign backers as necessitating a 1980s-type jihad.” 4 At the same time, Jalaluddin
Haqqani, one of the most important Taliban military commanders fighting the Afghan
government and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, sent his brother Ibrahim to Kabul to meet
with American and Afghan government officials to inquire about the possibility of
reconciliation. 5
Despite these overtures, neither the United States nor the Afghan government saw
any reason to engage with the Taliban as they considered them to be a spent force. 6
Instead, senior and mid-level Taliban “were hounded, a short-sighted tactic that helped to
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sow the first seeds of insurgency.” 7 Many Taliban leaders were double crossed, handed
over after being promised protection (such as Taliban deputy head of intelligence Abdul
Haq Waseq) and harassed in their homes. 8 Those detained or captured were usually
mistreated by U.S. and Afghan forces. Moreover, “family members of Taliban and tribal
elders fell victim to the abuses by individuals associated with the new interim
government and were alienated and sidelined.” 9 Thus, “the failure to grant amnesty to
Taliban figures who had abandoned the movement and accepted the new Afghan
government had repercussions far beyond the specific individuals targeted.” 10
Soon “a sense began to develop among those formerly connected to the regime,
from senior officials to rank-and-file fighters, that there was no place for them in the
post-2001 society.” 11 Believing that they lacked any other alternatives, many of those
detained and targeted began reaching out to the Taliban leadership that was regrouping
across the border in Quetta, Pakistan. 12 Leaders such as Tayeb Agha, Mullah Obaidullah,
and Mullah Beradar, “who were once open to the possibility of reconciliation, slipped
back into Pakistan and became leading figures in the movement’s resurgence.” 13
Many Afghans were initially supportive of the international intervention,
particularly as the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) promised positive changes
in their lives. 14 “Barbershops, DVD stores, and hairdressers began to appear throughout
Afghanistan as thousands of Afghans rushed out to get cell phones, radios, and television
7
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sets.” 15 Many Afghans were also very thankful for all of the aid and assistance being
provided by foreign aid workers as they helped to build new schools, hospitals, and
bridges. They also took advantage of new roads being built throughout the country. 16
Between 2002 and 2004, this attitude began to change “as many Pashtuns became
disenchanted with the ATA which was widely viewed as being controlled by the Panshiri
Tajik Faction that held the government’s key ministries of defense, interior, and foreign
affairs.” 17 Pashtun “suspicions and mistrust of the government were further heightened” 18
by the Afghan Transitional Government’s inability to protect Pashtuns from abuses being
carried out by insurgents and the various anti-Taliban militias. During the invasion the
United States “driven by immediate military objectives,” 19 entered alliances with a group
of warlords and anti-Taliban commanders that “captured state apparatus for personal
gain; warlords and semi-warlords often fought over shares of the state and monopolized
access to the government, foreign forces, and resources, including contracts with those
same forces.” 20 The U.S. unknowingly became a pawn used by their Afghan partners to
target their enemies.
Moreover, the new Afghan government, supported by the international
community, “was plagued by entrenched corruption and nepotism.” 21 According to
Transparency International on their rates of corruption in 2002, Afghanistan ranked 179th,
with only Somalia ranking lower. 22 Despite his pledges to combat corruption, Hamid
Karzai “did not support his anti-corruption squads when they attempted to arrest and
15

Ibid., 196.
Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan Declassified,” 196.
17
Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” 97.
18
Ibid., 98.
19
Alex Strick van Linschoten & Felix Keuhn, “Separating the Taliban from al Qaeda,” 8.
20
Alex Strick van Linschoten & Felix Keuhn, “Separating the Taliban from al Qaeda,” 8.
21
Ibid., 8.
22
Ian S. Livingston & Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” 23.
16

25

remove corrupt ministers and governors, especially those officials who were friends.” 23
In addition,” the underpaid Afghan National Police (ANP) earned a reputation for
demanding bribes which infuriated those they shook down and played into the hands of
the Taliban.” 24 Not surprisingly, Karzai began to appear weak and corrupt to many
Afghans who grew to despise corrupt politicians, judges, and police who represented the
local face of the Afghan government. 25 His appeal began to diminish in the West as well
as many foreign officials began referring to Afghanistan as “Corruptistan.” 26
Many Afghans were also becoming upset over the lack of international aid being
provided by the international community. 27 Despite the spending of millions of dollars, a
majority of Afghans continued to live in extreme poverty. According to Matt Waldman
(2008), “far too much aid has been prescriptive and driven by donor priorities rather than
responsive to evident Afghan needs and preferences.” 28 Moreover, the average aid going
to Afghanistan per person was $80, while postwar Bosnians, a far more advanced
European people, received $275.” 29 Yet, Afghanistan “was the poorest country in
Eurasia, with a life expectancy in the low 40s and one of the world’s highest infant
mortality rates.” 30
Finally, a big source of frustration and fuel for the insurgency “was the heavyhanded tactics of U.S. military operations in Pashtun areas of the country.” 31 Despite
warnings from many Afghan observers, such “hard-knock” operations continued to be
23
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standard procedure for several years, alienating much of the populace. 32 Meanwhile, the
leadership at CENTCOM continued to view the Afghan conflict “as one of
counterterrorism, not counterinsurgency, and conducted operations in the rural areas
accordingly.” 33 As one U.S. PRT leader commented, “Black Ops [Special Operations
counterterrorism forces] do more damage in my province in one night than I can undo in
six months.” 34
Taliban Resurgent: 2002-2008
Throughout the spring of 2002, the remnants of the Taliban that were able to
escape into Pakistan began preparations “to launch the insurgency that Mullah Omar had
promised during the Taliban’s last days in power.” 35 Commanders such as Mullah
Dadullah were sent to recruit new fighters from Pashtun villages in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan to launch a renewed “jihad” against the Afghan government and the U.S-led
coalition. Many Pakistani tribesmen from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) also joined the resistance as “small mobile training camps were established
along the border with Pakistan by al Qaeda and Taliban fighters to train recruits in
insurgent warfare and terrorist tactics.” 36
Upon reestablishing contact with his commanders, “Mullah Omar appointed a
ten-man council known as the Quetta Shura (QS) or the Rahbari Shura (Supreme Taliban
Shura) to coordinate strategy amongst the group.” 37 The QS consists of four regional
military councils located in Quetta, Peshawar, Miramshah, and Gerdi Jangal, and
32

Mark Sedra, “The Forgotten War Shows No Sign of Abating,” http://fpif.org/the_forgotten_war_
shows_ no_ sign_of_abating/ [accessed December 10 – April 1, 2003], 2.
33
Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy,” 97
34
Mark Sedra, “The Forgotten War Shows No Sign of Abating,” 2.
35
Griff Witte, “Afghanistan War, “2001-Present,” 2.
36
Ibid., 2.
37
Bill Roggio, “The Afghan Taliban’s Top Leaders,” http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/
the_ talibans _top _lea.php [accessed September 3 – February 23, 2010], 1.

27

includes ten committees: Military, Finance, Political Affairs, Culture and Information,
Interior Affairs, Prison and Refugees, Education Recruitment, Repatriation Committees,
and the Ulema Council. 38
Figure 1: Taliban Regional Military Councils

Source: Qazi, Shehzad H. “The Neo-Taliban,” p.7, http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/586_ISPU%20Report_
Neo%20Taliban_Qazi_WEB.pdf.

Mullah Omar also appointed four senior commanders to reorganize the fighters in
the southern provinces of Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul. 39 These were Mullah
Baradar Akhund, Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Usmani, Mullah Dadullah, and Mullah
Abdul Razzaq. “All four men had close links to bin Laden and were known for their
belief in global jihad.” 40 In case he was captured or killed, Mullah Omar also appointed
Usmani as his successor. 41
In Afghanistan’s eastern Pashtun provinces the Taliban’s was headed by Saif urRahman Mansur, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani. They operated out
38

Ibid.,1.
Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: How the War Against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Central Asia, (Penguin Books Limited, 2008), 241.
40
Shehzad H. Qazi, “The Neo-Taliban, Counterinsurgency & the American Endgame in Afghanistan,”
http://www .ispu.org/pdfs/586_ispu%20report_neo%20taliban_qazi_web.pdf [accessed December
– February 2011], 7.
41
Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, 241.
39

28

of Miramshah, in North Waziristan, one of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In
the 1980s, Haqqani was a major recipient of CIA money and arms routed through the
ISI. 42
After 9/11, “the ISI promoted Haqqani as a possible moderate Taliban, and he
visited Islamabad under ISI protection to talk to the CIA, just before the U.S. invasion in
October 2001.” 43 During the invasion, the ISI asked the U.S. not to bomb Haqqani’s
tribal home of Khost, “saying that a deal with him was still possible, but Haqqani was a
firm believer in al Qaeda.” 44 In 2002, U.S. SOF made at least three attempts to kill him,
including bombing a mosque near his home, “an attempt that killed seventeen people-but
he always seemed to be well tipped off before any U.S. attacks.” 45
Figure 2: Taliban Insurgent Groups

Source: Qazi, Shehzad H. “The Neo-Taliban,” p.7, http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/586_ISPU%20Report_

The Taliban received another boost when the Iranian government allowed
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to leave his exile in Meshed, Iran. “Hekmatyar and his group
Hizb-i-Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG) received extensive U.S. support against the Soviet Union,
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but turned against its mujahedin colleagues after the Communist government fell in
1992.” 46 The Taliban displaced HIG as the main opposition to the 1992-1996 Rabbani
government. 47 After secret talks with the ISI in Dubai, Hekmatyar returned to
Afghanistan or Peshawar, Pakistan in February 2002. 48 Shortly after returning to
Afghanistan, the ISI allowed Hekmatyar to set up a base in the sprawling Shamshatoo
refugee camp outside Peshawar, “where many of his former fighters lived.” 49 He became
an ally of the Taliban and al Qaeda, “yet never fully merged with either unit.” 50
Throughout the fall and winter of 2002, hundreds of Taliban and foreign fighters
began the long and dangerous journey back into Afghanistan. According to Ahmed
Rashid (2008), the Taliban did not just slip back across the border in the winter of
2002/2003; “they arrived in droves, by bus, taxi, and tractor, on camels and horses, and
on foot.” 51 The Taliban also began to move weapons, ammunition, and food supplies in
Afghanistan, adding to those stockpiles that they had stored away during their retreat in
2001. U.S. and Afghan forces began increasingly to unearth caches of new weapons. “In
November alone they uncovered 475 large and small weapons caches. In one cache,
2,100 brand new AK 47 rifles were discovered along with 70,000 mortar shells and
43,000 rockets.” 52
Between 2004 and 2006, “Afghan groups developed a close relationship with
Iraqi insurgent groups, who provided information on making and using various kinds of
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remote-controlled devices and timers.” 53 According to Brian Glyn Williams (2008), U.S.
military leaders “noticed an increase in the use of Iraq-style IEDs in Afghanistan at this
time” 54 as Islamic militants in Iraq “furnished information through the internet and faceto-face visits to the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent groups.” 55
By 2006, “a full-bodied insurgency had developed in Afghanistan as the Taliban
stepped up attacks with IEDs, and suicide bombers, as well as assassinations and
kidnappings.” 56 According to Seth G. Jones, “the overall number of insurgent-initiated
attacks increased by 400 percent from 2002 to 2006, and the number of deaths from these
attacks increased more than 800 during the same period.” 57 Many of the attacks were
against Afghan government officials, though others targeted civilians and Coalition
forces. “The number of suicide attacks also quadrupled, remotely detonated bombings
more than doubled, and armed attacks nearly tripled.” 58
As the demands of combat grew, “differences between NATO allies over
‘caveats’ – restrictions placed by some European governments on the activities in which
their troops were authorized to engage –became rancorous.” 59 According to David
Auerswald and Stephen Saideman (2009), “there are between fifty and eighty known
restrictions that constrain NATO commanders in Afghanistan.” 60 However, the number
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of informal and unstated caveats is not known. 61 At least “one nation may not deploy its
troops at night. At least one country’s force was not allowed to participate in missions
alongside the troops from a historical rival.” 62 Some U.S. soldiers began referring to
ISAF by a range of derogatory names such as “I Suck at Fighting,” “I Saw Americans
Fighting,” “I Sunbathe at FOBS.” 63 “The latter was a reference to the small, heavily
fortified forward operating bases established in rural areas.” 64
Moreover, commanders on the ground “were contending with unrealistic demands
from their capitals to promote reconstruction and development, which they were unable
to execute because of the growing insurgency, and the absence of aid officials, who were
deterred by the lack of security.” 65 American commanders had “access to substantial
amounts of money that they could direct towards reconstruction projects, and were able
to use these funds to advance tactical goals, but improvements that were made often
could not be sustained.” 66
Frustrated with continued violence, in 2007, NATO settled on a more integrated
strategy involving pre-emptive combat and improved governance. 67 During 2007, U.S.
and ISAF forces, “bolstered by the infusion of 3,200 U.S. troops and 3,800
NATO/partner forces, pre-empted an anticipated Taliban ‘spring offensive’ with
Operation Achilles (March 2007) to expel militants from the Sangin district of northern
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Helmand Province and the area around the key Kajaki dam.” 68 The Taliban “spring
offensive” did not materialize. 69 The operations (including Operation Silicon), had a
major success on May 12, 2007, “when the purportedly ruthless leader of the Taliban
insurgency in the south, Mullah Dadullah, was killed by British Special Forces during a
raid on a compound in the volatile Helmand province.” 70
To address “the widespread perception that the U.S. and NATO war effort in
Afghanistan was failing,” 71 the Bush administration concluded in early 2008 that the
United States needed to focus more attention and resources on the Afghan situation than
it had previously. 72 Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Mike Mullen largely
confirmed the view that the Afghan war was “under-resourced” in his December 11, 2007
testimony in which he stated that, in Iraq, “the United States does what it must, while in
Afghanistan, the United States does what it can.” 73 Thus, in the first five months of 2008,
the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan increased by over 80% with a surge of 21,643
more troops, bringing the total number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan from 26,607 in
January to 48,250 in June. 74
By the end of 2008, there were over 65,000 U.S. and NATO troops in
Afghanistan. 75 In another significant move, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
“approved a plan to place almost all U.S. troops, including those performing OEF anti68
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insurgent missions, under General David McKiernan’s NATO/ISAF command, in order
to create unity of command, and to improve flexibility of deployment of U.S. forces
throughout the battlefield.” 76
Despite these changes in U.S. and NATO strategy, support for the Taliban
continued to grow as the group regained most of the territory it had lost in 2001.
According to testimony provided by then-Director of National Intelligence Mike
McConnell to the Senate, “by the end of 2008, the Karzai government controlled only
30% of the country, while the Taliban controlled 10%, and tribes and local groups
controlled the remainder.” 77 Like the mujahideen during the Afghan-Soviet war, the
Taliban controlled the countryside while the government controlled the towns. 78
Moreover, “3,276 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) detonated or were
detected before blowing up in Afghanistan in 2008. 79 This was a 45% increase compared
to 2007.” 80 The number of troops killed by bombs also more than doubled in 2008 from
75 to 161. 81 “The number of Taliban-related incidents per day also jumped by almost 50
percent, as Afghanistan experienced 18.4 attacks per day in 2008 compared to 12.4 in
2007.” 82 Thus, by the end of 2008 a new strategy was needed to pull Afghanistan back
from the brink of failure.
A New Strategy is Needed: January-December 2009
When President Obama took office in January 2009, domestic opinion in the
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United States and Europe was turning against the war. “High unemployment rates and
budget cutbacks at home, coupled with the deteriorating security in Afghanistan and
Hamid Karzai’s flawed August 2009 reelection, soured Americans on the huge
investment Washington had made in the Afghan war.” 83 Over a thousand U.S. soldiers
had been killed, thousands more wounded, and $120.9 billion had been spent since
2001. 84 “Many questioned whether it was worth sacrificing more lives and money on the
deadlocked eight-year-long conflict." 85 A poll conducted three months after Obama’s
inauguration on April 25, 2009, showed that only 43 percent of Americans thought the
Afghan war was worth fighting. 86 “The disappointing trends in Afghanistan suggested
that the percentage of Americans opposing the Afghan war would only grow.” 87
During the 2008 Presidential Election, “then-Senator Barack Obama repeatedly
said the real front of the war against terrorists was on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
and not in Iraq.” 88 Moreover, he believed “that the war in Afghanistan had been underresourced and marginalized in the five years since the invasion of Iraq.” 89 Having
campaigned on ending the war in Iraq, the new administration was aware that, within a
year, the American public and media would consider the Afghan war “Obama’s war.” 90
Thus, Obama and his cabinet needed to come up with a strategy that would break the
Taliban’s momentum, and produce success before the 2012 general elections.
Shortly after being sworn in, Obama immediately dispatched 17,000 more troops
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to add to the 36,000 Americans already deployed in Afghanistan, and ordered a strategy
review of the conduct of the war. Picked to lead this review was Bruce Riedel, a retired
CIA analyst “who possessed a deep knowledge of terrorist groups in Afghanistan and
Pakistan and had recently published a book about al Qaeda in South Asia.” 91 Upon
arriving in Washington, Riedel and his team immediately began work on coming up with
policy recommendations for the review which soon became known as “AfPak.”
Findings from the AfPak review started to become public on March 27th as
Obama stated that the core goal of any new U.S. strategy would be to “disrupt, dismantle,
and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan.” 92 Other recommendations made by
the Riedel review included “the need to shift strategic focus to Pakistan—a country with
a Muslim population of 180 million, an increasingly volatile and destructive insurgency
of its own, and a military with an ever-growing number of nuclear weapons.” 93 At the
same time, “progress in Afghanistan was clearly linked to progress in Pakistan and vice
versa.” 94 Thirdly, the review did not set the defeat of the Taliban as an objective. Rather,
“it said that the Taliban’s momentum must be reversed.” 95 In order to achieve these
objectives, Riedel and his team argued that a fully resourced civil-military
counterinsurgency strategy was needed. 96
On May 11th, President Obama made another unexpected move by firing General
David McKiernan, then the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan. 97 Believing
“that a new commander was needed to implement the administration’s new AfPak
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strategy,” 98 Obama followed the advice of Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff by appointing Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the former commander of Special
Operations in Iraq. Even though the president had only met the general briefly and knew
very little about him, “the Pentagon believed that McChrystal was the right man for the
job due to his unique skill set in counterinsurgency.” 99
“Having embraced counterinsurgency doctrine “with the zeal of a convert,” 100
McChrystal was “determined to place his personal stamp on Afghanistan.” 101 Upon
arriving in Kabul in June 2009, “McChrystal and his team set about changing the culture
of ISAF by banning alcohol on all NATO bases, kicking out Burger King and other
symbols of American excess, and threatening to turn the one piece of greenery at NATO
headquarters in Kabul into a shooting range.” 102 Even though few could argue with the
appointment of Stanley McChrystal and the policy recommendations made by the Riedel
review, many felt that the central “CT versus COIN” debate was far from being fully
resolved. Thus, months of political wrangling lay ahead on what strategy the Obama
administration should implement. 103
The McChrystal Assessment
One of the most important options being considered by the Obama administration
during the fall of 2009 was a classified 66-page assessment written by General Stanley
McChrystal on the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. “Seen by many as a
searing indictment of American-led NATO military operations and a corrupt Afghan
98
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civilian government, pitted against a surprisingly adaptive and increasingly dangerous
insurgency,” 104 McChrystal’ s report and recommendations met both support and
criticism when delivered to senior policy makers on August 30.
Even though the assessment was conducted in response to a formal directive
issued by SECDEF Gates on June 26, 2009,
“many White House officials, including Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel and senior
political advisor David Axelrod, saw it as a brazen attempt to reopen the ‘COIN
versus CT’ debate in order to influence the resourcing for a much broader
population-centric COIN campaign that moved Afghanistan back to the
centerpiece of the overarching strategy.” 105
Moreover, these officials believed that the “military was trying to box the president in
and force him to commit to significant troop increases in Afghanistan." 106
Despite these suspicions, “very few could argue with the report’s findings which
warned that Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the nearterm (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome
where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” 107 The assessment also offers a
harsh critique of the Afghan government, arguing that corruption is as much a threat to
Afghanistan as the insurgency is. 108 “The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of
power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and
ISAF’s own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government.” 109 The
result has been a “crisis of confidence among Afghans,” McChrystal writes. “Further, a
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perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against
the insurgents.” 110
General McChrystal is equally critical of the U.S. led NATO military alliance that
he had led since June 15. According to him, the key weakness of U.S. and Coalition
forces is that they are not defending the Afghan population aggressively enough.
“Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner
that distances us – physically and psychologically – from the people we seek to
protect … The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.
ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in the local communities, nor
how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and
criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population.” 111
The general also notes that “coalition intelligence-gathering has focused on how to
attack insurgents, hindering ISAF’s comprehension of the critical aspects of Afghan
society.” 112
At the end of his report, McChrystal outlines a plan to implement a fully
resourced population-centric counterinsurgency strategy that would reverse the Taliban’s
momentum and allow the Afghan government to control these contested territories. 113 He
also makes one last plea that his command must be bolstered if failure is to be averted.
"ISAF requires more forces," 114 he states. “Failure to provide adequate resources also
risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, high overall costs, and ultimately, a critical loss
of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to result in mission failure.” 115
The public airing of a leaked copy of General McChrystal’ s analysis on
September 21 by Bob Woodward of the Washington Post did not come at a good time for
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the Obama administration. 116 Afghans had just gone to the polls a month earlier on
August 20th and “the election was seen by many as flawed, manipulated, and
illegitimate.” 117 Thus, the election raised serious questions as to whether or not there was
a legitimate Afghan government for the United States to support.
The 2009 Strategy Review: The Afghan Surge
The remainder of the fall of 2009 would be used for the second major Afghan
strategy review of the year. The president and the NSC staff directed the review. The
purpose of these review sessions was to debate the pros and cons of a fully-resourced
counterinsurgency campaign versus counterterrorism-centric. 118 There was also a third
strategy called “counterterrorism plus,” by its strongest proponent Vice President Joe
Biden. 119 The issue of troop levels remained undecided throughout this period as well. 120
The first meeting with the president took place on September 13th as Obama
posed a series of questions:
“Does America need to defeat the Taliban in order to defeat al Qaeda as well?
Can a counterinsurgency strategy work in Afghanistan given the problems with its
government? If the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan would a nucleararmed Pakistan be next?”121
This skepticism was reinforced by Vice President Biden, who expressed opposition to an
expansive strategy requiring a big troop increase. 122
Instead, Biden proposed an alternative strategy dubbed “counterterrorism plus.” 123
This approach boiled down to retaining the massive American bases at Bagram and
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Kandahar, which would allow SOF teams to raid anywhere in the country, improving the
quality of training Afghan forces and expanding reconciliation efforts to peel off some
Taliban fighters. The problem with this plan was that “it did not clarify how such a
policy would substantially differ from what George W. Bush’s policy of maintaining a
light footprint approach and pursuing a counterterrorism mission.” 124
According to Bob Woodward’s 2010 book, Obama’s Wars, the vice chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General James Cartwright), went behind the back of his boss
Admiral Mike Mullen “who despised the counterterrorism option.” 125 Against Mullen’s
objections, Cartwright worked up numbers for Biden that “showed that it would take an
additional twenty thousand soldiers to execute counterterrorism plus: half of them Special
Forces to hunt insurgents, and half of them trainers to build up the Afghan army.” 126 The
president never seemed to have seriously considered this approach. 127
Tensions between the military and the Obama administration reached a new high
on October 1, when General McChrystal made it clear during a public appearance that he
“believed a policy in Afghanistan that focused largely on counterterrorism, Biden’s
preferred option, would lead to failure.” 128 He also said that “success required a fullblown counterinsurgency strategy.” 129 White House officials were furious upon learning
about the statement as “National Security Advisor, Jim Jones, shortly called Admiral
Mullen after learning about the comments and told him that McChrystal’s speech was
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insubordinate and stupid.” 130 The president quickly “summoned McChrystal to Denmarkwhere he was receiving the Nobel Peace Prize at the time – and gave the general what
one can only assume was something of a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment.” 131
The episode “underscored the uneasy relationship between the military and a new
president, who aides said, was determined not be as deferential as he believed his
predecessor, George W. Bush, was for years in Iraq.” 132 The military on the other hand,
“needed to adjust to a less experienced but a more skeptical commander in chief.” 133 The
military also saw “Obama in the same light as his democratic predecessor in the White
House, Bill Clinton, a lightweight on foreign policy with no real understanding of warfighting.” 134 Moreover, commanders such as David Petraeus trusted very few of Obama’s
civilian political advisors, especially senior political advisor David Axelrod, who they
believed to be “a complete spin doctor.” 135
On October 9th, President Obama and his national security team began to review
the troop levels proposed by General McChrystal that would be needed to reverse the
Taliban’s momentum. 136 The first option was “a further eleven thousand trainers to build
up the Afghan army; the second option was forty thousand more soldiers through 2013;
and the last an additional 85,000.” 137 McChrystal, Petraeus, and Mullen all understood
that the first and third options were not going to go over well. 138 “The first did not suffice
to make much of a difference in disrupting the Taliban, while the third was politically out
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of the question.” 139 As before, many White House officials were skeptical and had many
misgivings about send more American forces to Afghanistan. 140 According to Peter
Baker of the New York Times, one senior official asked in an interview: “Why wasn’t
there a 25 number. He then answered his own question: It would have been too
tempting.” 141 Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, the point person at the National Security
Council for Afghanistan under both Bush and Obama, is quoted as saying that “I can’t
tell you that the prospect here for success is very high.” 142
The only members of the president’s national security team that seemed in favor
of a counterinsurgency strategy and a large increase of American forces was Robert
Gates and Hillary Clinton. According to one member of McChrystal’s inner circle,
“Hillary had Stan’s back during the strategic review.” 143 Like Clinton, Secretary Gates
was also sympathetic to General McChrystal’s request. Initially, “Gates was skeptical of
any troop increase, but two things had changed his mind by late summer.” 144 The first
was an article in The Weekly Standard called “We’re Not the Soviets in Afghanistan,”
written by Fred Kagan (who had made the case for the surge in Iraq). 145 In his article,
Kagan noted that the Soviets had rolled in with brute force, their arsenals contained no
precision weapons, and their soldiers had no experience in COIN. 146 The second was the
66-page classified report written by McChrystal. 147
On October 22nd, the National Security Council produced a ‘consensus memo,’
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that concluded that “the United States should focus on diminishing the Taliban
insurgency, but not destroying it; building up certain critical ministries; and transferring
authority to Afghan security forces.” 148 With still no consensus on the number of troops
that should be sent to Afghanistan, Obama met with Sectaries Clinton and Gates on
October 26th to gauge their feelings about a possible troop surge. Both of them expressed
support for General McChrystal’s request for 40,000 troops or something close to it.
Despite Clinton’s and Gates’s support for a fully-resourced counterinsurgency strategy,
Obama remained wary of committing a significant number of troops. 149
Four days later on October 30th, Obama met with the Joint Chiefs and emphasized
the need for speed to break the Taliban’s momentum. “Why can’t I get the troops in
faster he asked? ” 150 If they were going to do this, he concluded, “it only made sense to
do this quickly, to have impact and keep the war from dragging on forever.” 151 Having an
a better idea of what the president was asking for, Secretary Gates began coming up with
a plan that would make up the differences in the number of troops to be sent to
Afghanistan and for how long they would be deployed there. 152 The plan, called Option
2A was presented to Obama on November 11 and gave McChrystal the bulk of his
request.” 153 Upon learning of this option, the president reportedly complained that it
would take too long to get the troops in Afghanistan. “What I’m looking for is a surge.
This has to be a surge.” 154
This statement represented a stark contrast from when Obama was a senator. In
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2007, then-Senator Obama staunchly opposed President Bush’s buildup in Iraq and
questioned the effectiveness of a COIN based strategy in Iraq. Thus, “the president was
hoping that the same strategy that helped to save Iraq led by the same general (Petraeus)
could once again snatch strategic victory from the jaws of defeat, this time in
Afghanistan.” 155 However, unlike the Bush plan, Mr. Obama wanted from the start to
speed up a withdrawal as well.
By the beginning of November, the idea of some sort of time frame was starting
to take on momentum. 156 Shortly before Hamid Karzai’s inauguration to a second term,
Secretary of State Clinton met with him to suggest that he use his speech to outline a
schedule for taking over security of the country. 157 Upon hearing about this suggestion,
Karzai was “more than enthusiastic.” 158 On the evening of November 23rd, the president
gathered his team to present a revised version of Option 2A, this one titled “Max
Leverage,” pushing 30,000 troops into Afghanistan by mid-2010 and beginning to pull
them out by July 2010. “As a quid pro quo for securing a substantial troop increase,
Obama told military officials that they had to get troops in Afghanistan quickly and out
before the 2013 drawdown date they had originally proposed.” 159 The July 2011
withdrawal date was also designed by Obama officials “to send a signal to the American
public that the commitment to Afghanistan was not an open-ended one.” 160
Upon learning about this revised plan, many Pentagon officials, including
Petraeus and McChrystal, had misgivings about setting a time frame for withdrawal,
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“fearing that it would be used by Taliban leaders to boost their fighters’ morale.” 161 Thus,
Secretary Gates countered with a “withdrawal” date of July, 2011 to bridge over the
differences between the Pentagon and the White House. 162
Most of the president’s advisors and military staff concurred with the plan. The
only one to have deep reservations about it was Joe Biden, who once again expressed
skepticism about any plan that required more troops. On November 29, Obama
summoned his national security team to the White House to announce his decision.
Having finally decided on a strategy, the president announced that he would send 30,000
troops as quickly as possible, and then begin the withdrawal in July 2011. “In deference
to Gates’s concerns, the pace and endpoint of the withdrawal would be determined by
conditions at the time.” 163 Having secured the support of his advisors, Obama then called
General McChrystal and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry to make them aware of his
decision.
Two days later on December 1, 2009, Obama finally announced his decision
during a speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. In his
33-minute address, the president set out a strategy that would send thirty thousand
additional troops to Afghanistan to reverse Taliban gains in large parts of the country,
increase the pressure on Afghan authorities to build its own military capacity and a more
effective government, and step up attacks on al Qaeda in Pakistan. 164 He also delivered a
pointed message to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, saying, “the days of providing a
blank check are over and that the United States could not afford and should not have to
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shoulder an open-ended commitment.” 165 Thus, Obama, vowed to start bringing
Americans troops home during the fall of 2011.
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CHAPTER IV: SECURING AFGHANISTAN’S POPULATION AND BORDERS
“You can surge troops, but you can't surge trust.” – MG Larry D. Nicholson

One of the main goals of the counterinsurgency strategy implemented by Generals
Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus was to win over the “hearts and minds” of the
Afghan people by securing the population. According to FM 3-24, counterinsurgency is a
contest between insurgents and the government for control and the support of the
population. 1 One of the “manual’s core assumptions is that the main challenge facing
counterinsurgents is not killing their opponents, but rather finding them in the first
place.” 2 Thus, counterinsurgent forces must win over the support of the people and
“protect any informants who come forward with information that is useful in locating the
enemy.” 3
In order to protect the population, counterinsurgents must be able to control key
terrain, “both natural and man-made, in and around major urban areas, as well as the
border regions between neighboring countries.” 4 Counterinsurgents must also be able to
achieve increased levels of security and isolate enemy forces. 5 Unfortunately, there is no
simple metric or easy way for determining the number of troops needed to win a
counterinsurgency campaign.
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Upon review, “Field Manual 3-24 recommends that force requirements should be
measured in terms of “troop density”, or the ratio between counterinsurgents and local
inhabitants in the area of operations (AO).” 1 According to Paragraph 1-67 of FM 3-24,
“No predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures
success in [counterinsurgency] . . . . A better force requirement gauge is troop
density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police
forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density
recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every
1,000 residents in an [area of operations]. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000
residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective
[counterinsurgency] operations; however, as with any fixed ratio, such
calculations remain very dependent on the situation.” 2
Based off this ratio, a counterinsurgent force of 725,000 troops would be needed to
secure Afghanistan’s population of 29 million people. 3 This is a number five times higher
than the number of troops on the ground during the peak of the surge in the summer of
2011. 4
At first look, it would appear that the U.S. COIN strategy implemented by
Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus does not meet the minimum troop
density level requirements recommended by FM 3-24. However, as mentioned above,
“any fixed troop ratio remains very dependent on the situation.” 5 Factors such as the
security situation on the ground, available manpower & resources, and availability of
native security forces can help offset the number of troops needed to secure the
population. 6 Using FM 3-24 as a guideline, the beginning part of this chapter will
compare troop density levels before, during, and after the surge to determine whether the
1

Jeffrey A. Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency,” 7.
Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency,” http://strategic
studies institute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/09winter/goode.pdf [accessed January 20 –
Winter 2009-2010], 46.
3
Hugh D. Blair “Challenges With Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan,”8.
4
Jeffrey A. Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency,” 560.
5
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1-68.
6
Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency,” 49.
2

49

U.S.’s counterinsurgency and accompanying surge strategy satisfy the minimum troop
density level requirements advocated by FM 3-24.
This chapter will also compare troop density levels before, during, and after the
surge to those of other recent counterinsurgency campaigns to see where Afghanistan
places among the operations that succeeded and those that did not. Since current U.S.
doctrine on force requirements is based off recent American and European COIN and
nation-building operations, 7 this study utilized the 22 case studies used by James
Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, and et. in their 2008 study, Europe’s Role in Nation-Building:
From the Balkans to the Congo. The first volume compares inputs and outcomes for eight
U.S.-led nation-building missions: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq.
The second compares inputs and outcomes for those original eight cases plus
eight more UN-led nation-building missions: the Belgian Congo, Namibia, El Salvador,
Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. The final
volume incorporates the data from those cases with findings from the European and
Australian cases of Congo, Bosnia, the Balkans, and the Solomon Islands. Thus, the
incorporation of data from these previous studies yields a total of 22 case studies from
which to draw, with some overlap. For instance, there are two Congo cases, the UN effort
in the 1960s and the UN – and European-led effort in the current decade.
While the focus of Dobbins’s study is nation-building not troop density, its
compilation of troop densities from recent U.S. and European counterinsurgency and
7
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contingency operations gives a way of comparing troop numbers in Afghanistan before,
during and after the surge to those of other successful and unsuccessful
COIN/contingency operations. Comparing these cases also allows us to see if they meet
the force level requirements recommended by FM 3-24, and where troop density levels
before, during, and after the surge in Afghanistan rank amongst them. As noted earlier,
there is no simple metric for determining how many troops are needed to secure a
population, as FM 3-24 makes it very clear that such calculations remain very dependent
on the situation. 8 Moreover, “there is no consensus among previous studies whether
indigenous forces should be included in the total number of troops deployed in support of
specific operations.” 9
One major component of FM 3-24 Paragraph 1-67 is that counterinsurgent
security forces include U.S. military, foreign military, and host nation military and police
forces. 10 This is in contrast with James Dobbins’s study as well as John McGrath’s 2006
study, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations. According to
Dobbins and his team, international troops and police are essential to establishing
security after a major war. 11 “Often, in the immediate aftermath of civil or inter-state
conflict, states will undergo a period of anarchy in which groups and factions seek to arm
themselves for protection.” 12 Thus, as pointed out by Seth G. Jones (2008), large
numbers of troops and police are needed for defeating and deterring these groups. “These
8
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forces are also needed for general law-enforcement functions such as crowd control,
patrolling borders, securing roads, and policing the streets.” 13
Even though it is “possible to distinguish between local and intervening security
forces,” 14 Field Manual 3-24 highlights the importance of training Host Nation (HN)
security forces and including them in counterinsurgency operations. Despite being better
trained and equipped, “intervening forces such as the U.S usually do not possess the
language skills and cultural familiarity that local forces can provide.” 15 Local residents
are also usually more willing to work with native forces because they are not as
suspicious as foreign soldiers. Thus, local security forces are critical in winning the
“hearts and minds” of the people as well as securing the population. 16
For the purposes of this study, force levels will be measured by manpower only,
not by quality or role. As pointed out by Steven Goode (2009), “clearly different forces in
a given conflict can vary widely in effectiveness due to variations in their training,
motivation, leadership, equipment, level of corruption, and other factors.” 17 What is
much more difficult is comparing forces across conflicts in a consistent manner. 18 Thus,
in accordance with doctrine and previous studies, this analysis will use total military
strength for all cases.
Finally, this chapter will also take a look at U.S. and ISAF efforts to secure
Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, which poses a major challenge to counterinsurgency
in that country. “The Pakistani government has traditionally enjoyed only limited control
13
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over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that border
Afghanistan.” 19American and ISAF officials have noted that cross-border attacks ‘have
yielded big operational and tactical benefits—by causing the insurgent networks to feel
disconnected, and prompting local residents in Pakistan to want al Qaeda and other
outsiders to leave their communities.” 20
From 2007-2011, U.S. forces conducted numerous counterinsurgency operations
in an attempt to win over the local tribes’ support and built small outposts to stem the
flow of foreign fighters coming in from Pakistan’s FATA. 21 In the fall of 2011, “U.S.
troops were withdrawn from the region, after it was determined that their presence there
only antagonized the locals and led them to carry out attacks on U.S. patrols and to attack
U.S. combat outposts (COP).” 22 Hence, this area “has resulted in some of the most deadly
tactical defeats suffered by U.S. forces anywhere in the country with little or no strategic
value.” 23
Did the U.S. Possess the Necessary Troop Density Level to Secure the Population
In order to secure the population, the U.S.’s COIN strategy relied on a basic
tenant of counterinsurgency operations borrowed and adapted from Vietnam and more
recently Iraq, “clear, hold, and build.” Done successfully, “clear-hold-build” allows the
HN government to increase the territory under its control. 24 “According to the most
common simile, government control spreads like oil or ink-spots across absorbent
19
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paper.” 25
In the spring of 2011, ISAF Headquarters identified 121 districts out of 400
Afghan districts whose control would provide a marked advantage over the enemy. 26 Out
of the 121 districts, 80 were designated as “key terrain” while the other 41 were assessed
as “areas of interest.” 27 Control of these districts would allow the U.S. to achieve its goal
of being able to secure and protect the Afghan people. Thus, most of the 30,000 surge
troops initially sent to Afghanistan would be deployed to populated areas around
Kandahar City as well as in Helmand province. This would be the main effort of the
U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy as the goal would be to protect the population from
Taliban insurgents and clearing them from key population areas. ANSF forces would
then be used to hold the cleared areas and prevent the Taliban from returning.
Next, a smaller number of troops would be sent to the eastern region of
Afghanistan. With insufficient troops for a COIN strategy in the area, a counterterrorism
strategy would be implemented instead. Thus, Coalition forces would attack fighters from
the Haqqani Network instead of clearing population areas. “The goal of this second phase
was to “wear down Haqqani Network fighters, leaders, and infrastructure, rendering them
less capable of operations.” 28 This, in turn, “would halt their momentum and prevent
them from spreading into neighboring provinces and, most importantly, the capital city of
Kabul.” 29
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Figure 3: The 2009 Troop Surge Plan

Source: Radin, CJ, “Analysis: U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan,” (2011): 1, image 1.

Moreover, this strategy would also “provide valuable time to expand the Afghan
Army, disburse reconstruction assistance, and create local governments in places where
there had been very little government influence.” 30 Finally, “with persistent outside
efforts, the capacity of the Afghan government would steadily grow, the levels of U.S.
and international assistance would decline, and the insurgency would eventually be
defeated.” 31
What the Numbers Say
Upon review, troop levels before the surge failed to meet the minimum troop
density levels that were needed to secure Afghanistan’s population. As seen in Figure 4,
30
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the light footprint approach used by the United States and ISAF in Afghanistan, translates
into one of the lowest troop and police levels in any COIN/stabilization operation since
the end of World War II. 32 Between 2002 and 2006, troop density levels ranged from
0.61 per thousand inhabitants in 2002 to 4.5 per thousand in 2006.
Figure 4: Number of Troops per Thousand Inhabitants
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These force levels rank with some of the international community’s most notable
failures: the UN mission of Belgian Congo (1.3 per thousand); the American and UN
intervention in Somalia (5.7); the U.S. rescue of Haiti (2.9); the French operation in Cote
32
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d’Ivorie (0.2); and the U.S. war in Iraq in 2005 (5.3). By comparison, “89.3 U.S. troops
per thousand inhabitants were needed to establish security in the American sector of
Germany after World War II, 35.3 per thousand were needed in Eastern Slavonia, 19.3
per thousand in Kosovo, 17.5 per thousand in Bosnia, and 9.8 per thousand in East
Timor.” 33 As mentioned by Dobbins, “none of these conflicts were resolved easily, even
at those levels of troop involvement.” 34
Figure 5: Number of U.S./ISAF & HN Security Forces per Thousand Inhabitants
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In an attempt to counter the Taliban’s momentum, the United States deployed an
additional 1,500 troops to Afghanistan in 2007. Between 2007 and 2008, the number of
U.S. forces serving in Afghanistan rose from 24,800 in 2007 to 32,500 by the end of
33
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2008. ISAF troop levels also increased during this time, as NATO deployed an additional
10,400 troops between 2006 and 2008. Despite this substantial increase, troop density
levels continued to remain well below the minimum force requirements recommended by
FM 3-24. Between 2006 and 2007, troop density levels rose from 4.5 per thousand to 6.2
and by end of 2008, force levels in Afghanistan had reached 7.5 per thousand inhabitants.
Figure 6: Troop Density Levels in Iraq & Afghanistan (2002-2014)

Source: The Brooking Institute’s “Afghanistan Index,” updated February 2014 & “Iraq Index,” updated
July 2013

Force levels during this time are very comparable to some of America’s most
recent contingency and nation-building failures including: Somalia (5.7) and Iraq 2005
(5.3). Moreover, when compared to Iraq, troop density levels in Afghanistan took a much
longer time to reach levels achieved by the United States and its allies in Iraq. As seen in
Figure 6, there were only 3.3 troops per thousand inhabitants in Afghanistan in 2005,
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while there were 12.3 troops per thousand in Iraq. During the height of the Iraq Surge in
2007, troop density levels reached a new high of 18.85 troops per thousand inhabitants.
This is 3.5 more troops per thousand residents than during the height of the Afghan surge
in 2011 (15.5). This may not seem significant, but it bolsters the argument that the United
States was willing to do whatever it took to win in Iraq while doing what it had to do in
Afghanistan. Moreover, the COIN strategy that was used to help turn around the Iraq War
was supposed to serve as a blueprint for the U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy in
Afghanistan.
Figure 7: U.S./ISAF Troop & ANSF Levels (2001-2014)

U.S./ISAF Troop & ANSF Levels (2001-2014)
400000
350000
300000
250000
ANSF

200000

ISAF Troops
150000

U.S. Troops

100000
50000

Aug-13

Jan-13

Jun-12

Nov-11

Apr-11

Sep-10

Jul-09

Feb-10

Dec-08

May-08

Oct-07

Mar-07

Aug-06

Jan-06

Jun-05

Nov-04

Apr-04

Sep-03

Feb-03

Jul-02

Dec-01

0

Source: The Brooking Institute’s “Afghanistan Index,” p.4, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/f
oreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20140227.pdf

59

In a last ditch effort to turn the tide and reverse the Taliban’s momentum, the U.S.
sent a surge of 30,000 troops along with 6,000 European soldiers as part of a new
counterinsurgency strategy implemented by General Stanley McChrystal in 2010. With
the surge, the total number of American troops serving in Afghanistan rose to 100,000
while raising the number of NATO troops to over 42,000. Compared to 2009, this is a
1.35% increase in the number of U.S. and ISAF forces serving in Afghanistan. Between
2009 and 2010, force levels rose from 10.4 inhabitants per thousand to 14.1.
This is an increase of over 3.7 troops per thousand. This may not seem significant,
but troop density levels in Afghanistan did not reach 3.7 troops per thousand until 2006
(4.5), almost five years after the war had started. Troop density levels continued to rise in
2011 (15.5) as U.S. and Coalition forces reached their peak. At the same time, ANSF
forces were beginning to conduct a small number of operations on their own and had
started to take over security in the central, northern, and western parts of the country.
Even though a majority of the surge troops sent by the U.S. were withdrawn in
September 2012, force levels reached an all-time of 16.3 per thousand inhabitants as
ANSF forces reached a level of 342,378 by July 2012.
When compared to the 22 other cases listed above, force levels in Afghanistan
between 2010 and 2012 rank with some of the highest levels reached by U.S. and
international forces in Kosovo (19.3); Iraq 2007 (18.85); Bosnia (17.3); and East Timor
(9.8). These campaigns are considered to be some of the more successful COIN and
nation-building operations carried out by the United States and international community
in recent years. 35 Despite reaching similar force levels, the counterinsurgency and
accompanying surge strategy implemented by Generals McChrystal and Petraeus failed
35
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to meet the troop density levels needed to conduct a successful COIN operation.
Moreover, the U.S. and NATO have been unable to generate the kind of success
experienced by these other campaigns as violence continues to plague eastern
Afghanistan and has spread to areas previously unaffected by the insurgency. Thus, as
pointed out by Stephen Good (2009), “having enough forces to reverse increasing
insurgent violence does not always equate to victory, or even the attainment of low levels
of violence.” 36
Even though it may appear that troop density levels are not useful in determining
how many troops are needed to secure the population or carry out a successful COIN
campaign, this study has shown that numbers do matter and that past campaigns that have
come close to or meet the force requirements advocated by FM 3-24 have been
historically more successful than those that have not. This study has also shown that
military efforts alone however, cannot ensure victory in a coin campaign. Thus, “having
adequate forces can at best enable the counterinsurgent side to provide a certain level of
security, and security itself is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for victory.” 37
Efforts to Secure Afghanistan’s Borders
In order to protect the population, “the counterinsurgent force must also be able to
control key terrain, both natural and man-made, in and around major urban areas, as well
as the border regions between neighboring countries.” 38 Thus, one of the main goals of
the U.S.’s COIN strategy was to help the Afghan Government secure its borders and deny
cross-border mobility to insurgents and other anti-government/criminal elements. To
accomplish this objective, “U.S. efforts to secure Afghanistan’s border focused on two
36
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areas: (1) building the capacity of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and (2) regional
engagement.” 39 According to Generals McChrystal and Petraeus, securing Afghanistan’s
border would directly support security in the country “by denying insurgents access to
and from sanctuaries in Pakistan.” 40 Securing the borders would also promote security by
“limiting or preventing the flow of illegal narcotics across the border, thereby denying
criminals and insurgents alike an important source of revenue.” 41
Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1,500-milelong Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous. “Since 2001, the United
States has pursued several initiatives to reduce tensions between Afghanistan and
Pakistan and to encourage both governments to concentrate their attention on countering
the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists operating inside their territories.” 42 Unfortunately,
incidents of violence have increased on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border “as
historical conflicts, different priorities, and personal animosities have combined to
weaken the collective ability of the three countries to repress Islamist extremists
operating along the border.” 43
In the last several years, U.S. officials and national intelligence reports have
“repeatedly attributed the growing strength of al Qaeda and the resurgence of the Taliban
to safe havens in this border region.” 44 According to the Pentagon, “the existence of
militant sanctuaries inside Pakistan’s FATA represents the greatest challenge to long39

Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces,” http://csi
is.org/publication/winning-afghanistan [accessed February 20-May 2, 2009], 21.
40
Ali A. Jalali, “Winning in Afghanistan, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/
09spring/jalali.pdf [accessed February 21 – March 2009], 14.
41
Department of Defense, “Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 19.
42
Richard Weitz, “Afghan-Pakistan Border Rules: The U.S. Role,” http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/
eurasia_border_review/ebr3/weitz.pdf [accessed February 20- November 27, 2011], 1.
43
Jayshree Bajoria, “The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border,” http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afgh
an-pakistani-border/p14905 [accessed February 20 – March 20, 2009], 1.
44
Dilip Hiro, Apocalyptic Realm: Jihadists in South Asia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 207.

62

term security within Afghanistan.” 45 In 2008, General David McKiernan, the top
commander in Afghanistan, “asserted that Pakistan’s northwestern tribal regions provide
the main pool for recruiting insurgents who fight in Afghanistan.” 46 Most intelligence
analysts appear to agree that, so long as Taliban forces enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan, the
U.S. will be unable to quell the insurgency plaguing most of Afghanistan. 47
Heart of Darkness: The Afghan/Pakistan Border
Shortly after the fall of the Taliban in December 2001, the group along with some
members of al Qaeda (AQ) began to establish sanctuaries in northwest Pakistan,
specifically in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 48 Consisting of seven
provinces: “Bajaur, Mohmand, Kyber, Kurram, Orakzai, North and South Waziristan,
FATA has served as a buffer zone operating under its own paramilitary forces and police
and ruled directly by the President of Pakistan via the Governor of North West Frontier
Province.” 49 Shortly after 9/11, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the
adjoining North West Frontier Province served as an escape hatch for al Qaeda and
Taliban fighters trying to escape U.S. and Afghan forces. 50 According to Ahmed Rashid,
with the arrival of al Qaeda and other Islamic militant groups, FATA became a
multilayered terrorist cake. 51
“At its base were Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen, soon to become Taliban in their
own right, who provided the hideouts and logistical support. Above them were the
45
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Afghan Taliban, who settled there after 9/11 followed by militants from Central
Asia, Chechnya, Africa, China, and Kashmir, and topped by Arabs who forged a
protective ring around bin Laden. FATA became the world’s ‘terrorism central.” 52
It was from here that the bomb plots in London, Madrid, Bali, Islamabad, and later
Germany and Denmark were planned. 53
Al Qaeda’s first sanctuary was the South Waziristan agency. “With its high
mountains, steep slopes, deep ravines littered with broken rock and shale, and its thick
forests, it was an ideal hideout.” 54 In June 2002, U.S. military officials believed there
were up to 3,500 foreign militants hiding out in South Waziristan.55 At the time,
“Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was deflecting U.S. pressure to send in troops on
account with Pakistan’s standoff with India as al Qaeda and Taliban fighters brazenly
launched rockets at U.S. firebases at Shikin and Lawara, just inside Afghanistan.” 56
Coalition forces also complained that paramilitary soldiers from the Frontier Corps were
helping al Qaeda fighters cross the border or were providing covering fire to distract U.S.
forces. 57
American officers on the ground soon became frustrated and began pressuring
U.S. commander, Lt.-Gen. Dan McNeill, to allow them to chase al Qaeda fighters into
South Waziristan.” 58 Even though he did not have permission from the Pentagon to do so,
McNeil threatened to cross the border into Pakistan if the cross-border raids by the
Taliban and other militant groups continued. “U.S. forces acknowledge the
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internationally recognized boundaries of Afghanistan, but may pursue attackers who
attempted to escape into Pakistan to evade capture or retaliation, read a U.S. Army
statement.” 59 There was also mounting U.S. pressure on Musharraf to act or face
unilateral attacks inside FATA. 60
U.S. and NATO forces “noted a sharp deterioration in border security after the
Pakistani government began negotiating a series of peace deals with local tribal leaders
and with various extremist groups.” 61 Between 2004 and 2008, the Pakistani government
and military cut numerous peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban, the most famous of
which was the May 2008 Swat Agreement. 62 The peace agreements, “which were struck
throughout the tribal areas and in Swat and other settled districts in the northwest,
required the Taliban to accept the writ of the state and eject "foreigners," or al Qaeda and
allied groups, from their areas.” 63 Despite these agreements, the Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) refused to abide by them, and instead established mini-Islamic emirates
while continuing to expand their control into neighboring areas. 64 By 2008, U.S. combat
deaths in Afghanistan began to exceed those in Iraq, “despite the fact that five times as
many U.S. troops were in Iraq than Afghanistan at the time.” 65
In July 2007, a National Intelligence Estimate issued by the entire U.S.
intelligence community stated “that al Qaeda was based in FATA and that the United
States would not hesitate to bomb or even invade any part of FATA if bin Laden was
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found to be hiding there.” 66 In 2008, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Michael Mullen, singled out the terrorist camps in Northwest Pakistan as one of the most
serious threats confronting the next U.S. presidential administration: “Al Qaeda is there.
Its leadership is there. We know that. And it continues to plan against the West, including
against our homeland.” 67 The Pakistani Army did conduct several minor raids against
militants in Northwest Pakistan between 2002 and 2005, but most of these were for show
and did not achieve any strategic objectives. 68
Figure 8: Map of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas

Source: BBC News.Com, “Taliban Growing in Strength,” p.1, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/news/20
09/05/090513_pakistan_map.shtml

In the spring of 2009, the Pakistani military finally launched a major operation to
clear militants and foreign fighters operating in FATA. In what became the Second Battle
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of Swat, the Pakistan Army launched the strategic airborne attack, codenamed “Black
Thunderstorm” on April 26, 2009. The objective of this operation was the retaking of
Buner, Lower Dir, Swat, and Shangla districts under the control of the radical militant
leader Mauluna Fazullah. 69 Following the success of “Operation Black Thunderstorm”,
the Pakistani military conducted another campaign called “Operation Rah-e-Nijat” (Path
to Salvation) that began on June 19th, 2009. “Supported by F-16 fighter jets and
helicopter gunships, 30,000 Pakistani soldiers engaged over 10,000 militants and foreign
fighters.” 70 Many analysts quickly “described this much-awaited operation as the ‘mother
of all battles.” 71
During the battle, senior TTP leaders were forced to abandon their posts and
escape to neighboring Afghanistan as thousands of their fighters were either killed or
captured by Pakistani forces. On December 12th, “the military announced the success of
the operation as all of South Waziristan was now under the full control of the Pakistani
government, denying al Qaeda and its militant allies from their former stronghold.” 72
Despite these operations, U.S. officials continued to complain “that members of the
Pakistani military and ISI were still providing aid and training to the Taliban, including
alerting them to imminent U.S. air strikes on Pakistani territory.” 73Since the Afghan
Taliban, Haqqani Network, and HIG do not carry out attacks against the Pakistani state,
Islamabad has refused to target these groups as they see them as potential allies against
India. As Steve Coll explains (2010),
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“Pakistan’s generals have retained a bedrock belief that, however unruly and
distasteful Islamist militias may be, they could yet be useful proxies to ward off a
perceived existential threat from India. Many more Pakistanis believe that since
the U.S. and NATO are planning to withdraw from the region in the next few
years, the Taliban could well return to power in Kabul, making it important for
Pakistan not to antagonize them. 74
Pakistan’s support for the Afghan insurgency is also “reinforced by its aspiration for
influence among the Pashtuns that are divided by the disputed ‘Durand Line’ which
separates Afghanistan and Pakistan.” 75
Pakistani Complicity with the Taliban
During the last seven years, “multiple reports have surfaced that elements of
Pakistani intelligence and the military are in close contact with and supporting members
of the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent groups.” 76 According to Ahmed Rashid
(2010),
“Taliban leaders and their families live in Pakistan and are in close touch with the
military and ISI. Some Taliban allies, such as the network led by Jalaluddin
Haqqani, are even closer to the ISI.” 77
Three of the most wanted terrorists by the United States are also widely believed to reside
in Pakistan, including al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mullah Omar, and Haqqani
Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani. 78 “Some intelligence officers believe that Mullah
Omar may be receiving protection from elements of the Pakistani government in either
Quetta or Karachi.” 79 U.S. officials have also “repeatedly accused the ISI of actively
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supporting the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other insurgent groups with money,
supplies, and planning guidance.” 80
According to Matt Waldman (2010), the Taliban-ISI relationship is founded on
mutual benefit. “The Taliban need external sanctuary, as well as military and logistical
support to sustain their insurgency, the ISI believes that it needs a significant allied force
in Afghanistan to maintain regional strength and ‘strategic depth’ in their rivalry with
India.” 81 Pakistan has been intimately associated with the Taliban since its creation in the
mid-1990s. 82
By 2001, the ISI and Pakistani military “were providing the Taliban with
hundreds of advisers and experts to run its tanks, aircraft, and artillery, and thousands of
Pakistani Pashtuns to man its infantry” 83 At one point, up to thirty ISI trucks a day were
crossing into Afghanistan. 84 In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, “Pakistan reluctantly
chose to side with the U.S. as American and allied forces intervened in Afghanistan with
a UN mandate and toppled the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” 85
This created a dilemma for Pakistan, “as it now had to hunt down the Taliban and
other Islamic militant organizations it had helped to create in the first place.” 86 Pakistan
officially became a coalition partner of the United States in the Global War on Terror, “it
simultaneously continued supporting and directing the Taliban as a deputy government in
80
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Afghanistan.” 87
Shortly after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the ISI began granting refuge to
the Taliban and other Islamic militants it regarded as friendly, while extraditing al Qaeda
fighters to the United States. 88 According to Adrian Hanni and Lukas Hegi, “the
Pakistani military and ISI played a central and active role” 89 in aiding and training the
Taliban, “promising them money, weapons, and other kinds of support.” 90 The ISI also
allowed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of the HIG and Jalaluddin Haqqani of the Haqqani
Networks to set up bases in Northwestern Pakistan, from where they could launch attacks
against U.S., Coalition, and Afghan forces from. 91
Over the last decade, analysts have “disputed whether ISI support to the
insurgency is officially sanctioned, and whether it is carried out by serving or former
officers.” 92 According to Matt Waldman, “some analysts speak of the collaboration of
elements within the ISI with the Taliban.” 93 Antonio Giustozzi argues “there is evidence
of the involvement of the insurgency of advisors with long-standing experience of
Afghanistan, such as current or former ISI operatives.” 94 Seth Jones has argued, “there is
some indication that individuals within the Pakistan government—for example, within
the Frontier Corps and the ISI—were involved in assisting insurgent groups.” 95 He has
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also reported that by mid-2008, “the United States collected fairly solid evidence of
senior-level complicity [in ISI support to the insurgents].” 96
In July 2010, WikiLeaks, released dozens of U.S. diplomatic documents that
detailed Pakistan’s links with Islamist militants including the Afghan Taliban and al
Qaeda. Some of the most important documents “detail a 2006 meeting with senior
Taliban leaders in which Pakistani officials pushed for an attack on Maruf, a district of
Kandahar that lies beside the Pakistan border.” 97 An offensive began later that year. 98
The files also link active and retired ISI officers to some of the Afghan insurgency’s most
notorious leaders including General Hamid Gul, who ran the ISI from 1987 to 1989. 99
In one classified "threat report", Gul is described ordering magnetic mines to be
planted in snow on roads used by military vehicles. 100 "Gul's final comment to the three
individuals was 'to make the snow warm in Kabul' basically telling them to set Kabul
aflame,’ the report said.” 101 Another report describes a meeting between Gul and a group
of militants in Wana, the capital of South Waziristan, in January 2009. There, he met
with three senior Afghan insurgent commanders and three “older” Arab men, presumably
representatives of al Qaeda, who the report suggests were important because “they had a
large security contingent with them.” 102 Some of the other documents released by
WikiLeaks contain accounts of American anger at Pakistan’s unwillingness to confront
insurgents who launched attacks near Pakistani border posts, moved openly by the
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truckload across the frontier and retreated to Pakistani territory for safety. 103
A NATO study published in 2012 “based on the interrogations of 4,000 captured
Taliban, al-Qaeda and other fighters in Afghanistan concluded that ISI support was
critical to the survival and revival of the Taliban after 2001 just as it was critical to its
conquest of Afghanistan in the 1990s.” 104 It provides sanctuary, training camps, expertise
and help with fund raising. The NATO report concluded “the ISI is thoroughly aware of
Taliban activities and the whereabouts of all senior Taliban personnel.” 105
The circumstances of Osama bin Laden’s (OBL) death “brought more focus on
purported Pakistani and ISI links with Islamist militants.” 106 On May 2, 2011, bin Laden
was located and killed in a compound in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. This
compound was just a half-mile from the Kakul Military Academy, Pakistan's equivalent
of West Point, and close to various army regiments. The news of Osama bin Laden’s
whereabouts led to immediate questioning of Pakistan’s role and potential complicity in
his refuge. 107 President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, told
reporters it was “inconceivable that Osama bin Laden did not have a support system in
Pakistan.” 108
Following the May 2011 raid, the Pakistani government began to crack down on
people it believed to be working with the CIA. In May 2011, the ISI was accused of
103
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ordering the torture and murder of investigative journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad who had
just finished writing a book detailing Pakistan’s links with al Qaeda and the Afghan
Taliban and how fundamentalists had infiltrated Pakistan’s military establishments.
Pakistani authorities also arrested Dr. Shakil Afridi, “who aided the CIA’s manhunt for
Osama bin Laden by going door-to-door in Abbottabad offering hepatitis jabs to children
in an attempt to collect DNA samples from OBL’s compound.” 109 On May 23rd, Dr.
Afridi was convicted of treason by a court in northwestern Pakistan and sentenced to 33
years in prison. 110
After the May 2nd raid, “ISI leadership was confronted more frequently by U.S.
officials over allegations of collusion between the Pakistani government and Afghan
insurgents, especially with the Haqqani Network.” 111 The terrorist network led by
Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, is “commonly identified as the most
dangerous of Afghan insurgent groups battling U.S.-led forces in eastern Afghanistan.” 112
The Haqqani network, “which professes obedience to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, is
believed to have been involved in some of the most audacious attacks of the Afghan
war.” 113
During oral testimony given to the Senate Armed Services Committee on
September 22, 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen repeatedly reiterated his concerns about the
ISI’s role in sponsoring Haqqani Network attacks: "The fact remains that the Quetta
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Shura [Taliban] and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity.
Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking
Afghan troops and civilians as well as U.S. soldiers.” 114 Publicly, the Obama
administration did not fully back up Admiral Mullen’s charges against the ISI and
Pakistani government. President Obama himself later stated, “I think the intelligence is
not as clear as we might like in terms of what exactly the [ISI-Haqqani] relationship
is,” 115 but he still insisted that the Pakistanis “have got to take care of this problem in any
case.” 116
U.S. Efforts to Secure the Border from the Flow of Insurgents and Foreign Fighters
Since 2001, “the United States has provided the Afghan and Pakistani
governments and militaries with considerable money, equipment, training, and other
security assistance.” 117 The U.S. has also provided economic aid to the border region. 118
Furthermore, the United States “helped to establish a Joint Intelligence Operations center
in Kabul to provide a forum where analysts from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and ISAF could
share and evaluate data about terrorist activities along the Afghan-Pakistan border.” 119
Unfortunately, none of these attempts have proven very effective at curbing the
flow of fighters and weapons crossing the Afghan-Pakistani border. Even though the
United States and NATO has so far been unsuccessful in securing Afghanistan’s border
with Pakistan with the efforts discussed above, programs such as the creation of the
Afghanistan Border Police, the use of armed drones in Pakistan’s Federally Administered
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Tribal Areas, and Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams have yield better results.
Building the Capacity of the Afghan Border Police
Afghanistan shares borders with six other countries and has over 3,400 miles of
international border – most of it vast desert or high mountains. 120 “The most treacherous
of these borders is the 1,500 mile border with Pakistan, which serves as a safe haven for
various insurgents, foreign fighters, bandits, and smugglers.” 121 In order to help stem the
flow of insurgents, equipment, and weapons coming in from Pakistan, the United States
and international community created the Afghan Border Police in 2005. 122 The mission
of this new force was to “provide law enforcement capabilities at borders and entry
points, including the country’s airports, in order to deter criminal activity and the
movement of insurgents into Afghanistan.” 123
Originally, the Afghan Border Police was overseen by the State Department’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs with DnyCorp. Other
organizations have also helped to train the APB including; the European Union Police
Mission (EUPOL), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and
Border Protection agencies. 124 By the end of 2008, the ABP maintained an operational
strength of approximately 12,000 out of an authorized strength of nearly 18,000. 125 Like
the ANP, the Afghan Border Police undergo an eight-week training program conducted
by private U.S. security contractors.
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In January 2009, the U.S. military launched a major overhaul in the training of the
Afghan Border Police in response to the Focused Border Development program that was
developed by the Afghan government and international community to combat corruption
and incompetence plaguing most of the ABP. In the past, “the U.S. primarily relied on
small teams of embedded advisers to train Afghan security forces, but those teams were
in short supply, especially for the border police and Afghan National Police.” 126 In
response to this demand for more advisors, commanders from the 4th BCT of the 101st
Airborne Division began assigning each of its battalions to work with a battalion of
border police during joint operations in eastern Afghanistan. Besides training, new
recruits were also issued new weapons and gear. 127
Before 2009, Border Patrol commanders “complained of a lack of heavy weapons
and few development projects in their areas, which they said made it difficult to win over
the local population.” 128 By the end of 2010, U.S. and ISAF forces had trained and
equipped over 4,200 border police members at a cost of $70 million. 129 The U.S. also
built 18 operational border facilities along the Afghan-Pakistani border with the hopes of
building 139 more. 130 Despite dramatic improvements in their operational capabilities,
“the Afghan Border Police continue to be plagued by corruption, incompetence, and a
lack of funding and weapons.” 131
According to officials from Academi (formerly Blackwater International) and
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Dyncorp, “roughly one in twelve of the Afghan troops who have attended the ABP basic
training course were thrown out after failing drug tests.” 132 Officials also heard
complaints from ABP commanders that their troops “are still being issued cheaply made
Pakistani or Egyptian assault rifles, rather than the Hungarian models promised to
them.” 133 Even though the ABP is fully funded for equipment and supplies, “corruption
within the Afghan Ministry of Interior (AMOI) and at the regional logistic hubs present
problems for units in the field stationed along the Afghan borders. 134 In many parts of the
country, the Afghan Border Police are also complicit in the drug smuggling trade. 135
Use of CIA Paramilitary Teams along the Afghan/Pakistan Border
The CIA has also assigned a small number of American civilians and paramilitary
troops to operate alongside the Pakistani military, but primarily as advisors. 136 The teams
“provide the Pakistanis with various types of intelligence, especially analyses of
intercepted communications and imagery data from U.S. planes and spy satellites.” 137 In
return, the Pakistanis share their human intelligence about militant activities in the tribal
areas and other terrorist plots. 138 “Since 2001, U.S. and Pakistani intelligence and law
enforcement services have conducted more than one hundred joint raids against suspected
Taliban, al Qaeda, or other Islamist extremists.” 139
In 2010, Bob Woodward disclosed the existence of a well-armed 3,000-member
132
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Afghan paramilitary force collectively known as Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams in his
book Obama’s Wars. These teams are reportedly trained by the CIA at Firebase Lilley, in
Paktika province, Afghanistan. 140 “In addition to being used for surveillance, raids, and
combat operations in Afghanistan, the teams are crucial to the United States’ secret war
in Pakistan, according to current and former U.S. officials.” 141 A former senior CIA
official involved in the formation of the Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams said the first
unit was created in Kabul shortly after the U.S.-backed invasion in 2001. 142 The team in
the capital “remains the largest and most sophisticated, and it is routinely used to carry
out operations elsewhere in the country.” 143
Over the past 10 years however, new units have been created in other locations,
including Kandahar. 144 Their missions “vary from sensitive intelligence-gathering
operations to carefully orchestrated takedowns of Taliban targets.” 145 Some of the
Wikileaks reports leaked in 2010 provide descriptions of the activities of the “Other
Government Agency” (OGA) and “Afghan OGA” forces. 146 In addition to accounts of
snatch-and-grab operations targeting insurgent leaders, “the logs contain casualty reports
from battles with the Taliban, summaries of electronic intercepts of enemy
communications, and hints of heavy firepower at the CIA’s disposal.” 147
For several years now, the CIA has been running operations from its eastern
Afghan bases, which are generally shared with U.S. SOF teams and other military units.
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These bases “are also used by the agency to build and manage networks of ethnic Pashtun
informants who cross into Pakistan’s tribal belt.” 148 The CIA has also used these bases
for their drone programs. According to Craig Whitlock and Greg Miller, “the use of these
bases has allowed the CIA to identify the whereabouts of al Qaeda and Taliban leaders.
This has led to an exponential increase in drone attacks against AQ and Taliban
targets.” 149 At the same time, these bases and teams have helped to reduce the CIA’s
dependence on the ISI. 150
Drone Wars
In recent years, missile strikes by armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have
constituted the principle U.S. military activity inside Pakistani territory and along the
Afghan-Pakistan border. Launched in 2004, “the CIA’s covert drone campaign to target
and kill al Qaeda and Taliban commanders based in Pakistan’s lawless northwest has
resulted in the death of dozens of lower-ranking militants and at least ten upper-level
leaders within AQ and the Taliban.” 151 Moreover, these strikes have forced militants to
abandon satellite phones and large gatherings in favor of communicating by carrier and
moving in small groups. 152
While unpopular among the Pakistani public, the drone strikes have become a
weapon of choice for the United States’ campaign against insurgents and Islamic
militants in FATA. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush authorized the use of
drones equipped with laser-guided Hellfire missiles to kill the leaders of AQ in Pakistan.
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The United States’ fleet of drones includes Predators and the larger Reapers. According
to Bill Roggio of the Long War Journal, the U.S. has carried out 354 strikes since the
drone campaign began in 2004. 153
Between 2004 and the end of 2008, the Bush Administration authorized 46 strikes
in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Provinces. A majority of these strikes (35) were carried
out in 2008 after U.S. officials reached a quiet understanding with President Pervez
Musharraf to allow U.S. forces to conduct drone strikes and hot pursuit operations in
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 154 Moreover, “there was mounting
evidence that al Qaeda and affiliated groups were using FATA to train Westerners for
attacks on American and European targets.” 155 For instance, “the masterminds of the July
7, 2005, transit system attacks in London, which killed 52 people, had trained in the tribal
regions.” 156
Since assuming office, Obama has greatly accelerated the program, “likely as a
result of better intelligence on the ground in Pakistan.” 157 In 2009, the U.S. launched
more than 53 drone strikes against militant targets in Pakistani territory. 158 This was more
than the previous four years combined. 159 The number of drone strikes continued to surge
in 2010 (117) and 2011 (64) as the Obama administration was seeking to complement the
increase of U.S. combat troops inside Afghanistan with intensified operations in the
Taliban sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan.
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Figure 9: Number of U.S. Airstrikes in Pakistan by District 2004-2014

Source: Roggio, Bill, “The Covert U.S. Air Campaign in Pakistan,” p.2 http://www.longwarjournal.org/pa
kistan-strikes.php

Over the past six years, a majority of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan have targeted
Islamist militants operating in North Waziristan, 160 a FATA in northwestern Pakistan that
borders Afghanistan. According to Jeffrey Dressler, “North Waziristan hosts a blend of
insurgents and terrorists operating against Pakistan and Afghanistan, with some also
targeting the American homeland.” 161 Enemy groups based there include: “the Haqqani
Network; powerful tribal enablers; foreign extremists; and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP),
160
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who have been at war with the Pakistani state for much of the past decade.” 162 Out of the
354 drone strikes that have occurred in Pakistan since 2004, 253 of them have struck AQ
and Taliban targets in North Waziristan. 163
Figure 10: Number of U.S. Airstrikes in Key Districts of Northwest Pakistan

Source: Roggio, Bill, “The Covert U.S. Air Campaign in Pakistan,” (2013) p.2, http://www.longwarjourna
jl.org/p kistan-strikes.php

The United States has also carried out a large number of drone strikes (83) in the
neighboring province of South Waziristan. Shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan by
U.S. and NATO forces in October 2001, “thousands of Afghan Taliban along with their
al Qaeda allies fled to South Waziristan looking for refuge and bases to continue their
fight against the foreign forces occupying their country.” 164 The local tribes, sympathetic
to the cause, provided shelter and assistance to the fighters, while local militants who
162

Ibid., 1.
Bill Roggio, “The Covert U.S. Air Campaign in Pakistan,” 3.
164
Mansur Khan Mahsud, “The Battle for Pakistan: South Waziristan,” http://newamerica.net/
publications/ policy/the_battle_for_pakistan_south_waziristan [accessed February 14 – April 19,
2010], 5.
163

82

were affiliated with the Afghan Taliban government before September 11--such as
Abdullah Mehsud, Baitullah Mehsud, Nek Muhammad, Haji Sharif, and Haji Omar-began to organize local Taliban groups across South Waziristan. 165
Since 2004, the U.S. has killed a number of prominent al Qaeda and Taliban
leaders, including: Abu Laith al Libi, senior military commander in Afghanistan and the
leader of al Qaeda’s paramilitary Shadow Army (2008); Sa’ad bin Laden, one of Osama
bin Laden’s sons who served as a senior AQ leader in Iran and was involved in several
plots (2009); Baitullah Mehsud, the overall leader of the Movement of the Taliban in
Pakistan (2009); Ilyas Kashmiri, the leader of al Qaeda’s Lashkar al Zil and the
operational commander of the Harakat ul Jihad-i-Islami (2011); and Mullah Sangeen
Zadran, the deputy of the Haqqani Network operational commander Sirajuddin Haqqani
(2013). 166 According to The Long War Journal, “American drones have killed more than
1,900 Islamist insurgents in Pakistan’s FATA areas since 2006.” 167 As a result of these
strategically significant deaths, “then-CIA director Leon Panetta called drone strikes “one
of the most important weapons in the fight against terrorists.” 168
The Pakistani government “regularly issues protests over the strikes—and the
perception that they violate Pakistani sovereignty fuels considerable anti-American
sentiment among the Pakistani public.” 169 Despite these protests, the Pakistani
Government has never ordered the Pakistani Air Force to shoot down the drones.
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According to Sara Birkenthal (2012), “global outcry over the drone campaign has also
intensified in response to collateral civilian deaths brought by errant air strikes in the
country.” 170 An analysis published by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann in Foreign
Affairs shows that “less than two percent of those killed by U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan
have been described in reliable press accounts as leaders of al Qaeda or allied groups.” 171
U.S. government officials have disputed such reports, “claiming that only 50 nonmilitants have been killed by drone strikes over the past decade in six countries in which
the United States is known to have used Predator and Reaper drones in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.” 172
Members of the Pakistani Taliban “also cite the continuing UAV strikes to justify
their terrorist campaign against Pakistanis living outside the tribal zone.” 173 Although
unarmed Pakistani civilians are usually the targets of their attacks, the TTP claims that
these bombings are in retaliation for the Pakistani governments’ allowing the United
States to operate the drones on their territory. On March 30th, 2009, “a terrorist assault
team estimated in size at 14 men launched a coordinated attack on the Manawan Police
Trainers School in Lahore that resulted in 34 deaths.” 174
According to Baitullah Mehsud, the former leader of the Pakistani Taliban, the
Taliban’s March 2009 attack on the police academy was ‘in retaliation for the continued
drone strikes by the U.S. in collaboration with Pakistan on our people.” 175 Mehsud,
himself, would later on be killed in a drone strike on August 5, 2009. Another report
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written by Qandeel Siddique (2010), finds that the “growing number of U.S. drone strikes
in Pakistan’s border areas, and expanding U.S. presence and influence inside Pakistan has
further aggravated the jihadists.” 176
Despite criticism surrounding their use, “UAVs amount to safer, cheaper, and
more effective warfare in the United States’ counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan, as
consistently argued by the Department of Defense.” 177 Moreover, sending U.S. combat
troops into Pakistani territory could spark outrage in throughout the country. On one such
occasion, “a U.S. SOF team attacked a suspected terrorist base in Pakistan’s South
Waziristan region, killing over a dozen people.” 178 These attacks sparked outrage and
massive protests throughout the country. In response to this raid, the Pakistani military
announced on September 16, 2008, “that it would shoot at U.S. forces attempting to cross
the Afghan-Pakistan border.” 179 Since then, “several minor incidents have occurred when
members of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps have fired at what they believed to be American
helicopters flying from Afghanistan to deploy Special Forces on their territory.” 180
Strategically, “killing terrorist operatives through drone strikes has proven
effective in dismantling terrorist havens along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.” 181 Such
attacks “keep extremist groups on edge and disrupt their plans, because when individuals
in these groups die or are wounded, new members must be recruited and less experienced
176
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leaders are forced to take over day-to-day operations.” 182 Terrorist or insurgent groups
fearing a strike or an attack “must also devote increased attention to their own security
because any time they communicate with other cells, they may be exposing themselves to
a targeted attack.” 183
According to memorandums between Osama bin Laden and his subordinates,
made public by the U.S. military’s Combating Terrorism Center, crippling U.S. drone
attacks had forced bin Laden to consider withdrawing his fighters from what had
previously been safe havens in Pakistan. “The reserves will not, for the most part, be
effective in such conflicts. Basically, we could lose the reserves to the enemy’s air
strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with explosives!” Moreover, he said that commanders
with experience “needed to get out of the area.” 184
Despite resting on morally questionable footing, the U.S. drone campaign in
Pakistan “has been arguably one of the most effective tactics against Islamist militants
operating in the remote regions of western Pakistan.” 185 However, until the Pakistanis do
something about the safe havens in FATA, insurgent and terrorist groups such as the
Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda will continue to recruit, train, equip,
and prepare to launch attacks against U.S., ISAF, and Afghan forces from within
Pakistan.
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CHAPTER V: MEASURING SECURITY PROGRESS DURING THE SURGE
We’ve got our teeth in the enemy’s jugular now, and we’re not going to let go.
-General David Petraeus
According to FM 3-24, “counterinsurgency is an extremely complex form of
warfare. At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population’s support.” 1 In almost every
case, counterinsurgents “face a populace containing an active minority supporting the
government and equally small militant faction opposing it.” 2 The government must
“demonstrate that it can fight the insurgents effectively while also protecting the
population.” 3 Insurgents on the other hand, “only have to demonstrate that the
government is unable to protect the population by inflicting enough chaos and destruction
to turn public support against the existing authorities.” 4
Upon review, the United States’ counterinsurgency and accompanying surge
strategy made substantial progress in the southern parts of Afghanistan. 5 Prior to the
surge in 2010, the Taliban and its allies made startling gains, “showing an ability to
control territory in Helmand and Kandahar they had previously lost.” 6 The surge reversed
those gains as U.S. and ISAF forces conducted more than 7,100 counterterrorism
missions between May 30th and December 2nd, 2010. During these operations, more than
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than 600 insurgent leaders were captured or killed. 1 In addition more than 2000 enemy
fighters were killed and over 4,100 captured. 2
To gauge the overall impact of the U.S.’s counterinsurgency and accompanying
surge strategy, this study consulted several sources: monthly data compiled by NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force, data gathered by the DoD for its semiannual
annual report to Congress (Report on Progress: Toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan), and annual reports produced by the United Nations. These sources are not
all consistent with one another in the specifics, “as they each have their own criteria to
hold territory, which is difficult to quantify, but is nonetheless important.” 3 For instance,
“the Taliban were much stronger overall prior to 2001, when the group controlled
Afghanistan and did not have to function as an insurgency.” 4 Therefore, “the various
statistics used to measure the insurgency’s efficacy offer only a part of the overall
picture.” 5
IED Attacks: The $30 Bombs that Cost the U.S. Billions
One security indicator that U.S. and ISAF forces used to measure progress during
the surge in Afghanistan was the number of IED attacks that occurred between January
2010 and December 2012. Since 2006, “IEDs have become the Taliban’s favored weapon
of choice and the biggest killer of Coalition soldiers and Afghan civilians.” 6 According to
documents released by WikiLeaks, “in 2004, there were 308 makeshift bombs in 2004: in
1
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2009 there were 7,155. 7 Taliban fighters in total planted more than 16,000 IEDs in those
five years.” 8
Figure 11: Number of IED Events (2004-2012)

Source: Brookings Institute, “Afghan Index,” as January 15, 2013, p. 11, http://www.brookings.edu/`media/
Programs /foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20130131.pdf

During an interview with USA Today in July 2009, General McChrystal argued
“the best way to defeat IEDs will be to defeat the Taliban’s hold on the people.” 9 In the
fall of 2009, McChrystal ordered his commanders to increase the number of dismounted
patrols being conducted by U.S. and ISAF forces. “The Taliban responded by increasing
the number of improvised explosive devices targeting dismounted patrols from 71 in
September 2009 to 228 by January 2010.” 10
Unfortunately, these numbers foreshadowed a deadly trend that was only about to
get worse. According to the Civil Military Fusion Center, the number of IED events in
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Afghanistan increased to over 15,225 in 2010. 11 “This is a 62 percent increase over 2009
and more than three times as many as the year before.” 12 The number of American troops
killed by roadside bombs in 2010 soared by 60 percent, while the number of those
wounded almost tripled. 13 The number of IED events continued to rise in 2011, as more
than 16,554 IEDs detonated or were cleared that year. The number of IED events in 2011
was a new record and represented a nine percent increase from 2010. U.S. fatalities did
fall that year from 257 in 2010 to 196 in 2011, and overall fatalities fell from 499 to
418. 14
Figure 12: Executed IED Attacks Nationwide Monthly Attacks

Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE)
Database as of January 12, 2013, p.5. http://augengeradeaus.net/wp content/uploads/2013/02/ ISAF_
Monthly_ Trends_ Dec 2012.
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Beginning in 2012, the number of IED attacks began to drop in Afghanistan with
February 2012 representing one of the best months since the beginning of the surge in
2010. 15 Overall, “there were 15,222 incidents in 2012, an 8 percent decline from their
record high in 2011.” 16 These numbers (15,222) are very similar to the number of IED
events that occurred in 2010 (15,225). 17 Moreover, fewer U.S. troops (104) were killed
by IEDs in 2012 than in 2011 (183), a 57% decline. 18 Bombs wounded fewer troops too,
from 3,542 in 2011 to 1,744 in 2012, a 50% drop. 19 Afghan troops however, suffered a
“124% increase in the number of IED attacks against them in 2012.” 20
U.S. IED Casualties
According to the Pentagon’s Defense Casualty Analysis System and iCasualties,
the U.S. military suffered a total of 14,627 casualties between 2009 and 2011. Of that
total 8,680 or 59 percent were from IED explosions. 21 Since 2006, “the United States has
spent $18 billion dollars on high-tech solutions aimed at detecting and protecting soldiers
from IEDs including robots, armored vehicles, high-tech surveillance gear, and blimps
with spy cameras.” 22 Despite these efforts, the number of IED casualties rose
dramatically between 2008 and 2012. As shown in Figure 13, only 96 U.S. service
members were killed by IEDs between dramatically between 2008 and 2012.
In 2008, the number of casualties caused by IEDs jumped to 84, this represents
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54.2% of all U.S. fatalities for that year. 23 By 2009, the number of IED fatalities almost
doubled to 142, a 59% increase from the previous year. Unfortunately, the number of
IED casualties continued to rise in 2010, “reaching a record high of 257 fatalities. Of the
499 U.S. fatalities that year, over 51.5 percent were caused by IEDs.” 24
Figure 13: U.S. IED Fatalities/Total Fatalities in Afghanistan (2001-2013)

Source: Brookings Institute, “The Afghan Index,” p. 11, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/forei
gn% 20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20140227.pdf

Despite an increase in the number of IED events in 2011, (16,554), U.S. fatalities
did fall that year from 257 in 2010 to 196 in 2011, and overall fatalities fell from 499 to
418. 25 With the United States and NATO handing over security responsibility to ANSF
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forces and taking more of an advisory role in 2012, the number of IED fatalities
continued to decline in 2012. 26 According to statistics released by the Pentagon, “only
104 U.S. troops were killed by IEDs in 2012, compared with 196 in 2011, a 57% decline.
IED casualties accounted for 33.5 percent of all U.S. troops killed that year.” 27
Even though the number of U.S. casualties caused by IEDs dropped by more than
8 percent in 2012, a decrease in fatalities may not always tell the full story. 28 According
to Bill Roggio of The Long War Journal, “attacks were down overall nationwide in 2012
as Afghan forces were pushed to the fore.” 29 While the number of U.S. casualties in
Afghanistan dropped by more than 60% between 2012 and 2013, the number of Afghan
troops killed in combat shot up almost 80%. 30 “This is likely in response to ANSF forces
taking an increased role in combat operations as well as the ongoing decrease in the
number of international forces in the country.” 31 In 2013, 95% of all conventional
operations were carried out by Afghan forces as well as 98% of all special operations
missions.32 Thus, “casualties are not the best way to judge the strength or weakness of an
insurgency.” 33
Afghan Civilian IED Casualties
Since 2009, IEDs in Afghanistan have killed or injured 12,504 civilians. 34 Compared
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to 2009, “the number of civilian casualties increased by more than 40 percent in 2010.” 35
According to UNAMA, IED attacks accounted for the majority of civilians killed in
2010. “This dramatic increase in the use of IEDs in 2010, even when targeting a
legitimate military object disproportionately harmed civilians.” 36 More than 511 civilians
were killed in the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar in 2010. 37
Figure 14: Civilian Death by Tactic (2009-2011)

Source: “2011 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.11, http://unama.unmissions
.org/ Portals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012.pdf

Upon review, “there were more than 1,281 IED incidents in the southern region of
Afghanistan in 2010.” 38 The Helmand districts of Lashkar Gah and Nad Ali (including
Marjah) “saw the most civilian casualties in the province, with 40 per cent and 16 per
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cent respectively of civilian casualties caused by IEDs.” 39 All of these areas where the
focus of intense counterinsurgency efforts by U.S. and ISAF forces in 2010.
IEDs continued to be the Taliban’s weapon of choice in 2011 as UNAMA
recorded more than 967 civilian deaths and 1,586 injuries from IEDs that year. 40 A
majority of the civilians killed by IEDs were killed by victim –activated pressure plate
IEDs (PPIEDs). 41 PPIEDs in Afghanistan are set to explode when they are walked on or
driven over with a trigger weight between 10 kg and 100kg. 42 “The majority of PPIEDs
in Afghanistan have approximately 20 kg of explosives, more than twice the explosive
content of a standard anti-tank mine yet, they have the trigger of an anti-personnel
mine.” 43 This means that “every PPIED acts as a massive anti-personnel landmine with
the capability of destroying a tank; civilians who step on or drive over these IEDS have
no defense against them and little chance of survival.” 44
The number of Afghan civilians killed by IEDs continued to rise sharply in 2012,
“with a three percent increase compared to 2011.” 45 Between January 1st and December
31st, 2012, “UNAMA documented 782 IED incidents (more than two IEDs per day
causing civilian casualties in 2012) which resulted in 2,531 civilian casualties (868
civilian deaths and 1,663 injuries).” 46 UNAMA also observed “that in most cases of
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civilian casualties caused by IEDs, the device appeared not to have been directed at
specific military objectives or was used in a way that its effects were indiscriminate and
in violation of international humanitarian law.” 47 For example, “UNAMA confirmed 298
incidents causing 913 civilian casualties (393 deaths and 520 injuries) from PPIEDs
which had been planted on roads and footpaths frequently used by civilians.” 48 This is a
huge increase compared to 2011 when UNAMA documented 74 killed and 67 injured by
this tactic. 49
Figure 15: Civilian Deaths and Injuries: IEDs by Region (2009-2013)

Source: UNAMA, “2012 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.17 http://unama.
unmissions.org/ Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf
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provinces of Afghanistan, where they constituted the vast majority of IEDs used.” 50 The
Taliban released several statements in 2012 denying the use of IEDs to target civilians
indiscriminately. 51
Afghan Civilian Casualties and the U.S./ISAF Failure to Protect the Population
Another security indicator U.S. and ISAF forces used to track positive trends
made during the surge was the number of civilians killed or injured. The first principle of
COIN doctrine “is the need to secure the indigenous population in areas deemed centers
of gravity, politically, economically, and militarily.” 52 According to David Kilcullen, “in
areas where there is a high level of Afghan-on-Afghan violence the population is very
unlikely to feel safe enough to put their weapons down and join in peaceful negotiations
or support for the government.” 53 Also, “a spike in Afghan-on-Afghan violence in a
particular area probably correlates to a drop in public confidence.” 54 Supporters of the
surge argued that “behind the protective shield of increasing numbers of ISAF and
Afghan security forces, good government would emerge, the rule of law would take root
and prosperity would grow.” 55
During his June 2009, testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services
Committee, General Stanley McChrystal discussed how civilian casualties affect popular
perception and behavior.
“I would emphasize that how we conduct operations is vital to success…This is a
struggle for the support of the Afghan people. Our willingness to operate in ways
50
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that minimize casualties or damage, even when doing so makes our task more
difficult, is essential to our credibility.” 56
Then-Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, expressed the same opinion before Congress.
“But I will tell you that I believe that the civilian casualties are doing us enormous harm
in Afghanistan, and we have got to do better in terms of avoiding casualties. And I say
knowing full well that the Taliban mingle among the people, use them as barriers. But
when we go ahead and attack, we play right into their hands.” 57
When Afghans were asked what the main problems in their area were, most
respondents stated that ISAF was not able to protect them “24/7”, both physically and
psychologically. 58 Even though U.S. and ISAF forces conduct daily patrols and other
operations to clear insurgents from their hideouts, these groups return during the night
after Coalition forces have returned to their bases. “Insurgents take advantage of this by
extending their influence through intimidation and attacks on civilians and the
infrastructure they use.” 59 This fact turns the local population against ISAF and the
Afghan government “as they are not able to live up to the promises of security.” 60
Moreover, ‘it is the consensus view among NATO intelligence that the inadvertent killing
of civilians is one of the two or three things, along with corruption and favoritism
perhaps, that most help the Taliban in recruiting.” 61
Afghan Civilian Casualties in 2010
According to United Nation’s “Afghanistan: Annual Report 2012, Protection of
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Civilians in Armed Conflict”, the numbers of civilian casualties (both dead and injured)
has risen dramatically since 2009. 62 Before the surge in 2010, “UNAMA estimated that
more than 2,412 civilians were killed in 2009.” 63 However, the number of civilians killed
in Afghanistan increased by more than 15% in 2010. 64 In total, more than 2,777 Afghan
civilians were killed that year. “The overall rise in civilian deaths can be attributed to the
increased use of IEDs and targeted assassinations by insurgents and intensified military
operations particularly in southern Afghanistan.” 65
Although the majority of fighting in 2010 occurred in the southern and
southeastern regions, the insecurity of the conflict continued to spread to the northern,
eastern, and western regions. All regions apart from the eastern region experienced major
increases in the number of civilians killed compared to 2009. 66 “The northern region saw
an intensification of fighting throughout the year with the number of civilians killed
increased by 76 percent compared to 2009.” 67 Both the southern and southeastern regions
saw a rise in the number of civilian deaths compared to 2009, “with a 21 percent and 40
percent increase respectively.” 68
Upon review of Figure 16, more than 2,080 civilians were killed by AntiGovernment Elements in 2010. This represents 75% of all Afghan civilians killed that
year. 69 In total, the Taliban and other insurgent groups were responsible for 5,446 civilian
casualties in 2010. IEDs, suicide attacks, assassinations and executions, intimidation,
62
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harassment, and abductions were the main tactics used by the Taliban to undermine
support for ISAF and the Afghan government. 70
Figure 16: Recorded total Civilian deaths in 2010 by parties to the conflict

Source: UNAMA, “2010 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p. xi. http://unama.
unmissions.orgPortals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012

As seen in Figure 17, IED attacks account for the majority of civilians killed in
2010 with 904 killed and 1662 injured. Civilian casualties from IEDs increased by 40
percent compared to 2009. 71 “2010 was also characterized by an intensified, systematic,
and widespread campaign of intimidation by insurgents.” 72 According to the UN’s 2010
“Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” UNAMA recorded
381assassinations and executions in 2010. 73 This is more than double the incidents
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recorded in 2009. 74
Figure 17: Record AGEs-attributed civilian deaths in 2010 by incident type

Source: UNAMA, “2010 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p. 2
http://unama.missions.org.Portals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_F
inal_Feb%202012 pdf

Surprisingly, the number of civilians killed by suicide attacks decreased by 15
percent compared to 2009. 75 “This may have reflected guidance in the Taliban’s Code of
Conduct or Laiha to concentrate the use of these strategic weapons on very important
targets” and possibly the guidance to “avoid casualties among the common people.” 76 At
least 71 suicide attacks were carried out in 2010, killing 237 civilians and injuring 737. 77
The majority of these attacks occurred in Helmand and Kandahar provinces.
Even though the Taliban and other insurgent groups were responsible for a
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majority of the Afghan civilians injured or killed in 2010, some of these casualties can be
attributed to Pro-Government Forces (PGF), which include U.S., ISAF, and ANSF
forces. Between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2010, more than 840 civilians were
injured or killed by Pro-Government Forces with 440 civilian deaths and 400 injuries. 78
“This represents a decrease of 21 percent from the 1,057 civilian casualties linked to
PGFs in 2009.” 79 UNAMA also recorded a significant decline in civilian deaths from air
strikes (171), escalation of force incidents (45) and search and seizure operations (80)
during 2010. 80
According to a number of statements released by U.S. and ISAF forces, “more
aerial attacks, more operations by SOF forces, and more night raids were carried out in
2010 than in any previous year.” 81 In spite of this increase, “UNAMA observed a
significant decline in the number of civilians killed and injured by U.S., ISAF, and ANSF
forces as General Petraeus, who took over command of ISAF in July 2010, reinforced
and revised General McChrystal’s COIN guidelines.” 82 Although the number of civilian
casualties decreased by 43% in 2010, air strikes remained the deadliest tactic used by
U.S. and ISAF forces that year. 83 Compared to 2009, “these attacks continued to cause
the most civilian harm with 171 deaths and 133 injuries.” 84
In the second half of 2010, the number of air strikes increased substantially. 85
According to USAFCENT Public Affairs Directorate, “as of December 31, 2010, a total
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of 33,679 Close Air Support sorties were recorded with a total of 5,101 incidents in
which weapons were released.” 86 Although the number of air strikes increased
dramatically, the number of civilian casualties from these attacks decreased in 2010. 87
“February and October proved to be the deadliest months for civilians killed by ISAF
airstrikes in 2010.” 88
The number of civilian casualties caused by “night raids” also decreased in 2010.
“UNAMA documented 60 incidents of night raids that caused civilian casualties.” 89 Both
General McChrystal and General Petraeus increased the number of night raids carried out
by U.S. SOF forces in 2010. These raids are “carried out without warning on private
residences and are deeply resented by Afghans, who see troops entering their homes a
night as a blatant violation of their country’s conservative social norms.” 90 Moreover,
President Karzai began calling for an end to the U.S. night raids in 2010. 91 “U.S. military
officials however, deemed the tactic extremely effective in gathering intelligence,
arresting suspected insurgents, reducing civilian casualties, and stopping more attacks by
insurgent forces.” 92 U.S. and NATO commanders also stated that no shots are fired in 80
percent of night raids. 93
Afghan Civilian Casualties in 2011
Despite a renewed emphasis by Coalition and Afghan forces to protect the
86

Marc V. Schanz, “Boom Time in Afghanistan,” http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Docume
nts/2011/June %202011/0611afghanistan.pdf [accessed March 18-June 2011] 28.
87
Ibid., 28.
88
UNAMA, “2010 Annual Report on Protection,” 23.
89
Ibid., 24.
90
Anthony H. Cordesman, “Afghanistan at the End of 2011,” http://csis.org/files/publication/120103 _
Afghan_War_at_End.pdf [accessed March 18-January 3, 2012], 9.
91
Alex Rodriguez & Hashmat Baktash, “Afghanistan, U.S. Sign Night Raid Authorization Pact,” The Los
Angeles Times, April 8, 2012.
92
Ibid., 1.
93
Open Society Foundations, “The Cost of Kill/Capture: Impact of the Night Raid Surge on Afghan
Civilians,” http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Night-Raids-Report-FINAL092011.pdf [accessed March 18-September 19, 2011], 21.

103

population and winning over their support, “Afghanistan again incurred a greater human
cost in 2011 than in previous years.” 94 UNAMA documented 3,021 civilian deaths in
2011, “an increase of eight percent over 2010 (2,790 civilian deaths) and a 25 percent
increase from 2009.” 95 Since 2007, the number of Afghans killed has almost doubled
from 1,523 (2007) to 3,021 (2011). 96 Insurgents caused 2,322-related deaths of Afghan
civilians in 2011, up 14 percent from 2010. 97 More than 410 civilians were killed from
operations by U.S., ISAF, and ANSF forces, down four percent from 2010. 98
Figure 18: Civilian Deaths by Year (2007-2011)

Source: “2011 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.1, http://unama.unmissions.
org/Portal s/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%202011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012.pdf
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significantly, particularly in the second half of 2011.” 99 As the intensity of the conflict
declined in southern Afghanistan, it began to intensify in areas previously unaffected by
the insurgency, including the eastern and northern parts of Afghanistan. 100 During the
second half of 2011, “only 289 civilians were killed as a result of engagements between
insurgent and Coalition forces in southern Afghanistan.” 101 This is a decline of 33 percent
compared to the same period in 2010. 102 “Deaths from this tactic decreased in all regions
except, the eastern region, where 72 civilians died in ground combat, up 29 percent from
2010.” 103
As mentioned earlier, insurgents were responsible for 77 percent of all conflictrelated civilian deaths in 2011. 104 “The use of IEDs by insurgent groups was the single
largest killer of Afghan men, women, and children in 2011, taking the lives of 967
civilians or nearly one in three (32 percent) of all civilians killed in the conflict.” 105
During 2011, insurgents increased their use of anti-personnel landmines and IEDs even
though they banned them in 1998 denouncing such weapons as “un-Islamic and antihuman.” 106
Unlike 2010, the number of civilians killed by suicide attacks rose dramatically in
2011. 107 In total, “431 Afghan civilians were killed in suicide attacks, an increase of 80
percent over 2010.” 108 According to UNAMA, suicide attacks accounted for 14 percent
of all civilian deaths in 2010. The number of suicide attacks carried out by insurgents
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increased as well. 109 In 2011, there were more than 431 suicide attacks across
Afghanistan, compared to 238 in 2010. 110 Targeted killings of civilians by insurgents
increased as well. UNAMA documented 495 targeted killings across the country, up three
percent from 2010. 111
Despite an increase in the number of civilians killed by the Taliban and other
affiliated groups, there was a 4 percent decrease in the number of civilians killed by
Coalition and ANSF forces. 112 In 2011, more than 410 Afghan men, women, and children
were killed as a result of operations conducted by Pro-Government Forces. 113 The
number of civilians injured also decreased by more than 16% in 2011 compared to 2010.
Similar to 2009 and 2010, airstrikes by U.S. and ISAF warplanes accounted for the
majority of civilian deaths by U.S, NATO, and ANSF forces. 114
According to UNAMA, more than 187 civilians were killed in airstrikes by
Coalition forces in 2011. 115 This is a nine percent increase compared to 2010. 116
Interestingly enough, “less aerial operations were carried out by ISAF/Operation
Enduring Freedom using fixed or rotary-wing aircraft (from 1,816 in 2010 to 1,675 in
2011).” 117 Unlike previous years, “the eastern region of Afghanistan saw the majority of
civilian deaths from aerial attacks in 2011.” 118 Kunar province, in particular, experienced
a third of all civilian deaths by Coalition aircraft that year.
The United States and ISAF also took additional steps in 2011 to help minimize
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the impact of night operations on civilians. In December of that year, General John Allen,
the new commander of ISAF,
“issued a directive that encouraged ANSF to take the lead on operations, required
that the provincial governor or his designated representative be notified prior to
the commencement of an operation, provide written notification of any
individuals detained within 24 hours where possible and that entry is initiated by
‘soft-knock’ with an Afghan led call-out in local language.” 119
Despite these new ROEs, “UNAMA continued to receive reports that the standard of
partnered operations was not often followed in night search operations.” 120
Another concerning finding reported in the UN’s “2011 Annual Report on
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, was the number of civilians killed by
operations and actions of the Afghan National Security Forces. 121 Between July and
December 2011, 41 civilians were killed as a result of operations carried out by the
ANSF. 122 This represented “a 192 percent increase in the number of civilian deaths
attributed to these forces compared to the last six months of 2010.” 123 UNAMA recorded
minimal increases or decreases in civilian casualties caused directly by ANSF forces in
transitioned areas. 124
Afghan Civilian Casualties in 2012
Despite the positive security gains made in southern Afghanistan in 2011, Afghan
civilians continued to be killed and wounded at an alarming rate in 2012. UNAMA
documented 7,559 civilian casualties (2,754 civilian deaths and 4,805 injuries from
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armed conflict in 2012. 125 “These numbers reflect a 12 percent reduction in civilian
deaths and a minimal increase in civilians injured compared to 2011.” 126 Despite this
decrease, the Taliban and other insurgent groups continued to target civilians throughout
the country.
Figure 19: Civilian Deaths by Year: 2007-2012

Source: UNAMA, “2012 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.1, http://unamam
issions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K0B5RL2XYcU%3D

According to the UN’s report, 81 percent of all civilian casualties in 2012 can be
attributed to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. 127 “The heavy use of IEDs by
insurgents remained the biggest threat to civilians in 2012, causing 2,531 civilian
casualties with 868 civilians killed and 1,663 injured, in 782 separate incidents.” 128 This
represented a three percent increase from 2011. Moreover, IED incidents accounted for
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38 percent of all civilian casualties in 2012. 129
UNAMA also recorded a 108 percent increase in the number of Afghan civilians
injured or killed as a result of targeted killings. 130 Between January 1, and December 31,
2012, more than 1,077 Afghan civilians were injured or killed. 131 “Many of these
casualties resulted from the intentional targeting of civilians perceived to be supporting
the Afghan Government, including government officials, off-duty police officers, tribal
elders, and persons supporting the peace process.” 132 Of these 1,077 civilian casualties,
“targeted killings and injuries of government civilian employees increased by a
staggering 700 percent.” 133
Civilian deaths and injuries caused by Coalition and ANSF forces continued to
decline in 2012, just like they had in the previous two years. 134 Between January 1 and
December 31, 2012, “UNAMA recorded 587 civilian casualties (316 deaths and 271
injuries) attributed to PGFs.” 135 This represented a “39 percent decrease in civilian deaths
and 53 percent reduction in civilians injured, and an overall 46 percent decrease in total
civilian casualties from 2011.” 136 Eight percent of all civilian casualties in 2012 were
attributed to U.S., NATO, and ANSF forces, compared to 14 percent in 2011. 137
Despite a decline in the number of civilians killed in aerial operations, airstrikes
continued to be main cause of civilian deaths by ISAF and Afghan forces.
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airstrikes (126 deaths and 78 injuries).” 139 This is a 42 percent decrease from 2011.
“Airstrikes caused 40 percent of all civilian deaths attributed to Coalition and ANSF
forces and three percent of all civilian casualties from all parties.” 140 Of the 126 civilian
deaths caused by aerial attacks, 40 percent were children. 141
Figure 20: AGE Civilian Deaths by Core Tactics (2010-2012)

Source: UNAMA, “2012 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.29, http://unama
missions. org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K0B5RL2XYcU%3D

The number of civilians killed as result of night raids conducted by U.S, ISAF,
and Afghan SOF teams also decreased in 2012. According to UNAMA, “only 54
civilians were killed while 21 were injured during these operations, a decrease of 33
percent compared with 2011.” 142 This is consistent with the downward trend documented
in the same periods in 2010 and 2011. UNAMA was also able to document 35 search
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operations by PGF forces which resulted in civilian casualties, a 78 percent drop in the
number of incidents of search operations resulting in civilian casualties compared to
2011. 143 Despite this decrease, “it remains unclear whether the decline in civilian
casualties can be attributed to the better practices and training of Afghan security forces
or a reduction in the number of search operations being carried out.” 144 In July 2012,
Afghan security forces began taking the lead in the majority of military operations,
although U.S. and ISAF forces may have been present during these operations. 145 The
majority occurred during ground operations against insurgents, “usually following an
attack against an ANSF checkpoint or convoy.” 146
Figure 21: Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Aerial Attacks (2010-2012)

Source: UNAMA, “2012 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” p.32, http:
//unamumissions. org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K0B5RL2XYcU%3D
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Enemy Initiated Attacks
Since 2009, “ISAF reporting – and a great deal of U.S. reporting as well – focused
on one set of criteria: enemy initiated attacks (EIAs).” 147 The U.S. and ISAF define EIAs
as “enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, as well as executed
attacks.” 148 At first, EIAs were “believed to be a useful surrogate metric for determining
which side possesses the tactical initiative as well as a key indicator of which side
controls initiation of firefights and has better situational awareness and access to
intelligence on enemy movements.” 149 However, the reporting of this metric was ceased
on March 5, 2013 after it became clear there was no progress made by Coalition forces
between 2011 and 2012. 150
ISAF and DoD reporting do indicate that the number of enemy initiated attacks
did drop between 2011 and 2012 “but these reports also indicate EIAs did not drop
meaningfully in 2012 and remain far higher than in 2009.” 151 This reporting also shows
that the number of EIAs in Kandahar and Helmand provinces (the main focus of the
surge) continued to remain high in 2012. 152 A breakout of the trend in enemy initiated
attacks by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is shown in Figure 22. It not
only “shows no significant progress when 2010 is compared to 2011 and 2012, but it also
shows that insurgents kept up the pace of their attacks by shifting away from ISAF
targets and focusing on ANSF and civilian targets.” 153
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Figure 22: Average Daily EIAs by Type in Afghanistan, Dec 2005-Dec 2012

Source: Afghanistan, Key Oversight Issues, Government account Office, February 2013, GAO-13-218SP,
p.17.

Another report that indicates the number of EIAs did not drop meaningfully
between 2010-2012 and remains far higher than levels in 2009 is ISAF’s “Monthly Data
Trends” report. This data comes from the Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined
Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) and defines EIAs as “enemy-initiated
direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, as well as executed attacks.” 154 ISAF includes
a bar chart of EIAs in its monthly reporting on the violence in Afghanistan. 155 “Although
the underlying data used to make the graphs is classified, it is possible, based on ISAF’s
reporting, to estimate the number of EIAs each month.” 156
According to Figure 23, “the number of EIAs exceeded or approximated 1,000 in
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just four months, and in no month did that figure reach 1,500 in 2008.” 157 Violence
continued to rise in 2009 as the number of EIAs “exceeded 1,000 in eight months out of
the year, 1,500 in five months, and topped 2,500 in one month (August 2009).” 158 By
2010, when the surge was first implemented, the number of EIAs exceeded 1,000 in
every month. “In ten of twelve months, the number of EIAs exceeded 1,500. (Recall that
in 2008 the number of EIAs did not reach 1,500 in any single month).” 159 Moreover, the
“number of EIAs was greater than 2,500 in six months out of the year.” 160 The number of
enemy initiated attacks also topped 4,000 for the first time in both August and September
of that year. While the level of violence “continued to remain high in 2011, the number of
EIAs began to decline in May of that year.” 161
Figure 23: Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIA) Nationwide Monthly Attacks
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After five consecutive years where enemy initiated-attacks and overall violence
increased sharply each year (e.g., up 94 percent in 2010 over 2009), “such attacks began
to decrease in May 2011 compared to the previous year and continued to decline for the
rest of 2011.” 162 In comparison, the number of EIAs only exceeded 3,000 in three months
in 2011 (June, July, & August) compared to six months in 2010. 163 The lowest number of
EIAs reported in 2011 was in February (under 1,500). 164 This month represented “the
first time the number of EIAs had not topped 1,500 since February 2010.” 165
Even though the number of enemy initiated attacks did drop in 2011 and 2012,
“these numbers are far closer to 2010 in terms of the total level of violence than 2008 or
2009.” 166 When compared to monthly totals from 2009, the total number of EIAs in 2011
and 2012 has been far greater each month. 167 While the total number of EIAs exceeded
2,500 in only one month in 2009, “it topped this same mark on five occasions in 2011,
and five months in 2012.” 168
Despite progress made by U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, the number of
EIAs did not decline as significantly in 2012 as they had in 2011. 169 In January 2013, the
U.S. and ISAF discovered that a number of EIAs reported from independent ANSF
operations had not been included in its database. 170 These EIAs occurred throughout
2012, although most occurred towards the end of the year. The ANSF had accurately
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reported this data, but ISAF mistakenly did not enter the data into its main EIA
database. 171 According to Anthony H. Cordesman (2013), “an internal audit resulted in a
retroactive correction of 2012 EIA totals, from being down 7 percent compared to 2011
to no change.” 172 The error revealed by the discovery in January has since then been
corrected (Figure 24), and all EIA-related data in this report uses this corrected data.
Figure 24: Number of Enemy Initiated Attacks Has Recovered Since the “Surge”:
No Progress in reducing EIAs in the First Six Months of 2013 versus First Six
Months of 2012

Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. A-1.

In contrast, Figures 25 through 27 show that “even if one does confine EIA
reporting to combat areas and tie it to specific regions,” 173 the figures do not show any
“significant” progress made by U.S. and ISAF forces in Helmand and Kandahar
provinces in 2011 and 2012. This is particularly important because plans to carry out a
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similar campaign in the east were canceled due to U.S. and NATO troop cuts. Thus, there
was no broad effort to take back control of key areas in eastern Afghanistan. 174 Figure 25
shows “what appear to be positive trends in enemy initiated attacks in the Helmand area –
which was the key focus of the surge: however, these trends do little more than show that
the insurgents stopped making attacks they know would result in major losses during the
peak of the surge in 2010.” 175 As seen in Figure 25, this “positive” trend largely vanishes
in 2011. 176
Figure 25: EIA Monthly Year-Over-Year Changes in RC SW (Jan 09-Dec 12)

Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE)
Database as of January 12, 2013, p.4. http://augengeradeaus.net/wp content/uploads/2013/02/ ISAF_
Monthly_ Trends_ Dec 2012. Pdf

Another area that was a key focus of U.S. and ISAF counterinsurgency efforts
was Kandahar province. Kandahar falls under the command of RC South (RC-S) which
includes the provinces of Uruzgan, Zabul, and Daykundi as well. Even though progress
was made in reversing the Taliban’s momentum in Kandahar, this area saw far fewer
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positive trends in EIAs during the 2010-2011 campaign than RC SW. Upon review, the
number of EIAs surged in Kandahar and the rest of RC South during the summer of
2010. While some progress was made in 2011, violence in Kandahar continued to remain
well above levels before the surge in 2010. Moreover, the number of enemy initiated
attacks increased once again during the spring and summer of 2012 and has declined very
little since then.
Figure 26: EIA Monthly Year-Over-Year Changes in RC S (Jan 09-Dec 12)

Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE)
Database as of January 12, 2013, p.4. http://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ ISAF
_Monthly_Trends_Dec2012.pdf

A final area that was the focus of intensive U.S. and ISAF military operations is
RC East. RC East includes the provinces of Bamyan, Ghazni, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar,
Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktiya, Panjshayr, Parwan and
Wardak. It covers 46,000 square miles and shares a portion of its border with Pakistan.
Moreover, this area serves as the home turf of the Haqqani Network. As seen in Figure
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27, RC E accounted for 38% of all EIAs reported in Afghanistan in 2012. This is a
decrease of 8% compared to 2011, but unlike RC South and RC Southwest, RC East has
seen very few positive trends, even less than RC South. 177 EIAs increased for 29
consecutive months between January 2009 and May 2011, before the there was any
decline. Even then, this decline was insignificant as the number of attacks has increased
since May 2011 and remains at levels well above EIA levels before the surge in 2010.
Figure 27: EIA Monthly Year-Over-Year Changes in RC E (Jan 09-Dec 12)

Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE)
Database as of January 12, 2013, p.4. http://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ISAF
_Monthly_Trends_Dec2012.pdf

Unfortunately, there is no way of telling if the U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy
would have been successful in quelling the insurgency plaguing eastern Afghanistan as
the United States began withdrawing troops before they could be dispatched to this
region. On June 22, 2011, President Obama announced that all of the 33,000 additional
177
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troops sent to Afghanistan would be withdrawn by September 2012. Defense Secretary
Gates and General Petraeus had initially pushed for a drawdown of 3,000-5,000 so that
U.S. forces could dispatch a small number of troops to the eastern provinces of Paktika,
Paktia, and Khost to conduct counterterrorism operations against Haqqani Network
fighters, leaders, and infrastructure. 178 This, in turn, “would have halted the Haqqani
Network’s momentum and prevent them from spreading into adjacent provinces and,
most importantly, to the national capital of Kabul.” 179 Despite these recommendations,
Obama ultimately decided to adopt a more aggressive withdrawal plan citing that the
current military campaign was “meeting our goals” in Afghanistan and the drawdown
would begin “from a position of strength.” 180
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CHAPTER VI: EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A MORE CAPABLE & ACCOUNTABLE
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
“A government that is losing to a counterinsurgency isn’t being outfought, it is being out-governed.”
-David Kilcullen

One of the biggest challenges to U.S. success in Afghanistan over the last decade
has been wide-spread corruption and a lack of governance by the Afghan Government.
According to FM 3-24, “good governance is normally a key requirement to achieve
legitimacy for the Host Nation (HN) government.” 1 FM 3-24 defines governance “as the
Host Nation government’s ability to gather and distribute resources while providing
direction and control for the society.” 2 These include the regulation of public activity,
taxation, maintenance of security, control and essential services, and normalizing the
means of succession of power. 3 Governments “that attain these goals usually garner the
support of enough of the population to create stability.” 4
Since 2002, Afghanistan has consistently ranked as one of the world’s most
corrupt nations, along with Syria, Somalia, and North Korea. 5 In 2009, Afghanistan
ranked 179 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index, making it-by that standard-the second most corrupt country in the world. An ABC
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poll in the winter of 2009-210 found that 95 percent of Afghans calls corruption a
problem, and 76 percent called it a “big problem.” 1 This is 31 percent points higher than
in 2007. 2 Integrity Watch Afghanistan released a survey in June 2010 that found
“Afghans considered corruption to be the third largest problem in the country, following
security and unemployment.” 3
The Afghan people “are likewise not enthralled by an overly centralized and
controlling government in Kabul. They prefer local governance and local security with
some enablers and resources from the central government.” 4 The Afghans also want
fundamental services such as education and roads. According to LTC Chris Cavoli, “the
Taliban seek ways to prevent the Afghan government from taking actions that would
legitimate itself by providing reconstruction and security, making possible economic
activity other than narcotics cultivation and trafficking.” 5 Thus, Afghans “who have
minimal positive ties with their national government, have minimal incentive to support
it.” 6 Even though many Afghans are dissatisfied with aid ineffectiveness, corruption, and
government failure to protect the population, support for the Taliban remains low.
According to David Kilcullen, “Afghans hate the Taliban; even today only four
percent want them back.” 7 Moreover, 63 percent of Afghans surveyed in 2008 wanted
Coalition troops to stay, while 82 percent wanted the current government to continue
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ruling Afghanistan. Forty-nine percent of these respondents also rated the central
government’s performance as good or excellent. 8 Thus, Afghan support remained one of
the United States’ and ISAF’s most important assets heading into 2010. 9
Under the guidance of Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus, the
Obama administration identified the need to “separate insurgent influence from the
populace and support Afghan government sub-national structures to establish rule of law
and deliver basic services” 10 as one of the three principal efforts of the United States'
counterinsurgency strategy. To gauge progress made in this aspect of the war, the
Defense Department developed a series of metrics for estimating the level of Afghan
government influence and control, and the impact of aid programs: (1) Corruption, the
misuse of entrusted power for private gain; (2) Rule of Law, the lack of effective
government; (3) Improving Afghan subnational governance, building governance from
the bottom up; and (4) Revenue collection, the rate and success of taxation is a measure
for government support. 11
Even though some of the “metrics used to gauge progress are inconsistent and
fewer and fewer have been provided as U.S. and NATO forces continue their withdrawal
from Afghanistan,” 12 these measures do provide insight into U.S. and ISAF efforts to
improve Afghan governance and corruption between 2010 and 2012. Moreover, these
measurements also give a way of determining whether or not the United States
counterinsurgency strategy was successful in promoting a more capably and accountable
8
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Afghan government.
Corruption: More Dangerous than the Taliban?
One of the biggest threats to Afghanistan over the last decade has been corruption.
According to Tom Pike and Eddie Brown, (2011), “Corruption permeates every facet of
Afghan governance from high levels of grand corruption at the national government to
petty corruption at the lower levels of government.” 13 Corruption has become in effect, a
“domestic issue on its own terms as well as a factor contributing to terrorism and
insurgency.” 14 Since 2001, “one of the unquestioned premises of American and NATO
policy has been that ordinary Afghans do not view public corruption quite the same way
that Americans and other Westerners do.” 15 Diplomats, military officers, and senior
officials flying in from Washington “often say privately that while public graft is
pernicious, there is no point in trying to abolish it-and that trying to do so could destroy
the very government the West has helped to build.” 16
The spread of corruption in Afghanistan has also been facilitated by the sudden
inflow of foreign aid over the past decade. “This had led to a nationwide crisis that has
undercut both the capability and legitimacy of the Afghan government to implement any
effective policy as well as the well-meaning actions of foreign supporters, including the
U.S. and UN.” 17 Although the pre-2001 Taliban proved corrupt in practice when they
came to power, many Afghans have turned to the Taliban shadow government, because
the current government has been unsuccessful at establishing a consistent and enforceable
13
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rule of law. 18
According to a report released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) in 2010, “Afghan citizens had to pay approximately US$ 2.5 billion in bribes
which is equivalent to 23 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).” 19 This
is similar to the revenue accrued by the opium trade in 2009 (which UNODC estimates at
US$ 2.8 billion). 20 “Drugs and bribes are the two largest income generators in
Afghanistan; together they correspond to about half the country’s licit GDP.” 21
The report also showed that graft was a part of everyday in Afghanistan. During
the survey period, one Afghan out of two had to pay at least one kickback to a public
official. 22 “In more than half the cases (56%), the request for illicit payment was an
explicit demand by the service provider.” 23 In three quarters of the cases, baksheesh
(bribes) were paid in cash. 24 The average bribe is US$ 160, in a country where GDP per
capita is a mere US$ 425 per year. 25
Moreover, the survey also finds that those entrusted with upholding the law are
seen as most guilty of violating it. 26 “Around 25 percent of Afghans had to pay at least
one bribe to police and officials during the survey period.” 27 Between 10-20 percent had
to pay bribes either to judges, prosecutors, or members of the government. 28 The
international community does not escape criticism: 54 percent of Afghans believe that
18
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international organizations and NGOs "are corrupt and are in the country just to get
rich". 29
Between 2010 and 2012, the U.S. and Afghan governments established a number
of programs to combat graft in Afghanistan. 30 General H.R. McMaster, a key deputy of
General Petraeus’s, “formed several DoD task forces to focus on corruption (Shafafiyat,
Task Force Spotlight, and Task Force 2010) from a U.S. military/counterinsurgency
perspective.” 31 These task forces, in part, reviewed U.S. contracting strategies to enhance
Afghan capacity and reduce the potential for corruption. 32 The Shafafiyat task force
announced in February 2012 that it had “caused the restitution of $11.1 million, $25.4
million in fines, and $3.4 million in seizures from allegedly fraudulent contractors, and
had debarred or suspended more than 125 American, Afghan and international workers
for alleged fraud.” 33
Senior U.S. officials also helped the Afghan government create a number of
oversight bodies to curb corruption. Since 2008, several additional investigative bodies
have been established under the Ministry of Interior. 34 “The most prominent is the Major
Crimes Task Force, tasked with investigating public corruption, organized crime, and
kidnapping.” 35 A related body is the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU), “run by several
dozen Afghan police officers, vetted and trained by the DEA.” 36 This body was
responsible for the August 2010 arrest of Mohammad Zia Salehi, a Karzai aide, on
29
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charges of soliciting a bribe from the New Ansari Money Exchange in exchange for
ending a money-laundering investigation of the firm. 37 The Afghan government also
“finalized a National Corruption Strategy (Azimi Report) on December 21, 2010 and
committed to enacting 37 laws to curb corruption.” 38 Despite the progress made by the
United States and Afghan government in fighting corruption, Afghanistan continues to
rank as one of the world’s most corrupt nations. 39
Figure 28: Afghanistan’s Rank in Transparency International’s Annual (CPI)

(T): Indicates years of Afghanistan’s score tied with one or more other country.
According to Transparency International’s Annual Corruption Perception Index,
Afghanistan has consistently ranked as one of the top five corrupt countries in the world
since 2008. In 2008, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan 176th out of 180
countries, only fourth from the worst case. Since then its ratings have continued to slip.
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Between 2010 and 2012, Afghanistan ranked 176th out of 180 in 2010, 180 out of 182 in
2011, and 174 out of 176 in 2012. 40 In 2013, Afghanistan tied North Korea and Syria as
the most corrupt country in the world. 41
Integrity Watch Afghanistan reports that Afghans, whom they surveyed in 2010,
“thought that the following four sectors were affected most from corruption: justice,
security, municipal government, and customs.” 42 Some commentators and organizations
have argued “that many of the forms of corruption noted above are somehow part of the
fabric of Afghan culture and society and that they are acceptable to many Afghans.” 43 In
December 2010, General Petraeus drew a lot of criticism for saying that corruption had
always been a part of Afghan history and culture. 44
Such comments “added to an ongoing debate concerning what levels and types of
corruption might be acceptable to Afghans and which they considered unacceptable.” 45
Integrity Watch Afghanistan provides some insight into this issue through its 2010
Afghanistan Survey. Figure 29 shows the type of corrupt behavior which Afghans said
they find acceptable and unacceptable. As the data itself shows, it does not appear that
any kind of corruption is acceptable to the Afghan people. Unfortunately, such polls have
done little to change the view of Westerners as many U.S. and international officials
believe corruption to be an internal problem.
Figure 29: Afghan’s Tolerance of Various types of Corruption
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Source: Afghanistan Integrity Watch, “2010 Afghanistan Survey,” p.4 https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo.afg
/Documents/Governance/Afghanistan_Corruption_Introduction.pdf

According to a report released by the Asia Foundation on December 11, 2013,
“Afghans see corruption as a major problem in all facets of life and at all levels of
government. Roughly half see corruption as a problem in their neighborhood.
More see it in their daily life, and almost 60 percent experience it at the hands of
local authorities. Roughly two thirds say it is a major problem at the provincial
level, and more than three quarters, 77 percent, say corruption is a major problem
in Afghanistan as a whole.” 46
Numbers have not been this high since 2006, according to the report, prior to the
Coalition troop surge in 2010. 47
The amount of bribery paid by Afghans has also increased significantly from
2007 to 2012. 48 In 2007, “$466 million were paid in bribes, this amount doubled in 2010
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and almost tripled in 2012.” 49 The 2012 data shows an overall increase of 16% in bribery
compared to 2010. 50 As seen in Figure 30, “an estimated 62.6 billion Afs
(62,582,667,120 Afs=1,254,543,390 USD) were paid in bribes in 2012. Compared to
2010, this number shows an increase of 16% (8,599,184,118 Afs in 2010).” 51 While in
2010, the average number of bribes per year was 3.4; in 2012 this number rose to 4.0. 52
Furthermore in 2012, less adults (55,510) paid bribes compared to 2010. 53 “This was a
3.4% decrease in the number of Afghan adults who paid bribes in 2012 compared to
2010.” 54
Figure 30: Estimated Amount of Money Paid in Bribes per Year

Source: Afghanistan Integrity Watch, “2012 Key Findings,” p.1 http://www.iwaweb.org/ncs/_2012/key_fin
dings.html

The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Missing in Inaction
Over the past few years, the international community has “increasingly
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recognized that the lack of focus on the rule of law, including security sector reform,
have undoubtedly contributed to the boom of organized drug-related criminality and
corruption in Afghanistan.” 55 As a consequence, “the development of Afghanistan’s
judicial institutions was considered by many U.S. and ISAF officials to be essential in
winning the support of the Afghan population, improving the Afghan government’s
credibility and legitimacy, and reducing support for insurgent factions.” 56
According to Seth G. Jones, there have been several challenges to improving
Afghanistan’s justice system. 57 “First, the central government’s inability to decrease the
power of the warlords and exert control over the country impacted justice reform.” 58
Shortly after the overthrow of the Taliban in December 2001, warlords began taking
control of the local in areas under their control. This led to intimidation of centrally
appointed judges. 59
Secondly, the “central government’s inability and unwillingness to address
widespread and deep-rooted corruption decreased the effectiveness of the justice
system.” 60 Over the last few years the Attorney General’s Office and Afghan Supreme
Court have also been accused of “significant corruption.” 61 Another challenge not
mentioned by Jones is “that a majority of Afghans have little or no access to judicial
55
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institutions.”62 Many of the courts used by the Afghan government were inoperable and
those that did function were severely understaffed. 63 As a result, a “growing number of
Afghans have been forced to accept the rough justice of the Taliban and criminal
powerbrokers in areas of the country that lie beyond government control.” 64
In 2008, press reports began to surface, “indicating that many Afghans who are
not sympathetic to the Taliban seem to believe that the Islamic Emirate is more capable
than the Afghan government in maintaining law and order, both in terms of policing
(catching culprits) and in delivering justice.” 65 In an attempt to “outgovern” the Afghan
government, the Taliban made the re-establishing of their judicial system as their top
non-military priority in 2005. 66 The first signs of Taliban provincial governors and judges
date back to 2003, when the Taliban started controlling significant areas of Afghan
territory. 67 The Taliban’s effort initially faced little opposition as the Afghan government
and U.S./ISAF forces paid little attention. 68 Many observers believed “that the new
governance system was merely a façade and that its purpose had more to do with public
relations and propaganda than anything else.” 69 From about 2006, district governors and
“chiefs of security” also started being reported. By 2010, 33 provincial governors and
about 180 district governors were said to be in existence.
62

International Crisis Group, “Reforming Afghansitan’s Broken Judiciary,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/
asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx [accessed
April 4-November 2010], 1.
63
Ibid., 1.
64
Nick Grono, “Rule of Law and the Justice System in Afghanistan,” 1.
65
Pamela Constable, “As Crime Increases in Kabul, So Does Nostalgia for the Taliban,” The Washington
Post, September 25, 2008.
66
Kaufman, Kraay & Mastruzzi, Governance Matters V, pp. 113-115
67
Antonio Giustozzi, “Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun, the Taliban’s Shadow Government,” http://
cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/prism71-80_giustozzi.pdf [accessed April 4-March 2012], 1.
68
Angela Priestley, “Taliban Survives Through the Rule of Law,” http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news
/ taliban-survives-through-rule-of-law- [accessed April 4-September 7, 2009],
69
Antonio Giustozzi, Claudio Franco, & Adam Baczko, “Shadow Justice: How the Taliban run their
Judiciary?” http://www.iwaweb.org/_docs/reports/research/shadow_justice-how_the_ taliban_
run_their_judiciary.pdf [accessed April 4-December 2012], 13.

132

ISAF also estimated that there were 15 Taliban courts operating in southern
Afghanistan during this time, mainly involved with resolving local disputes. 70 Before
2011, the Taliban mostly maintained fixed courts in known locations, where
complainants could approach judges or clerks and file a case. 71 “Many villagers
appreciated the quick justice provided by the Taliban, where trials would rarely last more
than two weeks.” 72 David Kilcullen described the work of the Taliban courts as
“translating local dispute resolution and mediation into the local rule of law, and thus into
political power.” 73
Due to the threat of “night raids” the Taliban began relying more on mobile courts
in the spring of 2011. 74 The Taliban were “rapidly forced to abandon the fixed courts
system in most if not all provinces and switched to a mobile courts system, where the
judges would hold a trial at a different place each time within a particular district.” 75
These operations also made it more difficult for villagers to access the courts, although
the Taliban have adapted “by tasking commanders to enquire in the villages if anybody
needed the judges and by giving elders mobile numbers to call.” 76 By 2011, the Taliban
judiciary seemed to have adapted pretty well to the new challenge. 77
In February 2010, the U.S. State Department issued the Afghanistan and Pakistan
Regional Stabilization Strategy, which included “enhancing Afghan rule of law” as one
of its nine key initiatives for Afghanistan. The 2010 Stabilization Strategy identified five
major ROL program objectives including: (1) capacity building for the formal justice
70
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sector; (2) strengthening traditional justice; (3) enhanced access to formal justice; (4)
corrections sector support; and (5) enhanced and focused outreach. 78 Justice sector
reform was also featured in the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan. 79
Other strategies and guidance created by the U.S. to help improve Afghanistan’s
judicial institutions include the U.S. Strategy for Rule of Law in Afghanistan and a U.S.
Strategy for Anti-Corruption in Afghanistan. According to the State Department, “the
Rule of Law Strategy is composed of four pillars, or goals:
Pillar 1: Tackle the pervasive culture of impunity and improve and expand access
to the state justice sector, by increasing capacity and reducing corruption in the
justice sector’s institutions;
Pillar 2: Support corrections reform;
Pillar 3: Provide security and space for traditional justice systems to re-emerge
organically in areas cleared of the Taliban and engage closely at the grassroots
level to ensure dispute resolution needs in the local communities are being met;
and
Pillar 4: Build the leadership capacity of the Afghan government’s justice sector,
and civil society generally.” 80
Despite these efforts by the international community and Afghan government, “data from
the World Bank suggest that Afghanistan’s rule of law continues to be one of the least
effective—if not the least effective—in the world.” 81
The data used by the World Bank measure the extent to which populations have
confidence in, and abide by, the rules of society. 82 They also include perceptions of the
incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the
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enforceability of contracts. 83 Figure 31 illustrates Afghanistan’s rule of law in
comparison to other countries in the region. The data show that Afghanistan’s justice
system started from a low base. 84 When the United States and its Afghan allies overthrew
the Taliban in 2001, “Afghanistan had the lowest-ranking justice system in the world,” 85
and it has improved very little over the course of reconstruction efforts and the surge. In
comparison to other countries in the region—such as Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—“Afghanistan’s justice system was one of the least
effective and ranked at the bottom.” 86
Figure 31: Afghanistan Rule of Law Indictors from World Bank

Source: World Bank, Aggregate Governance Indicators Data, 2002-2012, (Washington: World Bank,
2013)

Civilian Surge and Renewed Military Focus on District Governance
For more than a decade, improving governance in Afghanistan “has been
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recognized as the most difficult and critical challenge involving Afghanistan
reconstruction.” 87 Between 2002 and 2010, the international community focused a
majority of its assistance and efforts on increasing the capacity and effectiveness of the
Afghan national government. “This did little to improve the everyday lives of the Afghan
people who had very little contact with the government in Kabul.” 88 As a result, the
COIN strategy adopted by the Obama administration aimed to connect local governance
structures to national ones “from the bottom up.” 89
From 2010 to 2012, the number of representatives from the U.S. Agency for
International Aid (USAID), and the Departments of State, Justice, and Agriculture
roughly tripled from 300 to 1,000, overseeing additional thousands of contract civilian
implementing partners. 90 At the provincial level, “American-led Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which previously hosted one of two U.S. State
Department or USAID officers now became hubs of many more civilian personnel.” 91
Even though progress was made in certain municipalities, communities, and
districts, the United States and international community fell far behind in its efforts to
improve local government in critical Afghan districts. 92 “Of the 1,100 U.S. civilian
officials stationed in Afghanistan in 2011, over two-thirds were located in Kabul.” 93 This
did little to help a majority of Afghans, who lived in rural villages far from the capital.
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Moreover, “these experts reinforced the sense of big government coming from Kabul that
ultimately alienates populations and leaders in the provinces.” 94
According to Frances Brown, “efforts to improve Afghanistan’s subnational
institutions have failed because the United States’ counterinsurgency strategy rested on
three key assumptions that proved unrealistic.” 95 First, American plans “overestimated
the speed with which specific types of governance intervention would yield wider
progress.” 96 In military terminology, “the COIN strategy assumed that the campaign’s
quick success in “amassing security efforts” would be mirrored (or closely approached)
by the speed with which it amassed governance effects.” 97 The most high-profile
example of this driving assumption was “Operation Moshtarak”, which began on
February 15, 2010. 98
Billed as a model of the new, fully integrated counterinsurgency strategy,
“Operation Moshtarak” (Dari for Together or Joint) involved 15,000 American, British,
Canadian, Estonian, Danish, and Afghan troops aimed to remove the Taliban from its last
stronghold in central Helmand Province. 99 To distinguish it from previous offensives,
General McChrystal announced that NATO and Afghan officials had assembled a large
team of Afghan civil servants backed by 1,900 police officers, who would move into the
liberated town. “We’ve got a government in a box, ready to roll in,” he declared. 100
Faced with such overwhelming armed might, the Taliban disappeared after a few days of
fighting. On February 18, 2010, Afghan troops raised the national flag over the damaged
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bazaar.
Unfortunately, the trained Afghan officials promised by McChrystal--who would
jump in behind the troops and begin to govern and provide services--never
materialized. 101 “No Afghan wanted to serve in Marjah, because it was so insecure.” 102
By May, the situation had worsened to the point where the Americans were in control by
day but found themselves challenged by the gun-wielding Taliban at night. 103 Instead of
being the blueprint for the future in Afghanistan, Marjah had become in the words of
McChrystal, “a bleeding ulcer.” 104 Even apart from the high-profile Marjah campaign,
“several other local COIN efforts over-estimated the speed with which local district
governors would become locally viewed as ‘legitimate.” 105
A second miscalculation was “the expectation that the surge’s ‘bottom up’
progress-the result of dedicated work by locally-based U.S. and Afghan personnel-would
be matched by ‘top-down’ Afghan-led systemic reforms to make this local progress
durable.” 106 The U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy “deployed hundreds of civilians and
uniformed personnel at the district level to encourage district governors to become more
accountable to a broader spectrum of the population.” 107 These attempts were viewed
with little enthusiasm by the Afghan national government as “it threatened their heavily
centralized patronage system to ensure that district-level administrators maintained
101
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allegiance to the capital.” 108
According to Stephen Biddle, Hamid Karzai depends on the networks’ leadership
to deliver political support.
“In exchange, he empowers them with critical appointments, protects them from
prosecution, and allows them to prey on the public. The result is a government of
informal political deal making rather than rule-based administration by publicly
accountable institutions.109
Thus, “efforts to increase local accountability as well as local governance are
hindered by a lack of political will (or abundance of political obstruction) on top.” 110
Finally, the COIN strategy devised by McChrystal and Petraeus rested upon the
assumption “that the lack of governance was a universal driver of the insurgency, for
which service delivery was the appropriate cure.” 111 Though this rang true in some parts
of southern Afghanistan,” in other areas, particularly some remote parts of eastern
Afghanistan, observers suggested that the presence of U.S., ISAF, and ANSF forces
became a fueling factor.” 112 According to James Fussell, counterinsurgency has proved
more difficult to apply in the sparsely-populated mountains of Kunar and Nuristan
provinces. 113 Kunar Province in particular, has been a “no-go zone” since it rose up
against the Communists in 1978. 114
Although most observers see the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar as
being the heart of the Taliban insurgency, “the northeastern border province has been
described in mythic proportions as one of the most dangerous terrains for U.S. troops
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anywhere in Afghanistan.” 115 U.S. soldiers, who fight a bold enemy in Kunar’s rugged
mountains have dubbed it Afghanistan’s ‘Heart of Darkness.’ 116 From 2007-2011, U.S.
forces conducted numerous counterinsurgency operations in an attempt to win over the
local tribes’ support and built small outposts to stem the flow of foreign fighters coming
in from Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 117 Unfortunately, U.S. troops
were withdrawn from the region in 2011, “after it was determined that their presence
there only antagonized the locals and led them to carry out ambushes on U.S. patrols and
to attack U.S. combat outposts. “ 118
Generating Domestic Revenue Remains a Challenge
According to David Kilcullen, “the rate and success of taxation is a measure for
government support.” 119 In 2008, the Open Budget Index gave Afghanistan a score of 8
out of 100 for the openness of budget information by the Afghan government. 120 While
Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance continues to expand its tax code, “the central
government does not depend on the Afghan people for revenue because of its inability to
collect taxes.” 121 Since the population provides little to the national government, the
“government has little reason to provide services to the population and yet it must find
ways to fund the national budget.” 122
As pointed out by Colin Cookman & Caroline Wadhams (2010), “many factors
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have contributed to the international community and Afghan government’s limited
appetite to cultivate domestic revenue sources.” 123 Some of these factors include the
government’s limited control over local actors, weak popular legitimacy, active insurgent
violence, continued access to foreign funding, and the international community’s quickimpact security-and humanitarian-focused priorities. 124 Afghanistan is hugely dependent
on aid. A World Bank analysis in May 2012 suggested that only Gaza, the West Bank,
and Liberia have been so reliant. 125 As much as 80 percent of Afghanistan’s budget
comes from foreign aid. 126
Figure 32: Afghanistan’s Foreign Aid 2003-2011

Source: The Economist.Com, “The Hand that Feeds,” p.1 http://www.economist.com/node/21558635
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In a recent quarterly report, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) said that, “when security for aid workers is figured in, the total
amount of non-military funds Washington has appropriated since 2002 is approximately
$100 billion-more than the U.S. has ever spent to rebuild a country.” 127 Unfortunately,
“aid volume, rarely matched by efficiency.” 128 Since 2002, “some $55 billion of aid has
flowed into the country and billions of it has flowed out again to pay the salaries of
foreign staff and profits to foreign contractors.” 129 Thus, “only 10-25% of funds given are
spent on the ground in Afghanistan.” 130 Aid has also fed corruption in the government.
According to Paul Shinkman, corruption costs the Afghan government roughly $4 billion
each year. 131
Another factor that has contributed to the Afghan government’s inability to
cultivate domestic revenue is the withholding of funds by officials responsible for
customs revenue collection. 132 Over the last decade, “the government has clashed with
local efforts to renationalize their lucrative sources of income.” 133 One example of this is
“the central government’s showdown in 2004, with Herat’s former governor, the warlord
Ismail Khan, for the tax revenue from major border crossing points between Afghanistan
and Iran.” 134 The Afghan government marginalized the famous warlord from Herat and
secured profits from the Herat border. 135 It increased the government’s tax revenue sixfold from that border crossing, from $2 million U.S. dollars a month in 2001 to $12
127
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million U.S. dollars a months in 2005. 136
Upon review, Afghanistan’s score on the Open Budget Index has greatly
improved over the last six years. The Open Budget Survey “assesses whether the central
government in each country surveyed makes eight key budget documents available to the
public, as well as whether the data contained in these documents is comprehensive,
timely, and useful.” 137 The survey uses internationally accepted criteria to assess each
country’s budget transparency developed by multilateral organizations, such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), and the International Organization for Supreme Audit Institutions
(INTSOAI). The scores on 95 of the 125 Open Budget Survey questions are used to
calculate objective scores and rankings of each surveyed country’s relative
transparency. 138
Since 2008, Afghanistan’s score has risen 51 points. 139 In 2010, Afghanistan’s
OBI score rose 13 points to 21 in 2010. However, the biggest increase came in 2012,
when Afghanistan’s OBI score rose another 38 points to 59. 140 According to Open
Budget Index,
“Afghanistan’s score indicates that the government provides the public with only
some information on the national government’s budget and financial activity
during the course of the budget year. This makes it challenging for citizens to
hold the government accountable for its management of the public’s money.” 141
Nonetheless, Afghanistan’s OBI scores were the second greatest improvement in budget
transparency over all countries in the world in 2012. The score of 59 also “surpasses the
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target of 40 agreed upon by Afghanistan and the international community in the Tokyo
Mutual Accountability Framework.” 142 Compared to other countries in South Asia,
Afghanistan received one of the highest scores from Open Budget Index in 2012. Only
India (68), received a higher score.
Figure 33: OBI Scores for South Asia

Source: Open Budget Index, “Afghanistan 2012,” p.2, http://mof.govaf/en/news/16855
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CHAPTER VII: EFFORTS TO TRAIN & EQUIP A COMPETENT AFGHAN
NATIONAL SECURITY FORCE
We will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counterterrorism force,
which ensures that al Qaeda can never again establish a safe haven to launch attacks against us or our allies.
– President Barack Obama

As the United States and NATO continue the withdrawal of most of their troops
from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, “the U.S. military and its Coalition partners are
increasingly shifting security responsibilities to Afghan security forces.” 1 According to
Bill Rogio (201), “the success of this security transition depends greatly on the strength
and competence of the Afghan military and police.” 2 Thus the “training of the newlymustered Afghan forces became the linchpin of the United States’ counterinsurgency
strategy, which hinged upon the work of trainers with Afghan security forces.” 3
Unlike previous military doctrines, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps’ 2006
doctrine for counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) “underlines the need for assistance from the
military, along with other government agencies and Coalition partners, to organize the
host nation security forces required to establish and maintain security and stability within
their borders.” 4 This assistance may include developing, equipping, training, and
employing indigenous security forces to help carry out the counterinsurgency campaign.
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As of January 17, 2014, the United States has spent $59 billion funding security
forces in Afghanistan. 1 Most of these funds ($57.5 billion) “were appropriated through
the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and provided to the Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).” 2 Its purpose is to build, equip, train, and
sustain the ANSF, which comprises the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Air Force,
and the Afghan National Police. Within these units, “specialized personnel round out the
country’s security capabilities, including border police, public protection forces, local
police, narcotics officers, and communications and logistical staff.” 3
Despite the progress made in training Afghanistan’s security forces, “the
effectiveness, professionalism, and state of readiness of this security apparatus are
uneven.” 4 Within police units specifically, drug abuse, desertion, and violence remain
constant challenges. 5 The army also faces issues related to ethnic factionalism and poor
civilian oversight. 6 Here is a breakdown of each security component, and its current state
of effectiveness:
Afghan National Army: The ANA is widely seen as the most capable branch of
the country’s security forces. 7 The United States was the lead nation for building the
ANA, although the French, British, Turkish, and instructors from other coalition
countries were also involved. “The ANA structure includes 6 corps located in different
1
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parts of the country, 1 division (consisting of 2 brigades) based in Kabul, and 24
additional brigades (including 2 Mobile Strike Force brigades commanded from Kabul,
and deployed as needed throughout the country).” 8 The ANA is approximately 96%
complete with fielding forces with 11 specialty battalions remaining to be fielded. 9 As of
December 30, 2013, the size of the Afghan Army is roughly 185,386 soldiers including
nearly 11,000 Special Forces. 10
Afghan National Police: Made up of 152,600 personnel, “the ANP looks solid on
paper.” 11 Currently, “the Afghan Uniformed Police are responsible for public safety and
general enforcement and public safety with the Border Police patrolling the borders and
conducting counter-smuggling operations.” 12 There are also a number of more
specialized police units conducting operations like CT missions, criminal investigations,
and counter narcotics patrols. 13
According to General McChrystal, the Taliban “put a severe amount of pressure
on the police, particularly in areas where security is immature.” 14 Moreover, the
Pentagon has acknowledged that the development of Afghanistan's police force "has been
hindered by a lack of reform, corruption, insufficient U.S. military trainers and advisors,
and a lack of unity of effort within the international community." 15 Since 2011, there
have been some signs of progress as the number of units considered capable of
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independently planning and conducting operations has risen, albeit more slowly than the
Afghan Army. 16
Afghan Air Force: As of December 2013, there are approximately 6,529
Afghans serving in the AAF, including aircrew and maintenance and support personnel. 17
“The AAF currently has a fleet of 100 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, including 2 C-130s
and 12 Mi-17 helicopters that were delivered in September 2013.” 18 The re-establishment
of the AAF began later than that of the Army and Police and is expected to transition to
autonomous operations by 2017. 19
According to Seth G. Jones, the competence of Afghanistan’s security forces is
difficult to judge for two reasons. 20 First, “many of the most useful metrics are qualitative
rather than quantitative and difficult to measure accurately.” 21 Examples include the
performance of security forces in conducting cordon-and-search operations, border
security, patrols, riot control, intelligence collection, and combat operations. 22 Second,
“little data has been systematically collected for several decades in Afghanistan.” 23 For
example, “there are no reliable statistics on homicide rates, which may provide some
indication of the competence of police forces.” 24
Despite these difficulties, there are a few quantitative indicators that can be used
to measure ANSF progress:
1. Recruitment versus desertion rates: It is said that when an organization’s
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recruitment rates are higher than its desertion rates, morale is high. 25
However, “when desertion rates rise along with other indicators such as shortterm AWOL and increased sickness rates, organizational morale is likely to be
dropping. “ 26 Thus, the ANSF has tried to increase their recruitment and
retention efforts.
2. ANSF Literacy Training: “Literacy is a critical force enabler and force
multiplier for the ANSF.” 27 Literacy enables Afghan National Security Force
service members to learn required skills at vocational schools, enhances
instruction on human rights and the rule of law, and promotes the long-term
sustainability of the force as well as post-service economic opportunity. 28
3.

Assessment Levels of Afghan National Security Forces: These ratings reflect
an ANSF unit’s overall operational effectiveness; however, the overall rating
is derived from a more detailed assessment of each unit. The current rating
system uses six color-coded rating definitions-(1) fully capable, (2) capable,
(3) partially capable, (4) developing, (5) established, and (6) not assessed to
evaluate ANSF units at the brigade and regional levels each month. In
addition, this ratings system “focuses on assessing specific components of the
units, such as infantry and communications, against one overall and five
targeted categories.” 29
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4. Green-on-Blue attacks: According to Roggio and Lindquist (2012),
“operations involving combined action - where Coalition units partner with
local police, military, and civilian forces, tend to indicate improved
performance by all partners in the action.” 30 A main goal of the U.S.’s COIN
strategy was the build-up and training of Afghanistan’s security forces. This
has placed U.S. and NATO troops at increasing risk as the drawdown
continues and Taliban efforts to infiltrate Afghan forces are being ramped
up. 31
ANSF Recruiting and Retention
An effective Afghan National Security Force is the “main plank of the ongoing
security transition in Afghanistan and critically influences the country’s political and
economic transitions.” 32 Since 2009, the size of the ANSF has nearly doubled. 33 As of
January 2014, ANSF’s assigned force strength was 334,852, according to data provided
by CSTC-A. 34 This is short of the goal to have an end-strength of 352,000 ANSF
personnel by October 2012. 35
The goal had been published in the Defense Department’s April 2012 Report on
Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. 36 When the end strength was not
met, the DoD revised the goal to 352,000 ANSF personnel by 2014 (187,000 ANA by
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December 2012, 157,000 ANP by February 2013, and 8,000 Air Force by December
2014). 37 Neither the ANA nor the ANP met their end-strength goal by the revisited
deadline, as shown in Figure 34.
Figure 34: ANSF Assigned Strength

For the Afghan National Police, the process was the same. 38 An April 2011
SIGAR audit of ANP workforce and payroll strength found that the Ministry of Interior
(MOI) could not determine the number of personnel that work for the ANP because it had
“been unable to reconcile personnel records or verify data in its personnel systems and
databases Another challenge has been the inclusion of civilians in counts of ANSF
personnel.” 39 A February 2012 DoD OIG report on the Afghan National Army payroll
funding “found that ANA finance officers were including civilians in their count of ANA
personnel for the purposes of payroll reporting.” 40 CSTC-A also noted that civilians had
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been counted as part of ANSF assigned force strength, but were later removed from those
counts. 41
The ANSF is also “struggling with the fact that its recruitment rate is not
matching its wastage rate which has been pegged at a whopping 30 percent a year.” 42
Given its present strength, the ANSF needs to recruit approximately 60,000 personnel
every year. 43 The “high wastage rate has been attributed to many factors.” 44 First is the
low re-enlistment rate. 45 According to the DoD,
“about one-quarter of all recruits decline to sign up for extended service beyond
their initial three-year contract for various reasons such as poor leadership,
inadequate living and working conditions, the lack of a good program for leaves
and the effects of seasonal demands for harvesting and planting.” 46
There is also the issue of desertion. According to the Afghan Defense Ministry 7-10
percent of Afghan troops desert each year, while other estimates put it as high as 20
percent. 47
The effective strength of the Afghan National Security Forces has also been
adversely affected by the casualty rate. 48 With progress of the security transition the
casualty rate of the ANSF has increased. 49 The ANA had more than 1,100 casualties in
the first six months of 2013; “this is almost more than the previous year’s high of 1,200
41
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in 2012.” 50 During this same time period, the ANP suffered more than 2,200 fatalities. 51
ANA Strength
Widely seen as the most capable branch of the ANSF, the ANA is going to be a
key player in Afghanistan’s transition after 2014. 52 According to Gautam Das (2012), “it
is a “new-look army, combining elements of organization from the older Afghan Army
pattern with some completely new elements copied from the U.S. Army.” 53 The ANA
was also responsible for 95% of all reported operations carried out in Afghanistan in
2013. 54 Despite improvement in performance and training, attrition continues to be a
major challenge for the ANA. 55
The annual attrition rate for the Afghan National Army in 2013 was 34.4
percent. 56 Between January and November 2013, 38,916 ANA personnel left the
service. 57 The ANA has also suffered serious losses from fighting. Between December
2011 and November 2013, the ANA had 2,055 personnel killed in action (KIA) and
10,484 wounded in action (WIA). 58 The United States has tried to address all of these
weaknesses by (1) applying itself to the training of the new recruits and active mentoring
of ANA units and sub-units in the field, (2) increasing the salaries of ANA soldiers and
50

The Guardian.com, “Taliban Kill 1,100 members of Afghan Security Forces in Six Months,” http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/23/taliban-afghan-security-forces-nato [accessed April 16January 23, 2013], 1.
51
Monish Gulati, “Afghan National Security Forces-Hiccups Continue,” http://www.irgamag.com/compon
ent/k2/item/680-afghan-national-security-forces-hiccups-continue [accessed April 15-December
29, 2012], 2.
52
Ibid., 2.
53
Gautam Das, “The Afghan National Army in 2014,” http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-afghannational-army-in-2014 [accessed April 16-December 4, 2012], 1.
54
Ibid., 1.
55
SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” http://reliefweb.int/
sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014Jan30QR.pdf [accessed April 15-January 30, 2014], 7.
56
Ibid., 8.
57
Ibid., 7.
58
Emma Graham-Harrison, “Afghan Troop Deaths up almost 80% in 2013 Fighting Season, says
Pentagon,” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/08/afghan-troop-casualties-up-almost80-in-2013-fighting-season-says-pentagon [accessed April 16-November 8, 2013], 1.

153

ANP police officers. 59 “When the U.S. first began its army-building effort, it was
offering a mere three-year term of enlistment and a meagre salary, and the desertion rate
before completion of their enlistment period was as high as 25 percent of enrollment.” 60
This led to a recruitment crisis that ISAF failed to make public. 61
It was only in December 2009, that a NATO advisory team announced that a
disparity in pay was a major problem in recruiting. 62 According to the report, “a fighter in
the Taliban could make $250-$300 a month while the average ANA soldier got $120$180 a month.” 63 Shortly after, ANA and ANP salaries were raised to levels closer to
$240 a month. “This raised ANA recruiting from average lows far below the required
level-and only 831 in August 2009—to 2,659 in the first week of September 2009—
roughly half of the entire monthly quota level.” 64 It also led some 60 deserters out of 80
in one unit to return to service once they learned that the new pay system was in effect. 65
As of December 30, 2013, the overall end strength of the Afghan National Army
was 185,386 personnel (178,816 Army and 6,529 Air Force). 66 This total includes
“10,251 ANA personnel and 41 Air Force personnel who were AWOL, 10,905 trainees,
students and those awaiting assignment as well as 5,010 cadets.” 67 Determining ANA
strength “continues to prove challenging as limited details were available to account for
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the 126,659 personnel assigned to the ANA’s combat forces this quarter.” 68 SIGAR
determined that these forces included personnel in the following categories: (1) Present
for Duty of “Combat Strength”, 62,753 (50%); (2) Unavailable (including personnel in
combat, and on leave, but not personnel AWOL) 54,862 (43%); and (3) Absent without
Leave (AWOL), 9,043 (7%). 69
ANP Strength
As of December 31, 2013, the United States has spent $15.8 billion on building,
training, and sustaining Afghanistan’s National Police force. 70 In November 2013, “the
overall strength of the ANP was 149,466 personnel, including 106,784 Afghan Uniform
Police (AUP), 20,902 Afghan Border Police (ABP), 13,597 Afghan National Civil Order
Police (ANCOP), 2,850 in the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and
5,333 students in training.” 71 Like many countries’ police forces, Afghanistan’s police
force continues to be subject to local politics and national political interference. 72 This is
“exemplified by the high turnover rates of district chiefs, who are appointed directly by
the President of Afghanistan.” 73
The overall strength of the Afghan National Police continues to be affected by
turnover and attrition as well. 74 Since October 2013, the overall strength of the ANP has
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decreased by more than 3,191 police officers. 75 According to CSTC-A, “unlike the ANA,
the Ministry of Interior (MOI) does not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL,
sick, or on temporary assignment in its personnel reports.” 76 For this reason, it is not
known what the actual operational strength of the ANP is at any given time. 77
ANSF Literacy Training
Devastated by decades of conflict and neglect, “Afghanistan suffers from low
levels of literacy among the general population and even more so among recruits in the
Afghan National Security Forces.” 78 The Afghan Ministry of Education estimates that
only about one-third of the Afghan population can read or write while approximately 13
percent of ANSF recruits possess these abilities. 79 According to the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the overall literacy rate
among Afghans over the age of 15 is approximately 28%. 80
This varies from a high of 58 percent in Kabul to a low of 12 percent in Helmand
province. 81 NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) testing shows that fewer than
14% of the recruits entering the ANA and ANP have a first grade level of literacy. 82
Thus, illiteracy in the Afghan National Security Forces “remains a major obstacle to
effectively developing a capable and self-sustaining force that can operate independently
and defend the Afghan people.” 83 According to Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell,
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the former commander of NTM-A, “literacy is the foundation of a professional military
and police force.” 84
In his article, Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program, Michael J. Faughnan
(2011), points out that literacy is an enabler (a supporting capability). 85 Teaching
illiterate soldiers through memorization and repetition may work well for some military
tasks, but not all. 86 For example,
“literacy is not a requirement for accurate rifle marksmanship, but it is required
for scores of other specialties. Medics must be able to read the labels of a drug
prior to administering it. Field Artillery fire direction specialists must be able to
read and perform mathematical functions to compute accurate firing data for the
guns.” 87
Faughnan also points out that literacy can serve as a recruiting tool for the ANSF. 88
“After more than thirty years of warfare, many young Afghans in the prime recruiting age
group did not have the opportunity to attend school as children.” 89 Thus, the ability to
read is considered by many Afghans to be a badge of honor. 90 Providing literacy
instruction to this group “helps them to overcome this deficit and prepares them for a
more productive life, whether they make the ANSF a career or move into another
field.” 91
Finally, literacy can also help combat corruption within the ANSF. According to
Michael J. Faughnan (2012), illiterate soldiers and police are unable to read their
paychecks to make sure that they are being paid the proper amount. These soldiers also
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can’t perform basic inventory tasks because they are unable to count the number of rifles
on hand or account for the equipment issued to them. 92 Being literate would allow these
soldiers and policeman to carry out these common tasks and make supervisors and
commanders more accountable.
During the last six years, the United States has spent more than $200 million on a
program to teach Afghan soldiers how to read and write. 93 Before the implementation of
the ANSF Literacy program in 2009, literacy standards for recruits “were virtually nonexistent” as recruits “could literally be pulled off the street and made a police officer.” 94
Currently, the ANSF’s literacy program is based on a 312-hour curriculum. 95 According
to CSTC-A, in order to progress from illiteracy to functional literacy, a student may take
as many as seven tests. 96 The students’ performance determines if he or she progresses to
the next training level. 97
As seen in Figure 35 below, Level 1 literacy provides an individual with the
ability to read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole
numbers. 98 At Level 2, an individual can read and write sentences, carry out basic
multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement. 99 At Level 3, an
individual has achieved functional literacy and can identify, understand, interpret, create,
communicate, compute, and use printed and written materials. NTM-A/CSTC-A noted
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that at Level 3, the student is transitioning from learning to read to reading to learn. Since
2009, a total of 220,530 ANSF recruits have passed Level 1 of Dari or Pashto literacy and
numeracy training while 70,350 ANSF personnel have achieved Level Three, or
functional literacy under the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization standard. 100
Figure 35: Training Provided under NTM-A/CSTC-A’s ANSF Literacy Program

Source: SIGAR, “Afghan National Security Forces: Despite Reported Success, Concerns Remain about
Literacy Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment,” p. 9,http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/
audits/SIGAR_14-30-AR.pdf

Despite these numbers, a report released by SIGAR in January 2014 concluded
that the program appears to have had a limited impact on actual literacy levels within the
ANSF. 101 According to the report, “the ANSF has a remarkably high attrition rate,
between 30 and 50 percent a year.” 102 Thus, many of the soldiers who have been
educated at U.S. taxpayer expense are no longer in the Afghan Army. The SIGAR report
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also identified several other flaws in the literacy program. “The program did not track
students after their courses to be able to follow up on their progress.” 103 Further, the
program, “which relied on private contractors to teach the courses, did not specify what
the curriculum should contain or monitor the majority of sites where classes were
held.” 104 This led to what the report called poor implementation by contractors. 105 The
report also found that between July 2012 and February 2013, 45 percent of Afghan
National Police sent to the field received no literacy training. 106
Since the release of this report, the United States has cut back on the number of
sites where literacy courses are being taught in order to promote better oversight. 107
NATO has also worked with the Afghan government to implement new contracts for
literacy training of the ANSF, with more stringent metrics to measure literacy
performance and limiting contract scope to encourage better contractor performance. 108
According to recent reports, this new oversight has saved the United States $19
million.109 CSTC-A also said responsibility for literacy training of ANA personnel in the
field will transition to the ANA between July 1, 2014 and December 31, 2014. Literacy
training at ANA training centers will transition by December 2014. 110
Assessment Levels of Afghan National Security Forces
Passed in 2007, the Nation Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
directed the Department of Defense to report on its assessment of the operational
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readiness of ANSF units. Specifically, the act requires the DoD to “report on the number
of ANSF units that are capable of conducting operations independently, units that are
capable of conducting operations with U.S. and ISAF support, and units that are not
ready to conduct operations.” 111 The assessments also provide updates on the status of
these units as U.S. and NATO forces continue to hand over more security responsibility
to the ANSF. 112
Figure 36: History of ANSF Rating Definition Levels, 2010 to Present

Source: SIGAR, “Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining
Capability Assessment Efforts,” p.3, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/Audits/SIGAR_14-33-AR.pdf.

Since August 15, 2013, ISAF has used the Regional Command ASNF Assessment
Report (RASR) to rate the Afghan National Security Forces. 113 This is the third different
assessment tool used by the United States and ISAF to rate the ANSF. The RASR uses
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six color-coded rating definitions-(1) fully capable, (2) capable, (3) partially capable, (4)
developing, (5) established, and (6) not assessed to evaluate ANSF units at the brigade
and regional levels each month. 114 In addition, “the RASR focuses on assessing specific
components of the units, such as infantry and communications, against one overall and
five targeted categories: combined arms, command and control, leadership, sustainment,
and training.” 115
The Afghan National Security Forces “as a whole are increasingly capable and
proactive in conducting security operations and ANSF commanders are improving their
integration of combined arms.” 116 ANSF units are currently leading 95 percent of
conventional and 98 percent of special operations missions.117 Fifty-seven of 85 ANA
kandaks are rated as “capable” or higher. 118 Two major strengths of the ANA are infantry
maneuver and small unit execution of operations (at the kandak-level and below) and
human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. 119
For the ANA, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 24 brigades (22
corps brigades and 2 brigades of the 11th Capital Division). 120 Of those brigades, 88%
were “fully capable” or “capable” of planning and conducting joint and combined arms
operations. 121 According to Figure 37, equipment readiness within the ANA Ground
Forces Command (GFC) continues to improve. Attrition, however, “continues to pose a
serious challenge to the ANA as 71% of brigades are still considered “developing” which
114
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means that attrition in these brigades is 3% or more per month.” 122 In other areas, most
ANA brigades were rated “fully capable” or “capable,” including leadership (96%),
command and control (100%), sustainment (88%), and training (83%). 123
Figure 37: ANA RASR Assessments, December 2013

Source: SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” p. 87, http://relief
web.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014Jan30QR.pdf

For the Afghan National Police, the latest RASR report provides assessments of
16 of 21 regional ANP components—the Afghan Border Police, Afghan Uniform Police,
and Afghan National Civil Order Police in seven different zones. Of the 16 components
assessed, 94 percent were “fully capable” or “capable” of making arrests and prosecuting
those arrested. 124 According to Figure 38, “readiness within the ANP continues to be a
point of concern and the ANP also struggles with maintaining a manageable level of
equipment readiness.” 125 In addition, attrition continues to be a challenge for the ANP as
“50% of regional components are still considered “developing” which means that
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monthly attrition in these units is 2% or more.” 126 In other areas, the ANP regional
components are mostly “fully capable” or “capable”: leadership (94%), command and
control (94%), sustainment (94%), and training (88%). 127
Figure 38: ANP RASR Assessments, December 2013

Source: SIGAR, “Quarterly Report the United States Congress Revised, January 2014,” p. 88, http://relief
web.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2014Jan30QR.pdf

Green-on-Blue Attacks: The ‘Last Gasp’ of the Taliban?
One of the biggest threats to U.S. and ISAF soldiers in recent years have been
attacks on Coalition forces by Afghan forces—the so-called green-on-blue attacks. 128
These attacks from within have increased dramatically over the past three years, and in
2012 they accounted for 15% of Coalition deaths. 129 Insurgents’ use of insider attacks as
a tactic remains a risk to trust between U.S., ISAF, and ANSF forces. In particular,
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“insider attacks risk undermining international support for the mission and long-term
support for the Afghan government, which could pose a threat to the transition process
and stability beyond 2014.” 130
Figure 39: Number of Green-on-Blue Attacks per Year (2008-2013)
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Source: The Long War Journal, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” p.2, http://www.longwar
journal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php p.2

From 2007 to 2013, there have been 86 documented green-on-blue attacks. 131
“Even though it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the principal causes of
these attacks given the small total number of incidents, there are discernible trends.” 132
Based on information available from The Long War Journal and the Department of
Defense’s Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan reports, insider attacks
have increased in frequency over the past few years before decreasing in 2013. “Although
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U.S. and NATO commanders have stated that an estimated 90% of the attacks are due to
cultural differences and personal enmity, the attacks began to spike in 2011, just after
President Barack Obama announced his plan to pull U.S. forces out of Afghanistan and
end combat operations in 2014, transferring security to the Afghan forces.” 133 The
Taliban also have claimed to have stepped up efforts at infiltrating the Afghan National
Security Forces. 134
Based on information from the Long War Journal, there were 2 insider attacks in
2008, 5 in 2009 and 2010 each, 16 in 2011, and 44 in 2012. 135 The number of insider
attacks decreased by more than half in 2013 with only 13 attacks recorded that year.
Green-on-blue attacks were largely concentrated in the Southern, Southwestern, and
Eastern regional commands. 136 More than half of all attacks in 2012 occurred in
Kandahar and Helmand, which were the focus of the counterinsurgency campaign during
the “Surge.” 137
There are “two main narratives purporting to explain why green-on-blue attacks
happen and why they are happening more frequently: grievances and infiltration.” 138
Grievance-based insider attacks occur because of cultural misunderstandings between
foreign and Afghan troops, low morale, and revenge for perceived insults or
provocations. 139 Attacks caused by insurgent initiative are pre-planned violence
organized by members of the Taliban who have infiltrated the ANSF or influenced
133
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existing members to execute attacks.
The DoD believes that the vast majority of attacks are grievance-based rather than
a result of infiltration.” 140 In August 2012, ISAF Commander, General John Allen, said
“that approximately 25% of the green-on-blue attacks were due to Taliban infiltration
and/or coercion of Afghan forces.” 141 In contrast, on October 4, 2012, Afghan Deputy
Foreign Minister Jawed Ludin described “the majority of insider attacks as the result of
"terrorist infiltration" rather than cultural differences.” 142 Another theory cites the rise in
attacks in 2012 as a result of copycat behavior. 143 Meanwhile, the Taliban claims credit
for nearly every attack 144.
The U.S. military “became so concerned with green-on-blue attacks in the
summer of 2012 that it ordered units to designate “guardian angels” in each unit whose
job is to provide security for troops working with Afghans.” 145 In mid-August of that
year, field commanders were told they could increase the number of “guardian angels”
depending on the tactical situation. 146 The surge in insider attacks also prompted U.S. and
ISAF forces to expand their counterintelligence capability in Afghanistan. 147 In addition,
“General Allen issued a directive to all U.S. and NATO troops on August 17, 2012 to
carry a loaded weapon at all times.” 148 Announcing these changes, General Martin
Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that Afghan forces were also trying
140
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to address the problem and had already discharged "hundreds of soldiers" suspected of
having been radicalized. 149
In tabulating the green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan, this study utilizes
information gathered from The Long War Journal. For the purposes of this report, all
attacks in Afghanistan in which a person purporting to be affiliated with the Afghan
National Security Forces—whether, ANA, ALP, ABP, AUP, AAF, other branches, or
security personnel hired by Afghan authorities—are considered “green.” 150 Similarly, all
persons purporting to be affiliated with U.S., ISAF, or NATO security forces, including
interpreters and civilian contractors, are considered “blue.” 151 The data below indicates
the number of attacks, the affiliation of the attacker (if known), the location/province
where the attack occurred, the date of the attack, the number of security forces killed or
wounded in the attack, and the affiliation of those killed or wounded. 152 The data also
includes the reported fate of the attacker(s).
Because ISAF has generally not reported on green-on-blue incidents in which no
casualties have occurred, “the overall number of attacks is likely to be far greater than
those reported below.” 153 Similarly, ISAF has generally not reported on incidents that
have resulted only in injuries, not death; these too are likely to be underreported. 154 ISAF
has told The Long War Journal and other news and media outlets that the overall number
of green-on-blue attacks is “classified.”
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According to data gathered by The Long War Journal, more than 143 U.S. and
ISAF soldiers have been killed in green-on-blue attacks between 2008 and 2013. In 2008,
only two ISAF soldiers were killed by insider attacks, 12 in 2009 and 16 in 2010. 155 The
number of soldiers killed by green-on-blue incidents almost doubled in 2011 (35) before
reaching a record high of 61 fatalities in 2012. Green-on-blue deaths accounted for 15%
of all Coalition fatalities in 2012. Due to new measures put in place by ISAF and the
ANSF, the number of U.S. and NATO troops killed by Afghan forces (14) dropped by
more than 23% in 2013. 156
Figure 40: Green-on-Blue Deaths per Year
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Upon a closer look, a majority of these deaths occurred in the southern,
southwestern, and eastern parts of Afghanistan. As shown in Figure 41, the province with
the highest number of green-on-blue deaths is Helmand province with 34 fatalities. The
155
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next closest province is Kandahar with 17 reported fatalities. These two provinces alone
accounted for 26% of the 143 reported green-on-blue fatalities between 2008 and 2013.
Interestingly enough, the province with the third highest number of insider attack
fatalities is Kabul, which is supposed to be one the most secure provinces.
Figure 41: Total Number of Green-on-Blue Deaths per Province (2008-2013)
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Source: The Long War Journal, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” p.2, http://www.longwar
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A final analysis also shows that a majority of green-on-blue attacks have taken
place in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. More than 37% of all insider attacks between
2008 and 2013 have taken place in these two provinces. The province with the next
highest number of attacks is Kabul with 12. Rounding up the top five is Kapisa province
with 10 casualties and Nangarhar, Laghman, Wardak provinces tied with eight.
170

In conclusion, the mitigation measures adopted by U.S., ISAF, and ANSF forces
since the surge in attacks during the summer of 2012 appear to be making a difference,
and to date, the rate of attacks against ISAF forces is significantly reduced. 157 That said,
“these mitigation measures continue to diminish U.S. and NATO resources and hamper,
movement, speed, and activity on the tactical level.” 158 Attacks against the ANSF
continue to rise, however, and may continue to do as the ANSF assume greater
responsibility for the security of Afghanistan. 159
Figure 42: Total Number of Attacks per Province (2008-2013)
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CHAPTER VIII: A FLIP OF THE COIN: COUNTERINSURGENCY’S LEGACY IN
AFGHANISTAN
“Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia
or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.”
-Robert Gates

On September 20th, 2012, the last of the 30,000 surge troops sent to Afghanistan
two years before were withdrawn. During this time, the “Taliban were pushed out of
large stretches of southern Afghanistan, the influx of U.S. resources accelerated the
development of the Afghan security forces, and the billions that were poured into the
country in the name of reconstruction did provide short-term employment to thousands of
young men.” 1 The surge and its accompanying COIN strategy “also exacted a significant
cost on the United States and its NATO and Afghan allies – in lives, limbs, and dollars.” 2
Despite the remarkable progress made by U.S. and ISAF forces in southern
Afghanistan, eastern parts of the country are still in the grip of the Haqqani Network, a
“Taliban faction that Admiral Mike Mullen has called a ‘veritable arm’ of the Taliban.” 3
The Taliban have also made gains in parts of the country previously unaffected by the
insurgency including northern and western Afghanistan. 4 Moreover, the Taliban seems to
“possess a remarkable capability to regenerate its command structure in Afghanistan
despite years of night raids and other operations against the group’s senior, mid, and
1
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lower-level leadership cadre.” 1 In addition, “the top leadership cadre of the Quetta Shura
and the leaders of the four regional military commands, most of whom are based in
Pakistan, remain virtually untouched in these raids.” 2 Thus, the question remains as to
whether or not the United States’ COIN and accompanying surge strategy was successful
in achieving the four main objectives identified by Field Manual 3-24 needed to win in
Afghanistan? And were the gains worth the cost? Let’s examine them one by one:
1. Securing Afghanistan’s Population and Borders
Initially, then-ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal had proposed a plan
that addressed southern and eastern Afghanistan simultaneously. A counterinsurgency
strategy was to be implemented in both areas. This would have required adding more
than 40,000 U.S. troops to the 70,000 already in Afghanistan. 3 This plan was not adopted,
however. Instead, President Obama only approved an additional 30,000 troops. Because
fewer troops meant that a COIN strategy could not be implemented in the southern and
eastern parts of the country simultaneously, “the original 2009 plan was modified into a
two-phase plan.” 4 In Phase 1, the South would be addressed, and in Phase 2, the U.S. and
ISAF would shift its efforts to the East.
On June 23, 2011, Obama announced that the withdrawal of U.S. troops would
begin sooner than the counterinsurgency strategy devised by General McChrystal and
General Petraeus had envisioned. Originally planned to start in 2014, the drawdown of
U.S. and ISAF forces began in the summer of 2011, as the entire surge force was
1
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withdrawn by September 2012. 5 This revised timeline had major implications for the
original counterinsurgency plan. Although most of Helmand and Kandahar provinces had
been secured by U.S. and ISAF forces by the summer of 2011, “the early troop
withdrawal made Phase 2 of the counterinsurgency strategy no longer viable.” 6
By August 2011, most of the units that were to be transferred to eastern
Afghanistan once Helmand and Kandahar provinces had been cleared were withdrawn.
Thus, the United States and ISAF were unable to carry out a full-scale counterinsurgency
strategy in eastern Afghanistan. 7 Instead of clearing population centers, “Coalition forces
focused on conducting counterterrorism operations that would degrade the capabilities
and infrastructure of the Haqqani Network.” 8 Despite sustaining heavy losses, the
Haqqani Network has been able to infiltrate the neighboring province of Ghazni as well
as Zabul, Logar, and Wardak provinces. 9 The Haqqani Network has also maintained the
ability to carry out high profile attacks and operations throughout central and eastern
Afghanistan, especially in the capital city of Kabul. 10
As seen from above, the original counterinsurgency strategy devised by Generals
David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal and Admiral Mike Mullen was never fully
implemented by the Obama administration. Instead of pursuing a strategy that
simultaneously focused on southern and eastern Afghanistan, the United States was only
able to carry out the first phase of the strategy as President Obama began the withdrawing
of troops much earlier than anticipated. “This had an adverse effect on the United States’
5
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counterinsurgency strategy as the U.S. was no longer able to conduct counterinsurgency
operations in the eastern part of Afghanistan.” 11 Clearing operations in Helmand and
Kandahar provinces came to a quicker end as well as the U.S. began withdrawing troops
during the summer of 2011 instead of by the end of that year. The transfer of
responsibility for security for some of these areas to ANSF also began four months earlier
than originally planned. 12
Even if the Obama administration would have stuck to the original timeline
adopted in 2009, the United States’ counterinsurgency strategy failed to meet the troop
density levels that are recommended by FM 3-24 to secure the population. Troop density
levels before the surge translated into some of the lowest troop and police density levels
in any COIN/stabilization operation since the end of World War II. 13 These force levels
rank with some of the international community’s most notable failures: the UN mission
of Belgian Congo (1.3 per thousand); the American and UN intervention in Somalia
(5.7); the U.S. rescue of Haiti (2.9); the French operation in Cote d’Ivorie (0.2); and the
U.S. war in Iraq in 2005 (5.3). 14
When compared to the 22 other cases listed in this study, force levels during the
surge (2010-2012) rank with some of the highest levels reached by U.S. and international
forces in Kosovo (19.3); Iraq 2007 (18.85); Bosnia (17.3); and East Timor (9.8). These
campaigns are considered to be some of the more successful counterinsurgency and
nation-building operations carried out by the United States and international community
11
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in recent years. 15 Despite reaching similar force levels, the U.S. and NATO were unable
to generate the kind of success experienced by these other campaigns as violence
continues to plague eastern Afghanistan and has spread to areas previously unaffected by
the insurgency. Thus, “having enough forces to reverse increasing insurgent violence
does not always equate to victory, or even the attainment of low levels of violence.” 16
Other factors such as varying levels of trainining and equipping, as well as limitations on
force employment imposed by Coalition governments can all have a positive or negative
impact on the outcome of a COIN operation. 17
Efforts to secure Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, while gaining the Pakistani
government’s support in cracking down on insurgent sanctuaries on its soil have not fared
much better. Although Pakistan “has never been the lone player in Afghanistan’s proxy
conflicts, it remains the most problematic one for the United States.” 18 Pakistan has a
long history of officially sponsored militancy. 19 The reasons for this policy appear to be
diverse. 20 According to Matt Waldman (2010), the Taliban-ISI relationship is founded on
mutual benefit. “The Taliban need external sanctuary, as well as military and logistical
support to sustain their insurgency, the ISI believes that it needs a significant allied force
in Afghanistan to maintain regional strength and ‘strategic depth’ in their rivalry with
India.” 21
Since 2001, the “United States has provided the Afghan and Pakistani
15
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governments and militaries with considerable money, equipment, training, and other
security assistance.” 22 The U.S. has also increased the number of cross-border raids by
Special Operations Forces and drone strikes carried out in Pakistan’s tribal areas since
President Obama came into office. Between 2009 and 2013, American Predator and
Reaper drones have carried out more than 308 airstrikes against Taliban, al Qaeda, and
other militant targets in Pakistan. 23 These strikes have taken a significant toll on al
Qaeda’s leadership cadre and diminished the operational capabilities of allied groups
such as the Pakistani Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Despite the
success the United States has had in targeting and killing high-level members of the
Taliban, al Qaeda, and other affiliated militant groups, the drone program remains highly
controversial. 24
In December 2013, the Obama administration put a halt on further drone strikes
against militant and terrorist targets in Pakistan. Some administration officials now
believe the drone campaign may be counterproductive to U.S. national security
interests. 25 Counterterrorism experts “argue that because of the decentralized structure of
terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Taliban, targeting their top leaders is
ineffective. Thus, killing terrorist leaders is difficult, it is often ineffective and it can
easily backfire.” 26
According to Daniel Byman, “even when targeted killings do work to eliminate
22
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terrorist leaders, they are decidedly a ‘poor second to arrests’ because dead men are no
help in informing the United States of broader terrorist activities.” 27 Finally, drone strikes
are very unpopular in Pakistan and have put a deep strain on military ties between the
U.S. and Pakistan.
In conclusion, U.S. attempts to curb the flow of foreign and insurgent fighters and
weapons crossing the Afghan-Pakistani border have proven ineffective as the U.S.
government has failed to convince the Pakistanis to crack down on these groups or put
better measures and troops in place to secure its border with Afghanistan. This has done
much harm to U.S. and ISAF counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, as Taliban
insurgents and foreign fighters are able to move freely across the border as well as set up
permanent bases in Pakistan to launch attacks against Coalition and Afghan forces in
Afghanistan from. Even if the United States was able to convince the Pakistani
government to take action against these groups, the Pakistani Army has shown it is not
sufficiently equipped to fight the insurgency in these areas. 28
While it is true that Pakistan has increased its intelligence sharing with the U.S. in
support of its drone program, “it does so only in support of those terrorists who challenge
Islamabad’s authority.” 29 Moreover, “there is evidence of Pakistani complicity at some
level of providing: training, funds, weapons, and shelter to members of the Taliban and
other Afghan insurgents” 30 so that they are able to continue their fight against U.S.,
ISAF, and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. Even under the best of circumstances, U.S.
27
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efforts to secure the Afghan-Pakistani border would still have remained a monumental
task. However, until the U.S. with Pakistan’s assistance, is able to stem al Qaeda’s freeflow of weapons, money, and supplies into and out of Afghanistan, efforts to secure
Afghanistan’s population or border at any level will remain unsuccessful.
2. Winning the Hearts and Minds of the Afghan People by Increasing Security
Upon review, the United States’ counterinsurgency and accompanying surge
strategy made substantial progress in the southern parts of Afghanistan. Prior to the surge
in 2010, the Taliban and its allies made startling gains, “showing an ability to control
territory in Helmand and Kandahar provinces that they had previously lost.” 31 The surge
reversed these gains as “U.S. and ISAF SOF forces conducted more than 7,100
counterterrorism missions between May 30th and December 2nd, 2010.” 32 During these
operations, “more than 600 insurgent leaders were captured or killed.” 33 In addition more
than 2,000 enemy fighters were killed, and over 4,100 captured. 34
To gauge the overall impact of the United States’ COIN strategy this study
consulted several sources: monthly data compiled by NATO’s International Security
Assistance Force, data gathered by the DOD for its semiannual annual report to Congress
(Report on Progress: Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan), and annual reports
produced by the United Nations. These data, “measure in various ways, the ability of the
Taliban-insurgency to carry out attacks throughout the whole country as well as U.S. and
NATO efforts to improve security and protect the population.” 35
One indicator used by this study to measure security progress made by U.S. and
31
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ISAF forces during the surge is the number of IED attacks that occurred between January
2010 and December 2012. Since 2006, “IEDs have become the Taliban’s favored weapon
of choice and the biggest killer of Coalition soldiers and Afghan civilians.” 36 With the
start of the surge in 2010, the number of IED events in Afghanistan increased to over
15,255 that year. 37 “This was a 62 percent increase over 2009 and more than three times
as many as the year before.” 38
The number of IED events continued to rise in 2011, as more than 16,554 IEDs
were detonated or cleared that year. 39 Beginning in 2012, the number of IED attacks
began to drop in Afghanistan with February 2012 representing one of the best months
since the beginning of the surge in 2010. 40 Overall, there were “15,222 incidents in 2012,
an 8 percent decline from their record high in 2011.” 41 Moreover, fewer U.S. troops (104)
were killed by IEDs in 2012 than in 2011 (183), a 57% decline. 42
Even though the number of U.S. casualties caused by IEDs dropped by more than
8 percent in 2012, a decrease in fatalities may not always tell the full story. 43 According
to Bill Roggio of The Long War Journal, “attacks were down overall nationwide in 2012
as “Afghan forces were pushed to the fore.” 44 While the number of U.S. casualties in
Afghanistan dropped by more than 60% between 2012 and 2013, the number of Afghan
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troops killed in combat shot up almost 80%. 45 “This is likely in response to ANSF forces
taking an increased role in combat operations as well as the ongoing decrease in the
number international forces in the country.” 46 In 2013, 95% of all conventional
operations were carried out by Afghan forces as well as 98% of all special operations
missions.47 Thus, casualties are not the best way to judge the strength or weakness of an
insurgency. 48
Another indicator used by this study to track security trends during the surge was
the number of civilians killed or injured. Surge advocates argued “that behind the
protective shield of increasing numbers of ISAF and Afghan security forces, good
government would emerge, the rule of law would take root and prosperity would
grow.” 49 Yet, despite some of the strictest rules of engagement (ROEs) in the history of
warfare the United States was unable to protect the population, much less win their
support. In 2009, “more than 1,523 Afghan civilians were killed, this number increased
to 2,790 in 2010 before reaching an all-time high of 3,131 in 2011.”50 The number of
civilians killed did decrease in 2012 (2,754), but these numbers are well above pre-surge
levels.51 According to a report released by the United Nations in 2013, “81 percent of all
civilian casualties in 2012 were caused by the Taliban and other insurgent groups.”52 The
heavy use of IEDs by insurgents remained the biggest threat to civilians in 2012,
“causing 2,531 civilian casualties with 868 civilians killed and 1,663 injured, in
45
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782 separate incidents.” 53 This represented a three percent increase from 2011. 54
Moreover, IED incidents accounted for 38 percent of all civilian casualties in 2012. The
number of Afghan civilians killed by Coalition forces did decrease during this time
however. In 2012, the number of Afghan civilians killed by ISAF and Afghan forces
declined by more than 39 percent. 55
As seen from these statistics, the United States and ISAF were able to cut down
the number of Afghan civilians killed by Coalition and Afghan forces, but were unable to
protect the population from the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Moreover, the
number of Afghan civilians killed between 2010 and 2012 are well above levels before
the surge. Thus, U.S. and ISAF efforts in trying to protect the population are largely
mixed.
A final metric used by this study to gauge the overall impact of the United States’
counterinsurgency strategy was the number of enemy initiated attacks (EIAs) carried out
between 2010 and 2012. During much of the period after 2009, “ISAF reporting – and a
great deal of U.S. reporting as well – focused on the number EIA incidents carried out by
Taliban and insurgent fighters each month.” 56 ISAF and DoD reporting do indicate that
“the number of enemy initiated attacks did drop between 2011 and 2012, but these
reports also indicate EIAs did not drop meaningfully in 2012 and remain far higher than
in 2009.” 57 This reporting also shows that the number of EIAs in Kandahar and Helmand
provinces (the main focus of the surge) continued to remain high in 2012.
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In January 2013, the U.S. and ISAF discovered that a number of EIAs reported
from independent ANSF operations had not been included in its database. 58 These EIAs
occurred throughout 2012, although most occurred towards the end of the year. 59 “The
ANSF had accurately reported this data, but ISAF mistakenly did not enter the data into
its main EIA database.” 60 An internal audit resulted in a retroactive correction of 2012
EIA totals, from being down 7 percent compared to 2011 to no change. 61
In conclusion, the United States and ISAF failed to develop a system of metrics
that could be used to evaluate progress made by Coalition and ANSF forces during the
surge. Moreover, some of these metrics have actually backfired. “Rather than showing
progress made during the surge, metrics such as EIAs came to show negative trends
during 2011-2012 and never showed the overall progress above the levels in 2009 when
the surge in U.S. and NATO forces started.” 62 Even though enemy initiated attacks are a
“measurable combat activity as seen by a force under attack, they are largely irrelevant in
counterinsurgency analysis.” 63
As pointed out by Anthony Cordesman, “EIA trends revert to the same kinetic
focus on tactical victories in regular combat that characterized a great deal of U.S. and
ISAF reporting before the insurgency reached a crisis level in 2009.” 64 Focusing on EIAs
also ignores the fact that groups like the Taliban are fighting a political war against U.S.
and other Coalition forces that have already largely eliminated their offensive combat
58
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capabilities, but who will no longer be in the country at the end of 2014. 65 Thus, it is now
clear that U.S. and ISAF public reporting and media coverage of the war have relied too
heavily on EIA reporting as a “scoreboard” for progress. 66
3. Promoting a More Capable and Accountable Afghan Government
According to FM 3-24, good governance is normally a key requirement to achieve
legitimacy for the Host Nation (HN) government. 67 FM 3-24 defines “governance as the
Host Nation government’s ability to gather and distribute resources while providing
direction and control for the society.” 68 These include the regulation of public activity,
taxation, maintenance of security, control and essential services, and normalizing the
means of succession of power. 69 Governments “that attain these goals usually garner the
support of enough of the population to create stability.” 70
Unfortunately, “the assumption that robust and well-designed foreign
development assistance programs would, over time, yield effective governance and
popular legitimacy proved to be a bad one in Afghanistan.” 71 Since 2002, the United
States has spent more than $100 billion on promoting good governance and community
development in Afghanistan. 72 This is the most money the U.S. has ever spent to rebuild
a country. 73 Despite these efforts, Afghanistan continues to rank as one of the most
corrupt countries in the world. In 2008, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan
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176th out of 180 countries, only fourth from the worst case. Since then its ratings have
continued to slip. Between 2010 and 2012, Afghanistan ranked 176th out of 180 in 2010,
180 out of 182 in 2011, and 174 out 176 in 2012. 74 In 2013, Afghanistan tied North
Korea and Syria as the most corrupt country in the world. 75
The massive flux of foreign aid for development and other purposes has also
promoted a “culture of entitlement” among Afghans. 76 Those whose jobs “are funded by
foreign money have come to expect that the cash will continue to flow, and no doubt
many of them would stop supporting the government and its foreign patrons, and perhaps
even become insurgents, were the money and their jobs to disappear.” 77 According to
UNODC’s 2012 survey on Afghan corruption, “power brokers in Kabul have sold
governorships and police and judicial appointments, sometimes for hundreds and
thousands of dollars, and used them to further their own private interests in the
provinces.” 78 Moreover, ANA soldiers and Afghan policemen have been known to
switch sides when the Taliban and other insurgent groups come bearing wads of cash. 79
The total cost of corruption has significantly increased over the past three years as
well to $3.9 billion.80 In most cases, “bribes are paid to obtain better or faster services,
while in others, bribes are offered to influence deliberations and actions such as police
activities and judicial decisions, thereby eroding the rule of law and trust in
institutions.”81 In 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public
service and “nearly 30 percent of them paid a bribe for a private sector service, states the
74
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survey.” 82 Moreover, the bribes that Afghan citizens paid in 2012 were more than double
Afghanistan’s domestic revenue. 83
The development of Afghanistan’s judicial institutions continues to pose a
significant challenge to U.S. and ISAF efforts to promote the Afghan government’s
credibility and legitimacy among the Afghan people as well. 84 Over the last decade, there
been several challenges to improving Afghanistan’s justice system.
“First, the central government’s inability to decrease the power of the warlords
and exert control over the country impacted justice reform. Secondly, the central
government’s inability and unwillingness to address widespread and deep-rooted
corruption decreased the effectiveness of the justice system. Thirdly, many
Afghans have little or no access to judicial institutions.” 85
Despite efforts by the international community and Afghan government, data
from the World Bank suggest that Afghanistan’s rule of law continues to be one of the
least effective—if not least effective—in the world. 86 In comparison to other countries in
the region—such as Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—
Afghanistan’s justice system was one of the least effective and ranked at the bottom. 87
The Afghan government also continues to collect an extremely low level of
revenue (less than ten percent of GDP), and a large share of this comes from customs
rather than taxation. 88 In effect, “Afghans are not really charged by their government for
the services they are provided.” 89 Moreover, the Afghan government neither funds nor
delivers the key public services offered in the country. According to estimates by the U.S.
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Government Accountability Office, in recent years, the United States and other donors
paid for about 90 percent of Afghanistan’s total public expenditures. 90 In addition, “the
provision of many key services remains highly dependent on foreign advisers and
experts.” 91
Nonetheless, the Afghan government has made some progress in collecting
revenue and maintaining a transparent budget. 92 In 2012, the Open Budget Index gave
Afghanistan a score of 59. 93 This score was the second greatest improvement in budget
transparency over all countries in the world that year. 94 Compared to other countries in
South Asia, Afghanistan received one of the highest scores from Open Budget Index in
2012. 95 Only India (68), received a higher score. 96
Finally, U.S. efforts “to promote local governance and community development
have not generated the progress envisioned by surge advocates.” 97 Since 2010, the United
States has pumped billions into Afghanistan--- some $30 billion during those three years
alone. 98 According to Brian Glyn Williams, “the average aid going to Afghanistan per
person was $80, while postwar Bosnians, a far more advanced European people, received
$275.” 99 Yet, Afghanistan “was the poorest country in Eurasia, with a life expectancy in
the low 40s and one of the world’s highest infant mortality rates.” 100Afghanistan also has
the world’s highest infant mortality rate; one hundred and twenty-two of every thousand
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children die before they reach age one. 101 UNICEF also “reports that fifty-one percent of
the nation’s children grow up stunted for lack of nutrition during the early years of life.
That’s the world’s second-worst rate, behind Ethiopia.” 102 Furthermore, Afghanistan still
ranks near the bottom on per capita income, life expectancy, literacy, electricity usage,
and on the World Bank’s broad Human Development Index. 103
Efforts to promote local governance and community have also been stymied by
the Afghan national government. 104 The United States’ counterinsurgency strategy
“deployed hundreds of civilians and uniformed personnel at the district level to
encourage district governors to become more accountable to a broader spectrum of the
population.” 105 These attempts were viewed with little enthusiasm by the Afghan
National Government “as it threatened their heavily centralized patronage system to
ensure that district-level administrators maintained allegiance to the capital.” 106
According to Stephen Biddle, “Hamid Karzai depends on the networks’
leadership to deliver political support; in exchange, he empowers them with critical
appointments, protects them from prosecution, and allows them to prey on the public.” 107
The result is a government of informal political deal making rather than rule-based
administration by publicly accountable institutions. 108 Thus, “efforts to increase local
accountability as well as local governance are hindered by a lack of political will (or
101
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abundance of political obstruction) on top.” 109
Finally, the COIN strategy devised by McChrystal and Petraeus rested upon the
assumption “that the lack of governance was a universal driver of the insurgency, for
which service delivery was the appropriate cure.” 110 Though this analysis rang true in
some parts of southern Afghanistan, “in other areas, particularly some remote parts of
eastern Afghanistan, observers suggested that the presence of U.S., ISAF, ANSF forces
became a fueling factor.” 111 Counterinsurgency has proved more difficult to apply in the
sparsely-populated mountains of Kunar and Nuristan provinces where tribes view
outsiders (even Afghans from different regions) with great skepticism.
4. Efforts to Train & Equip a Competent Afghan National Security Force
As the United States prepares to complete the withdrawal of its combat troops
from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the U.S. military and its Coalition partners are
increasingly shifting security responsibilities to Afghan security forces. “The success of
this security transition depends greatly on the strength and competence of the ANSF.” 112
As of January 17, 2014, the United States has spent $59 billion funding the Afghan
National Security Forces. 113 Despite the progress made in training Afghanistan’s security
forces, “the effectiveness, professionalism, and state of readiness of this security
apparatus are uneven.” 114
The Afghan National Security Forces as a whole are increasingly capable in
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conducting security operations and ANSF commanders are improving their integration of
combined arms. 115 ANSF units are currently leading 95 percent of conventional and 98
percent of special operations missions. Fifty-seven of 85 ANA kandaks are rated as
“capable” or higher. 116 Two major strengths of the Afghan National Army are infantry
maneuver and small unit execution of operations and human intelligence collection. 117
According to the most recent Regional Command ASNF Assessment Report
(RASR), 88% of the Afghan National Army’s 24 brigades are “fully capable” or
“capable” of planning and conducting joint and combined arms operations. 118 In other
areas, most ANA brigades were rated “fully capable” or “capable,” including leadership
(96%), command and control (100%), sustainment (88%), and training (83%). 119
Attrition, however, continues to pose a serious challenge to the ANA as 71% of brigades
are still considered “developing” which means that attrition in these brigades is 3% or
more per month. 120
For the Afghan National Police, the latest RASR report provides assessments of
16 of 21 regional ANP components in seven different zones. Of the 16 components
assessed, 94 percent were “fully capable” or “capable” of making arrests and prosecuting
those arrested. 121 Readiness within the ANP continues to be a point of concern and the
ANP also struggles with maintaining a manageable level of equipment readiness. 122 In
addition, “attrition continues to be a challenge for the ANP as 50% of regional
components are still considered ‘developing’ which means that monthly attrition in these
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units is 2% or more.” 123 In other areas, the ANP regional components are mostly “fully
capable” or “capable”: leadership (94%), command and control (94%), sustainment
(94%), and training (88%). 124
Another big problem is illiteracy. In 2010, when Lieutenant General Caldwell IV
took command of the NATO training mission, he noted that “overall literacy” among the
Afghan military and police stood at about fourteen percent. 125 Between 2009 and 2014,
the United States spent more than $200 million on a program to teach Afghan soldiers
how to read and write. 126 Before the implementation of the ANSF Literacy program in
2009, literacy standards for recruits “were virtually non-existent as recruits could literally
be pulled off the street and made a police officer.” 127
Since 2009, a total of 220,530 ANSF recruits have passed Level 1 of Dari or
Pashto literacy and numeracy training while 70,350 ANSF personnel have achieved
Level Three, or functional literacy under the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization standard. 128 Despite these numbers, a report released by SIGAR in
January 2014 concluded that the program appears to have had a limited impact on actual
literacy levels within the ANSF. 129 According to the report, “the ANSF has a remarkably
high attrition rate, between 30 and 50 percent a year. Thus, many of the soldiers who
have been educated at U.S. taxpayer expense are no longer in the Afghan Army.” 130
The SIGAR report also identified several other flaws in the literacy program. The
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program did not track students after their courses to be able to follow up on their
progress. 131 Further, the program, which relied on private contractors to teach the
courses, “did not specify what the curriculum should contain or monitor the majority of
sites where classes were held.” 132 This led to what the report called “poor
implementation” by contractors. 133 The report also found that between July 2012 and
February 2013, 45 percent of Afghan National Police sent to the field received no literacy
instruction or training. 134
Since the release of this report, the United States has cut back on the
number of sites where literacy courses are being taught in order to promote better
oversight. 135 NATO has also worked with the Afghan government to implement new
contracts for literacy training of the ANSF, with more stringent metrics to measure
literacy performance and limiting contract scope to encourage better contractor
performance. 136 According to recent reports, this new oversight has saved the United
States $19 million.137 CSTC-A also said responsibility for literacy training of ANA
personnel in the field will transition to the ANA between July 1, 2014 and December 31,
2014. Literacy training at ANA training centers will transition by December 2014. 138
Attrition continues to pose a serious challenge to the ANSF’s sustainability and
operational capabilities as well. “The annual attrition rate for the Afghan National Army
131
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in 2013 was 34.4 percent.” 139 Between January and November 2013, 38,916 ANA
personnel left the service. 140 The ANA has also suffered serious losses from fighting. 141
Between December 2011 and November 2013, the ANA had 2,055 personnel killed in
action (KIA) and 10,484 wounded in action (WIA). 142 These problems “have been
compounded by poor leadership, inadequate living and working conditions, the lack of a
good program for leave, and the effects of seasonal demands for harvesting and
planting.” 143 The overall strength of the Afghan National Police continues to be affected
by turnover and attrition as well. Since October 2013, the overall strength of the ANP has
decreased by more than 3,191 police officers. 144
According to Olga Oliker, “significant Soviet funding went to train Afghan
soldiers and police fighting anti-government forces” 145 during the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. The Soviets faced many of the same problems that U.S. and ISAF troops
are currently dealing with as they “were unable to stem desertions in the military. 146
Despite having sent over 105,000 soldiers to help end the insurgency, “the Soviet Union
was forced to withdraw, and the Afghan military immediately began to dissolve.” 147
Finally, as U.S. and ISAF forces are beginning the final phases of their
withdrawal from Afghanistan, they are turning more and more of their forward operating
bases, outposts, and equipment over to Afghan Security Forces. But the SIGAR found
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that the ANSF do not have the capability to operate and maintain garrisons built for them.
As a result, “billions of dollars of U.S. taxpayer money will be at risk of going to
waste.” 148
Despite these negative reports, the ANSF has shown signs of becoming a
competent fighting force. In the face of Taliban vows to break them, the Afghan Army
demonstrated that it can fight well and win firefights on the battlefield in 2013. 149
According to Johnathan Schroden (2014), “the Taliban “tested the army in direct combat
but increasingly shifted from head-on to indirect attacks because they could not
overmatch the ANA.” 150 Even though ANA forces spent a large majority of its time
manning checkpoints and conducting patrols, it also showed some ability to plan and
carry out more sophisticated operations without help from U.S. and ISAF forces. 151
One such operation was Operation Semorgh, a large-scale effort to clear rural
areas used as staging areas for insurgent attacks on the capital city of Kabul. 152 In
addition, “Afghan Special Operations Forces have been widely commended by U.S.
commanders for their competence in leading independent operations and specialized
missions, including their roles in replacing U.S. forces in conducting night raids that have
long triggered popular anger and strained U.S.-Afghan relations.” 153 Moreover,
“casualties in Afghan SOF units are minimal, and they have only experienced one
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‘insider attack,’ which adds to their credibility.” 154
Should current trends continue, “U.S. and NATO forces are likely to leave behind
a grinding stalemate between the Afghan government and the Taliban.” 155 The ANSF can
probably sustain this deadlock, “but only as long as the United States and international
community continue to pay the multibillion dollar annual bills needed to keep fighting
the Taliban.” 156 The war will thus become a contest in will between the U.S./international
community and the Taliban. 157 However, the ANSF has shown signs of becoming a
competent force capable of conducting security operations on their own. 158 Despite
sustaining significant casualties in 2013, ANSF forces largely held their own as no major
population centers fell to the Taliban or other insurgent groups. 159
As seen from this study, the United States was largely successful in achieving its
primary objective of reversing the Taliban’s momentum. Despite this progress, eastern
parts of the country are still in the grip of the Haqqani Network. 160 The Taliban have also
made gains in parts of the country previously unaffected by the insurgency, including
northern and western Afghanistan. Moreover, Afghanistan continues to be one of the
most corrupt countries in the world as the Afghan Government struggles to rein in
corruption and provided services to the Afghan people. Thus, the counterinsurgency
strategy devised by Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus has had very mixed
154
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success in achieving the four main objectives identified by Field Manual 3-24 needed to
win in Afghanistan.
In particular, this study found three reasons why the United States’ COIN strategy
failed to achieve the objectives identified by FM 3-24 needed to win:
(1) The counterinsurgency strategy devised by Generals McChrystal and Petraeus
was never fully implemented and this set the mission up for only partial success.
On June 23rd, 2011, President Obama announced that U.S. troops would begin
withdrawing much sooner than the December 2009 counterinsurgency plan had
envisioned. This had major implications on the United States’ counterinsurgency strategy
as U.S and ISAF commanders no longer had the time, resources, or troops needed to
secure the rest of southern Afghanistan. 161 In particular, Coalition forces had to end
clearing operations in Helmand and Kandahar provinces during the summer of 2011
(only 18 months into the surge) instead of at the end of the year. 162 Moreover, U.S. and
NATO forces were unable to conduct counterinsurgency operations in eastern
Afghanistan to clear population centers held by the Haqqani Network because they did
not have enough troops. 163 Thus, the security gains made by the United States and NATO
in southern Afghanistan were largely negated as Coalition forces did not have the troops
or resources needed to secure population centers in other parts of the country, especially
eastern Afghanistan.
In “Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary of War,” former U.S. defense secretary Robert
Gates writes that although President Obama ordered a surge of 30,000 additional troops
161

CJ Radin, “Analysis: U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan shifts as forces draw down,” http://ww
w.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/the_military_strateg_1.php [accessed January 17 – August
3, 2011], 2.
162
Ibid., 2.
163
Ibid., 2.

196

to stabilize Afghanistan, the president came to believe that the strategy would not
work. 164 “As I sat there, I thought: the president does not trust his commander, cannot
stand Karzai, does not believe in his own strategy and does not consider the war to be
his.” 165 Gates also writes about a March 2011 White House meeting. “For him, it’s all
about getting out.” 166 Even though President Obama cannot be fully blamed for the
counterinsurgency strategy’s failure in Afghanistan, the timetable imposed in June 2011
made it impossible for U.S. and NATO forces to secure all off Afghanistan’s vital
population centers before the troops began withdrawing later on that year.
(2) The population-centric COIN strategy was the wrong strategy to implement due
to conditions on the ground.
The United States’ COIN strategy “rested upon the assumption that a ‘lack of
governance’ was a universal driver of the insurgency, for which service delivery was the
appropriate cure.” 167 Though this analysis rang true in some parts of southern
Afghanistan, in other areas, particularly some remote parts of eastern Afghanistan,
observers suggested that the presence of U.S., ISAF, ANSF forces became a fueling
factor. 168 COIN has proved more difficult to apply in the sparsely-populated mountains
of Kunar and Nuristan provinces where tribes view outsiders (even Afghans from
different regions) with great skepticism. 169 Moreover, “improving the Afghan
government’s capacity to deliver services to populations will not necessarily make the
government more legitimate—the strategic objective of COIN.” 170
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Secondly, U.S. and ISAF officials were unable to convince Hamid Karzai or his
advisors that a counterinsurgency strategy was the right strategy to carry out in the first
place. This created a lot of friction amongst U.S. officials and Karzai, who believed that
his government “was fighting a proxy war started by Pakistan, not a contest of domestic
legitimacy.” 171 Despite these differing points of view, U.S. and ISAF forces were still
able to reclaim large stretches of territory lost to the Taliban and improve security in
Helmand and Kandahar provinces. Yet, none of these victories or improvements in
security seemed to matter to Karzai as he “seemed both uninterested in and
unappreciative of what the COIN advocates took as mounting evidence that all was going
according to plan.” 172 Thus, as pointed out by General Karl Eikenberry, “in its
implementation of COIN doctrine in Afghanistan, the U.S. military was playing
American football, so to speak. It was not at all clear what sport Karzai was playing, or
indeed whether he was even in the same stadium.” 173
Finally, the U.S.’s COIN strategy could not resolve the “whole of government”
issue. 174
“The U.S. military can deal with armed insurgents and help partner security forces
do the same. But the military cannot do all the other things needed for lasting
success at counterinsurgency, like helping the government develop an effective
police force, good governance, a fair legal system, and a prosperous economy. 175
Even though there have been real improvements in interagency coordination and
collaboration over the past 10 years, agencies such as the State Department and USAID
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continue to lack the capacity and resources to compliment the Defense Department’s
efforts. 176 Thus, “the U.S. military can plead for greater interagency assistance during a
counterinsurgency or stabilization campaign, but it very rarely gets the help or support it
needs.”177
(3) The United States’ COIN strategy significantly overestimated the political will
that existed in the U.S. to engage in costly long-term nation-building operations.
According to Carl von Clausewitz, “war is a contest of political will executed
through violence.” 178 Even though warfare has changed exponentially since Clausewitz
wrote his essay on war in 1832, his observation on the importance of political will is still
accurate: “Not only does war serve to achieve political ends, but they are waged by the
political will of citizens.” 179 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have served as a reminder
of the importance of maintaining political will.
According to Justin Lynch (2014), “if the population of a democracy is to
maintain its passion for a military campaign, the people need to believe that the campaign
will provide a worthwhile victory at a reasonable cost. Unfortunately, large
counterinsurgencies are typically costly and often do not provide clear rewards.” 180 One
of the most famous T.E. Lawrence quotes, so often used to discuss proper counterinsurgent tactics, is “making war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like learning to eat
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soup with a knife.” 181 Thus, skeptics argue that an American public worn after a decade
of continuous war “will never support long-term deployments of U.S. soldiers, and so
serious counterinsurgency campaigns are a nonstarter.” 182
In order to garner and maintain public support for future long-term conflicts such
as counterinsurgency operations, U.S. civilian and military leaders should only wage
wars that have clear political goals and provide the American people with a “meaningful
material or emotional reward.”183 Moreover, “questions need to be asked about potential
negative consequences of adopting a doctrine that would require consistent, high-level
support across multiple changes in presidential administrations.”184 Finally, there needs
to be major changes in the institutional culture of the military as well as the United
States government.185
Even if U.S. policy makers are able to make the case for a large-scale
counterinsurgency campaign to the American public, these conflicts are very costly. 186
Between 2010 and 2012, “it cost $1 million to keep one American service member in
Afghanistan for a year.” 187 That meant the annual bill for the war during this timeframe
was about $100 billion a year. 188 With the fragile state of the U.S. economy during , “the
Obama administration found it very hard to justify spending another $300 to $400 billion
(borrowed to boot) to keep Hamid Karzai’s corrupt government in power and the Taliban
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at bay with so many Americans struggling at home.” 189
Finally, the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it much more difficult
for U.S. policy makers to convince a skeptical public of the need to participate in future
and currently ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Africa. According to
Justin Lynch (2014), “the American people’s support for war receded so much that they
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protracted insurgency.” 190 Lynch points to data gathered from multiple Gallup polls taken
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from 11 percent in 2001 to 49 percent in 2013.” 192
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Afghanistan with far less support than any other conflict. 194 “Opposition to the Iraq War
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American people’s unwillingness to participate in future counterinsurgency operations or
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lower.” 196
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the use of military force in Syria, despite reports surfacing in mid-August 2013 that
Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad had used chemical weapons against his own people,
potentially killing hundreds or even thousands of civilians.” 197 As seen from these polls
“the lack of clear victories and high financial and self-perception costs in large
counterinsurgencies reduces the probability that the American people will support future
military action, or maintain support once it has begun.” 198 Thus, as pointed out by the
ancient Chinese military sage Sun-Tzu, “there has never been a protracted war from
which a country has benefited.” 199
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adventures and are unwilling to provide political support for any large-scale COIN
campaign. There is also the belief that the United States cannot afford to fight these
campaigns anymore, “not in an age of austerity and fiscal cliffs.” 201 Moreover, too many
political and military leaders have lost confidence in the current counterinsurgency
strategy. 202 Thus, as American and NATO forces continue their withdrawal from
Afghanistan, it appears unlikely that the United States will find itself engaged in another
pro-longed counterinsurgency conflict any time in the near future.
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Middle East.” 203 According to the new guidance, U.S. forces
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the type undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instability will be addressed by the
U.S. through non-military means and military to military cooperation. U.S. forces
would only consider limited stability and counterinsurgency operations if required
operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. They will, of course,
maintain a presence abroad including rotational deployments and training
exercises designed to build capacity and interoperability.” 204
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the base budget in FY 2015. 206 This is “22 percent lower than the Pentagon’s all-time
budget highs of $716 billion in FY 2008, $718 billion in FY 2009, and $742 billion in FY
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Even though the United States is currently shifting away from long-term
counterinsurgency and nation-building operations, the U.S. military must not simply
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Nigeria, Yemen, and Somalia, “we are witnessing many of the same insurgency concerns
seen in Afghanistan and Iraq: non-state actors, ineffective governments and civil
institutions, military incompetence, tribal conflicts, and instances where conflict effects
spread across sovereign borders.” 210 Despite having a vested interest in ensuring the
effects of insurgency and terrorism do not spill over from these conflicts, the U.S has
resisted direct military participation thus far. 211
When domestic upheavals rocked the Middle East in the spring of 2011, “the
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“providing air and missile strikes and assisting the U.S.’s NATO partners with
intelligence and command and control – ‘leading from behind,’ in the words of an
anonymous administration official – and the United States showed no appetite for
participating in an effort to stabilize, much less rebuild, Libya in the aftermath of
Gaddafi’s fall.” 213
U.S. policy toward the civil war in Syria has been even more cautious. 214 Since 2012, the
United States has thus far avoided direct military participation in support of the various
groups fighting Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Moreover, U.S. officials have been very
reluctant and unwilling to provide weapons and funding to the Syrian Opposition. 215
Finally, “conflicts will continue to break out and the United States will continue
to be under frequent pressure to intervene in them.” 216 Thus, the U.S. may once again
need a counterinsurgency strategy to defeat an insurgency or terrorist group. 217 However,
before that day comes, two things must happen: (1) The United States must recognize
that counterinsurgency and nation-building operations take time. Thus, civilian and
military leaders must come up with clear political objectives before contributing U.S.
blood and treasure to overseas conflicts. More importantly, policy makers must do a
better job of explaining to the American people why it is important to support a conflict
or operation that could last years. (2) U.S. military leaders must continue to revise current
counterinsurgency doctrine so that it adopts a more realistic approach to what U.S. forces
are currently experiencing on the ground. Only then will the United States know whether
the lessons it has learned this past decade are adequate enough in meeting the challenges
posed by future counterinsurgency campaigns.
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